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Adviser: Professor Carol Gould 
All political communities set normative limits to the acceptable use of force. A threshold 
of atrocity indicates the point at which acceptable violence meets the boundaries of the 
unacceptable. In liberal democratic states such norms are ostensibly set higher. Hence, there is a 
theoretical threshold to the modern state’s ability to act in ways that violate norms it claims to 
uphold. Paradoxically, thresholds of atrocity are almost never breached and unconscionable 
violence occurs regularly. This study seeks to explain the persistence of extreme violence by 
developing a theory of atrocity grounded in moral vision. Liberal democratic nation-states are 
able to commit atrocities because they obscure these acts literally and metaphorically. Disguising 
violence in liberal democratic nation-states is further facilitated by the bureaucratic dispersion of 
responsibility characteristic of liberal nationalist ideology in particular, the conversion of liberal 
ideals into national myths, the mediation of moral information via a compliant news media 
system, and the adoption of technological means of violence that are inherently difficult to “see.” 
This raises an inescapable conclusion with radical normative implications: a great deal of the 
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I. LOOKING: At the Threshold of Atrocity 
 
“It will be seen again and again how characteristic of the whole process that we call civilization is this movement of 
segregation, this ‘hiding behind the scenes’ of what has become distasteful.” 
Norbert Elias 
 




All political communities set normative limits to the acceptable use of force. While 
human history is steeped in relentless mass slaughter, veritable orgies of sanguinary rage, some 
acts of violence are thought to go too far. At best, transgressions of these limits are met with 
widespread disapproval; at worst, revulsion, shock, and horror. The point at which acceptable 
violence meets the boundaries of the unconscionable I call a threshold of atrocity. Organized 
violence must always contend with the social reprobation passing beyond a threshold of atrocity 
implies. No political community has ever sanctioned unrestrained bloodletting as an end unto 
itself, not even the most warlike. While these unwritten social norms are informal, they have 
nevertheless acted as constraints on the use of force in practice throughout human history. 
To argue that violence is constrained by thresholds of atrocity might appear 
counterintuitive. History is rife with examples of violence that appear unrestrained by 
contemporary standards. One can scarcely ignore the apparent historical recurrence of what 
Primo Levi called “useless violence,” i.e. violence that advances no discernible military 
objectives and instead seems only to gratify sadistic impulses.1 No doubt, human communities 
have upheld and justified shocking levels of brutality against their enemies. Moral philosophers 
have occasionally concluded from the viciousness of human behavior that there cannot possibly 
be objective moral standards on matters of violence or indeed on the nature of good and bad 
                                                
1 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), chap. 5. 
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itself. As one representative account puts it, “We learn that all kinds of horrible practices are in 
this, that, or the other place, regarded as essential to virtue.” 
We find that there is nothing, or next to nothing, which has always and everywhere been 
regarded as morally good by all men. Where then is our universal morality? Can we, in 
the face of all this evidence, deny that it is nothing but an empty dream?2 
 
In the chapters that follow, I would like argue that there are indeed very good reasons for 
denying that it is an empty dream.  
Against the grisly record of history, we tend to think we know atrocities when we see 
them, that we are able to intuitively separate atrocious acts from the merely bad and thereby 
reserve for the perpetrators of those acts a special moral condemnation. Certainly, if we limit our 
reflections to particularly egregious manifestations of human violence (especially from the 
pacific serenity of our armchairs), moral judgment appears to be a deceptively straightforward 
affair. Of course genocide is wrong! Of course torture should not be a tool of state policy! How 
civilized we have become! We cannot fathom the torrents of blood spilled by our poor, ignorant 
ancestors in virtually all pre-modern societies and we congratulate ourselves for the moral 
progress this suggests. Yet, if one looks very closely into even the most gruesome historical 
cases, a rough framework governing the use of force usually reveals itself, offering insight into 
the toleration of acts that might, under very different circumstances, have instead been regarded 
as aberrant and atrocious. What is more, these norms are not so very different from our own 
shaky assumptions about the origins of violence and atrocity. 
Thresholds of atrocity vary dramatically across time and space, but it is nevertheless 
possible to identify patterns. For instance, while war-making has been a reliable adjunct to 
human civilization over the broad span of its existence, war itself has been commonly viewed as 
                                                
2 Walter Terence Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 14. 
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an unfortunate byproduct of the human experience, if not outright condemned as a lamentable 
evil. Where regulations governing the practice of warfare have been codified to a reasonable 
degree, the general social prohibitions to which these standards give expression remain strikingly 
similar across cases.3 This tells us something important—dare we say universal?—about 
prevailing moral concerns.4 Still, the formal or informal constraints placed upon the practice of 
warfare specifically are not the focus here. This study is instead concerned with the evolution of 
moral norms that would classify some forms of violence as acceptable, even desirable, and 
others as unjustifiable under any circumstances imaginable, i.e. atrocities. 
The unjustifiable nature of atrocities versus war in general is a crucial distinction. Few 
moral philosophers are prepared to argue that war is always unjust, but it would be difficult to 
find anyone, even the most dedicated act-utilitarian, who believes the perpetration of atrocities 
can ever be morally justifiable.5 From the Latin atrox, meaning heinous, cruel, or severe, the 
very word atrocity implies excess by definition. An atrocity is that which cannot be justified. The 
concept of justification of course relies on a consequentialist moral rubric; it looks to ends and 
outcomes. To the extent that conventional violence helps achieve a good state of affairs, some 
would argue it can be justified. “Violence,” as Arendt famously writes, “can be justifiable, but it 
                                                
3 On the moral prohibition against murder for example, see John Mikhail, “Is the Prohibition of Homicide 
Universal? Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law,” Brooklyn Law Review 75, no. 2 (2009): 497–515. 
4 For a useful look at the plausibility of universal moral norms from a range of philosophical traditions, see Gena 
Outka and John P. Reeder, eds., The Prospects for a Common Morality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993).  
5 One influential account argues against the notion that atrocities are morally justifiable within an act-utilitarian 
framework: “Where the tyrants who cause atrocities for the sake of Utopia are wrong is, surely, on the plain question 
of fact, and on confusing probabilities with certainties. After all, one would have to be very sure that future 
generations would be saved still greater misery before one embarked on such a tyrannical programme. … We can, in 
fact, agree with the most violent denouncer of atrocities carried out in the name of Utopia without sacrificing our 
act-utilitarian principles.” J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 63–64. For a rule-utilitarian discussion of moral conduct in war, see R. B. 
Brandt, “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 145–65. 
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will never be legitimate.”6 But what about forms of violence that are neither justifiable nor 
legitimate? Surely this unspoken counterpart to Arendt’s maxim must be that which lies beyond 
a threshold of atrocity. This study is interested first of all in what makes an atrocity atrocious 
and, by extension, why atrocities persist despite apparently strong and persistent moral 
prohibitions. 
In this, the introductory chapter of my study, I have two aims. The first is to demonstrate 
the existence of minimal norms governing the use of physical force throughout history. By doing 
this, my claim that all political communities establish thresholds of atrocity should become 
plausible. While it is virtually impossible to know for sure how certain forms of violence would 
have been interpreted by our ancestors across all levels of society, one can learn much from 
proto-legal standards set against some violent practices at different times and in different places.  
At no time in human history has violence ever been unaccompanied by basic norms of 
conduct. Rather, in case upon case, standards emerge that proscribe some forms and targets of 
violence. Examples include the desecration or mutilation of corpses, killing those who lay down 
their arms, killing women and children, killing noncombatant men, killing in violation of treaties, 
killing clerics, the destruction of holy sites, and cannibalism, to name just a few of the most 
commonly proscribed practices. Indeed, the concerns taken up by contemporary international 
law are not so very different. While ancient and pre-modern norms were by no means uniformly 
recognized or even enforced, their existence demonstrates that the myth of human prehistory as a 
time of absolute and unhinged violence is just that, a myth. 
The second aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of a threshold of atrocity 
developed in subsequent chapters. Adapting Norbert Elias’s work on thresholds of shame and 
                                                
6 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allen Lane, 1970), 52. 
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repugnance, I argue that a threshold of atrocity can be stretched, perhaps indefinitely, by moving 
practices out of sight—literally and metaphorically. Elias traces the emergence of European 
social mores governing sexual behavior, bodily functions, and table manners as these practices 
evolved according to what he calls the “civilizing process.” Thresholds of shame and repugnance 
inevitably shift over time, rendering practices long tolerated suddenly unacceptable, impolite, or 
simply uncivilized. By his account, many of these standards were instigated by courtly practices 
that originally served to distinguish and underscore class associations along with their attendant 
practices.  
Following Elias’s lead, I emphasize literal and metaphorical vision as a key moral 
component to a coherent theory of atrocity. Elias’s argument is often misread as one that draws 
observations about qualitative changes in social practices, but the process he describes is far less 
linear. More often, the changes he describes are of a superficial quality and leave the essential 
core intact. Some social practices move out of sight, others cease, while still others carry on as 
before under a different guise. His work helps us to understand not only how norms against 
certain forms of violence arise, but also how the perpetrators of horrific violence are able to 
disguise their behavior by circumventing the threshold, moving their unsavory activities beyond 
phenomenological reach. 
 
The Spectre of Melos 
In 416 BCE, during the second phase of the Peloponnesian War, Athens committed an 
act of atrocity that has since become legendary. While aggressively pursuing expansionist 
designs beyond its immediate borders, the putative Athenian empire redoubled military efforts in 
the Cyclades. When the residents of the island of Melos asked to retain formal neutrality in the 
war, their appeals were rebuffed. Instead, Athens offered the islanders a chilling ultimatum: 
 6 
submit or face annihilation. Thucydides famously restated the cruel and calculated position 
expressed by Athens in response to Melian protestations: 
[E]ach of us must exercise what power he really thinks he can, and we know and you 
know that in the human realm, justice is enforced only among those who can be equally 
constrained by it, and that those who have power use it, while the weak make 
compromises.7 
 
Faced with servitude or death, the Melians opted for the latter. True to their word, the Athenians 
swiftly crushed the resistance, slaughtered all the men of military age they could capture, sold 
the women and children into slavery, and repopulated the island with 500 colonists. Some have 
described the ruthless episode as an early instance of genocide.8 Certainly, the might-makes-right 
mentality expressed by the Athenians remains a favored illustration of cold-blooded power 
politics, particularly among proponents of the realist school of international relations theory.9 
 How would the average citizen of Athens have perceived the slaughter at Melos? 
Unwilling as ever to express his personal views of the events he recounts, Thucydides 
nevertheless provides clues as to what he must have regarded as unusual behavior. Helen Law 
writes that in his account of the sack of Mycalessus, during which Thracian forces allied with 
Athens slaughtered and pillaged despite the city’s surrender, Thucydides “shows that such a 
massacre of inhabitants and destruction of a city was not merely unusual but a unique instance 
and distinctly barbarian rather than Greek.”10 The attack included the highly unusual killing of 
                                                
7 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.89. I rely on the following translation: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian 
War, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 227. 
8 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 65–73. 
9 Michael Doyle, “Thucydidean Realism,” Review of International Studies 16, no. 3 (1990): 223–37; Michael T. 
Clark, “Realism Ancient and Modern: Thucydides and International Relations,” PS: Political Science and Politics 
26, no. 3 (1994): 491–94; Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,” 
International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 131–53. 
10 Helen H. Law, “Atrocities in Greek Warfare,” The Classical Journal 15, no. 3 (1919): 142. Emphasis added. 
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not only men but also women and children, the aged and infirm alike. Such brutality was 
typically reserved only for revolting colonies. Neutrality was generally respected and there is 
evidence that some were dismayed by Athens’ violation of this norm.  
Euripides’s play The Trojan Women, produced shortly after the massacre at Melos, has 
been widely interpreted as an allegorical critique of Athens’ proto-genocidal outburst.11 The play 
centers on several Trojan women after their city is sacked, their husbands killed, and many 
citizens taken as slaves. In one scene, Poseidon condemns excessive and wanton violence:  
That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool 
if he gives the temples and the tombs, the hallowed places  
of the dead, to desolation. His own turn must come.12 
 
Xenophon also offers a glimpse into popular perceptions of Athenian brutality. As Athens faced 
defeat near the end of the war, he writes that citizens expressed fear over the retribution in store 
for them over Melos specifically as well as other ravaged communities:  
[D]uring that night no one slept, all mourning, not for the lost alone, but far more for 
their own selves thinking that they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon 
the Melians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, after reducing them by siege, and upon the 
Histiaeans and Scionaeans and Toronaeans and Aeginetans and many other Greek 
peoples.13 
 
If they had not previously considered the moral implications of Athenian cruelty, defeat forced 
Athenian citizens to fear the looming repercussions. 
If we look to other cases besides the extraordinary brutality of the Peloponnesian War, 
we find that conventional warfare does not seem to have been treated as a good unto itself in 
                                                
11 For a sophisticated account of The Trojan Women as a cypher for Euripides’ own political sensibilities, see N.T. 
Croally, Euripidean Polemic: The Trojan Women and the Function of Tragedy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
12 Euripides, The Trojan Women 95-97. See Euripides, “The Trojan Women,” in Greek Tragedies, ed. Mark Griffith 
and Glenn W. Most, trans. Richmond Lattimore, Third edition, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
13 Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3-4. I rely on the following translation: Xenophon, Hellenica, vol. 1, Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 103–105. 
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antiquity. This does not mean, however, that war was not widely perceived as useful for 
achieving glories; it was. Greek society, including even Plato and Aristotle to some extent, 
embraced warfare as the “essence of a civic militarist ideal.”14 Still, a recognition of potential 
glories to be claimed within the norms of conventional warfare is not at all the same as 
advocating war as an end in itself. For the Greeks, war could be justified only on the assumption 
of worthy objectives. We see this in Herodotus, for example, when the victorious Persians ask 
the captured Lydian King Croesus why he chose to attack them. He replies: “The god of the 
Greeks encouraged me to fight you: the blame is his. No one is fool enough to choose war 
instead of peace—in peace sons bury fathers, but in war fathers bury sons.”15 Though sometimes 
necessary or inevitable, war still was not preferable to peace. As Zampaglione writes, “Although 
they judged [war] a legitimate instrument for settling disputes between communities, the Greeks 
were in no doubt that it was a painful necessity.”16  
Even the bloody Homeric epics reflect this pacifist sentiment to a degree. While The Iliad 
is, at heart, a story about vendetta and mass slaughter on a staggering scale, the “poem of 
force”17 nevertheless contains occasional but emphatic anti-war messages. “At the very least,” 
Creer argues, “[The Iliad is] an example of the sorrows and horrors of war, if not an outright 
indictment of it and of the kingly powers which promote its being waged.”18 The Olympian gods, 
                                                
14 Doyne Dawson, The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1996), 161. 
15 Herodotus, Histories 1.87. I rely on the following translation: Herodotus, The Histories, ed. John Marincola, trans. 
Aubrey De Sélincourt (New York: Penguin, 2003). 
16 Gerardo Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace In Antiquity, trans. Richard Dunn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1973), 18. 
17 Simone Weil, “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” trans. Mary McCarthy, The Chicago Review 8, no. 2 (1965): 5–
30.  
18 Tyler A. Creer, “Echoes of Peace: Anti-War Sentiment in the Iliad and Heike Monogatari and Its Manifestation in 
Dramatic Tradition” (Masters Thesis, Brigham Young University, 2014), 6. 
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despite lending their assistance to various factions over the course of the Trojan War, all seem to 
agree the war itself was regrettable. Zeus openly denounces his son, the war god Ares, for his 
reckless pursuit of destruction for destruction’s sake: “You—I hate you most of all the Olympian 
gods. Always dear to your heart strife, yes, and battles, the bloody grind of war.”19 No stranger 
to conflict himself, Zeus remained nevertheless intolerant of war as an end.  
Such moments are easy to overlook given the sheer abundance of carnage depicted in 
Homer’s epic, instances of cruelty so disturbing they verge on psychopathy. When Menelaus is 
prepared to spare the life of a Trojan soldier defeated on the battlefield, Agamemnon intervenes, 
slays the man on the spot, and furthermore calls for what we would now call genocide: 
Why such concern for enemies? I suppose you got 
such tender loving care at home from the Trojans.  
Ah would to god not one of them could escape 
his sudden plunging death beneath our hands! 
No baby boy still in his mother’s belly, 
not even he escape—all Ilium blotted out, 
no tears for their lives, no markers for their graves!20  
 
These bellicose moments are nevertheless tempered by a clear recognition that war is a 
lamentable enterprise. Menelaus, the only character with any meaningful stake in the war, 
expresses his desire for a hasty end to the violence. To this, the Achaean and Trojan forces 
respond with relief that the “agonies of war” would soon be at an end.21 
The Homeric epics are obviously not strict historical accounts. We must consider them in 
their artistic context, as legendary versions of events long past even in their own time. Legends 
are prone to exaggeration and the historicity of the events Homer describes in The Iliad is 
disputed. If the era of Homeric heroes witnessed even a small fraction of the violence depicted, it 
                                                
19 Homer, Iliad 5.1030-1032. I rely on the following translation for this and all subsequent references: Homer, The 
Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990). 
20 Homer, Iliad 6.66-70. 
21 Homer, Iliad 3.135-136. 
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is unclear how such bloodbaths would have been perceived by ordinary people—the peasant 
masses struggling to survive as sanguinary fury engulfed their lives. While those who 
participated in the warrior society may indeed have shared Agamemnon’s bloodthirsty rapture, it 
is less obvious that his enthusiasm would have extended across all sectors of society, especially 
among those who stood to suffer immensely from the prospect of war. 
Already in The Iliad, there are clear indications of a desire to regulate bloodshed, to set 
limits on organized brutality by separating acceptable violence from unacceptable violence. The 
Odyssey goes further in this regard; the warriors agree to ban the use of poisoned arrows and 
prisoners of war receive much better treatment, ransomed rather than executed. There are two 
issues we must acknowledge, however: first, the general distaste for conventional war does not 
rise to its absolute prohibition. War is thought to be necessary on occasion, e.g. wars of defense, 
retaliation, survival, glory, etc. Second, notwithstanding the reluctant endorsement of war, some 
violent practices are nonetheless thought to be unacceptable under any circumstances. Hence, the 
early attempts to condemn some forms of violence as atrocious even in the midst of the already 
unpleasant endeavor of war.  
The impetus behind the second issue may have stemmed from moral, religious, or 
instrumental objections, but it is here we find some of the very earliest attempts to set 
prohibitions governing the use of force. Though we tend to think of antiquity as a period of “total 
war,” devoid of any restraints on the practice of war-making, the reality was quite the opposite. 
Bederman argues that “the enemy–foe distinction [in antiquity] tended to privilege public 
combatants, and that that extended to deeply observed restraints on the conduct of hostilities.”22 
Public war against a common foe was not, at least notionally, a license for the suspension 
of the norms of human decency. Excesses, atrocities, and outrages were to be expected. 
But that was very different from imagining that they were to be the norm in warfare. 
                                                
22 David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 242. 
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Even the Israelite tradition of compulsory war, pursued with the single-minded purpose 
of exterminating the enemy without any restraints on the means or objectives of conflict, 
gave way to something different over time. Greek and Roman practices, although by no 
means uniform or civilized, showed the same progression.23 
 
We should also acknowledge that wherever standards governing the use of force arise, they tend 
to reflect the particular interests of the society (and especially the class) from which they emerge. 
As already mentioned, the glorification of war depicted in Homer via Agamemnon reflects the 
interests of a pre-Homeric warring aristocratic class, for whom war was widely perceived as a 
path to honor and glory. Obvious limitations prevent us from knowing how this might have 
differed from society at large. As Weeks points out, “the writing of history seldom includes 
description of the feelings of common folk.”24  
A large number of such hoi polloi were the people, after all, who made up the audiences 
of performances staged in the huge outdoor theaters of ancient Greece and Rome. 
Literate people, that tiny minority in ancient times, must also have been affected by what 
they read from the pens of those few writers of the ‘‘intelligentsia,’’ who found killing in 
war to be repugnant.25 
 
The moments of hesitation concerning unrestrained brutality that do exist in later antiquity then 
surely offer a glimpse into attitudes that must have been more in line with the concerns of wider 
society. Moreover, the very existence of an “intelligentsia” reflects the shift in political power 
away from Homeric warlords to the popular orientation we now associate with the rise of the 
polis and especially the robust cultural life of Athenian society. 
None of this is to say that popular attitudes necessarily translated into tangible constraints 
on the use of force in practice. It is important to separate the existence of long term agreements 
or formally recognized standards of conduct across the classical world—of which there were 
                                                
23 Ibid., 248. Emphasis added. 
24 Albert L. Weeks, The Choice of War: The Iraq War and the “Just War” Tradition (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2010), 15. 
25 Ibid. 
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none as far as we know—and a body of informal normative standards which did exist in various 
forms. Violating these informal norms would have been justifiable cause for indignation. So 
while none of the surviving evidence provides what we might identify as an early form of 
international law, it does show that norms of behavior existed at all levels of Greek society, not 
merely during war but in multiple areas of life. As they pertained to war specifically, these 
standards were by the late fifth century BCE referred to as the koina nomina, or common 
customs, of the Hellenes.26  
Ober sums up what he believes represented “in descending order of formality” the most 
important among these standards: 
• The state of war should be officially declared before commencing hostilities against 
an appropriate foe; sworn treaties and alliances should be regarded as binding. 
• Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate: sacred truces, especially those declared for 
the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed. 
• Hostilities against certain persons and in certain places are inappropriate: the 
inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of the gods, especially 
heralds and suppliants, should be respected. 
• Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies should be respected. 
• After a battle it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to request the return of 
one’s dead is tantamount to admitting defeat. 
• A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance of the challenge. 
• Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom rather than being summarily executed 
or mutilated. 
• Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained. 
• War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be primary targets of 
attack. 
• Battles should be fought during usual (summer) campaign 
• Use of [non-standard] arms should be limited. 
• Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in duration.27 
 
It appears that hundreds of years after the Homeric era, the standardization of war conduct was 
already quite well-established. The role of religion in ancient Greece was an especially important 
                                                
26 See Thucydides, 3.59.1. Euripides Heraclidae 1010 
27 Josiah Ober, “Classical Greek Times,” in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, ed. 
George J. Andreopoulos and Mark Schulman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 13. 
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factor underwriting the legitimacy of these norms, as is clearly reflected in the standards above 
involving the desecration of temples, proper funerary practices and handling of corpses, the 
sanctity of treaties, and the inviolability of heralds. Several of these standards seem merely to 
facilitate practical matters that would have appealed to the warring classes but been largely 
matters of indifference to civilians and peasants.  
These standards reflect a general desire for fairness that is admittedly rare in Homer’s 
epics, where there are no distinctions to be made between Greek and barbarian, no specified 
warring season, and in which dirty tricks like the notorious Trojan horse are apparently valid 
strategies. But would violation of these norms inspire mere indignation or would grievous 
violations evoke great distress among warrior and civilian alike? How were minor transgressions 
considered next to serious violations? It is difficult to know for sure but it is at least clear that 
proto-humanitarian concerns were not a novel prospect for the Greeks. Nevertheless, these 
standards offer a glimpse into only a very narrow sector of society and tell us little about the 
average citizen, and still less the average woman or slave. Whatever the threshold of atrocity, 
Ober argues that the koina nomina were largely respected in the practice of Greek warfare 
between 700 and 450 BCE and then broke down during the Peloponnesian War with the 
atrocities like the one at Melos. While the century immediately following the war experienced 
the gradual erosion of these standards in practice, by no means should we assume that they 
disappeared as normative ideals. 
Similar “cultural regulations of violence” developed beyond Greece as well.28 Crowe 
offers a comprehensive survey of atrocities in the pre-modern world with important 
developments in norms of conduct beyond the Greeks, including the Assyrian, Egyptian, 
                                                
28 Michael Howard, “Constraints on Warfare,” in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, 
ed. George J. Andreopoulos and Mark Schulman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 1. 
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Hebrew, Persian, Indian, and Chinese civilizations. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to 
comprehensively recount every historical case, but several notable examples are worth 
mentioning. In every case Crowe cites in the pre-modern world, norms governing the use of 
force arose to set limits and restrain what was perceived as more extreme forms of violence.29  
The Sumerian-Akkadian poem, the Epic of Gilgamesh suggests that war itself was 
permissible only in self-defense or commanded by the gods but that once initiated, there were 
virtually no restrictions on its prosecution. By some accounts, ancient Egypt’s imperialistic New 
Kingdom avoided the summary execution of defeated enemies and instead encouraged 
combatants to either cut off a limb or take them as slaves. The Hebrews, in a pattern that remains 
constant across many societies, seem to have tolerated nearly unrestrained violence against 
enemies, placing limits only on inter-Jewish violence. In Persia, Cyrus II the Great was 
apparently regarded as a much more humane ruler than his contemporaries and immediate 
predecessors, and there are numerous other examples.30 
We should be wary of overstating the case. Antiquity was an undoubtedly bloody place 
with forms of physical violence that would horrify us today. As far as we know, until the rise of 
Christianity and the development of just war theory, no one with the means to do so raised major 
objections to the horrors of war, whether defensive or aggressive. While the Romans introduced 
the limited concept of humanitas, no equivalent notion existed in ancient Greek.31 A general 
acceptance of war as a reality of life seems to have prevailed instead.  
Nevertheless, the informal norms that did emerge in antiquity and elsewhere around the 
world are the precursor to contemporary international law, and military practice has evolved on 
                                                
29 David M. Crowe, War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice: A Global History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
chap. 1. 
30 I rely on Crowe’s account in this paragraph. Ibid. 
31 Weeks, The Choice of War, 14.  
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lines first established there. The basic technological innovations of war leading away from spears 
and swords to guns and bombs has dramatically increased the distance between combatants. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles are only the latest in a series of technological revolutions that have 
dramatically altered the prosecution of military violence. In part because of these changes, many 
would argue that there has been a gradual diminishing of human violence over the centuries, 
both qualitative and quantitative, as many brutal practices have been recognized as objectively 
immoral and unacceptable. At least until the horrors of the twentieth century unsettled this 
optimistic view of moral progress, conventional wisdom seems to have regarded contemporary 
human behavior as more “civilized” than that of our forebears. It is to this question we now turn. 
 
Vision and the Civilizing Process 
Recent empirical research seems to demonstrate that violence throughout history—
including mass atrocity—has declined over the centuries and plummeted with the emergence of 
industrial capitalism and the rise the modern state. In a book that received a great deal of 
attention outside the academy, Harvard neuroscientist Stephen Pinker argues “the artifices of 
civilization have moved us in a noble direction.”32 Citizens of modern democratic nation-states, 
he argues, are much less likely to suffer a violent death than were their pre-state tribal ancestors. 
According to Pinker, “violence has declined over long stretches of time.”33 This salutary change 
has ushered in not only a more peaceful world, but perhaps “the most peaceable era in our 
species’ existence.”34 In his view, the average daily brutality of pre-modern times far exceeded 
anything we see today, notwithstanding either the horrors of the prior century or the grisly 
                                                
32 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2012), xxi. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., xx. 
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content of our Twitter feeds. Before the modern state (and especially the liberal-democratic 
state) imposed social order, human existence very much resembled a Hobbesian state of nature; a 
great many lives ended violently. Because of its emphasis on the order-making power of the 
modern Leviathan, we can call this a neo-Hobbesian argument. 
While the numbers remain a matter of some dispute,35 let us assume Pinker is correct in 
his basic claim that violence has declined. At least as a percentage of the population, perhaps it is 
true that fewer people are brutally murdered by covetous neighbors today than during the Bronze 
Age. Leaving aside the immense violence that has typically accompanied state-formation, 
perhaps it also true that the modern state bears a great deal of responsibility for this change. 
Perhaps it is even true, as Pinker argues strenuously, that the liberal-democratic state contributes 
to the pacific changes he sees.36 Even if we concede all these points, Pinker’s argument remains 
incomplete.  
While the crude percentage of violent deaths may have plummeted, the numbers have not 
and the technological potential for human aggression has dramatically increased—whether via 
the lingering threat of total annihilation posed by the development of nuclear weapons or 
weapons designed to “humanize” war like so-called smart bombs and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Moreover, some find the emphasis on statistics a crude rubric for measuring moral progress. As 
the political theorist George Kateb writes in response to those who would celebrate a supposed 
decline in violence on the basis of statistics alone, “such a concern for percentages rather than for 
                                                
35 Taleb and Douady claim Pinker exaggerates a statistically insignificant change. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb and 
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absolute numbers is, in fact, part of the mentality that makes large-scale atrocities possible. The 
failure to take seriously nothing but percentages shows a callousness that is part, though a 
familiar part, of the story of humanly inflicted suffering all through time.”37 Scholarship that 
attempts to reduce the complexities of human affairs to statistical analysis risks producing crude 
conclusions. When considering the apparent exception to his argument presented by the horrors 
of the twentieth century, Pinker writes that it would seem like a “monstrous disrespect to the 
victims” to suggest their deaths were unfortunate result of a statistical aberration—yet he makes 
precisely that claim just a few lines later.38 According to his argument, Nazism reflects a 
statistical anomaly and would have remained a mere footnote in German history had Adolf Hitler 
pursued art instead of politics.39  
None of this is to say that Pinker is wrong to celebrate a decline in violence, just that the 
decline he identifies appears significant in part because the definition of violence he uses. That 
said, it is not particularly important to my argument whether or not Pinker is correct about 
violence. While a number of compelling challenges have cast doubt on some of Pinker’s central 
claims, my interest in his argument is rather different from the objections raised by these 
critiques.40 In his eagerness to emphasize the decline in violence, Pinker implausibly denies that 
Nazism represents anything more complicated than a strand of “counter-Enlightenment 
utopianism.”41 Whereas Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Aimé Cesaire, Franz Fanon, Max 
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39 Ibid., 208–209. 
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Horkheimer, and others since have attempted to untangle the origins of Nazi ideology and its 
troubling relationship to the Enlightenment, Pinker never once cites the relevant work.42 In an 
endnote, he names Zgymunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, and Theodor Adorno43 and dismisses 
their work as “ludicrous, if not obscene.”44 Pinker does, however, favorably cite one post-war 
European social theorist. He describes the German sociologist Norbert Elias as “the greatest 
thinker you have never heard of”45 and devotes an entire chapter of his book to applying Elias’s 
ostensible insights to his own overarching claims about violence.46 Unfortunately, Pinker’s 
analysis is predicated on a misreading of Elias’s work. While he portrays Elias as a neo-
Hobbesian advocate for a powerful Leviathan, a more faithful reading reveals a deep 
ambivalence, even opposition, to the positions Pinker attributes to him. 
 Norbert Elias’s masterpiece, The Civilizing Process, is a study in two volumes of the 
evolution of European social mores.47 It documents, in short, the trend of moving practices 
deemed unpleasant out of view, i.e. the civilizing process. Despite the connotations of the word 
“civilization” in English, the process Elias describes has very little to do with the historically 
imperialistic and racist use of the term. Instead, he argues that the very idea of civilization is 
constructed via elaborate processes of social differentiation that establish boundaries of correct 
and incorrect behavior—proper modes of conduct among social classes, genders, races, etc. The 
civilizing process produces the gradual refinement of social norms governing behavior in 
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relation to nudity, defecation and urination, table manners, blowing one’s nose, sexual relations, 
and the slaughter of animals. As attitudes governing social norms shifted in the courts of 
European nobility, modes of conduct formerly tolerated or even encouraged became impolite, 
rude, boorish—in short, less “civilized.” Meanwhile, other forms of behavior moved in the 
opposite direction and gained widespread acceptance. 
Elias’s analysis helps explain a great deal about the emergence of technologies designed 
to render unpleasant social practices invisible, or at least less visible. The evolution of violence 
and its attendant technologies is of immediate interest to us for the purposes of this study, 
especially insofar as those practices relate to state power. Changes in manners and courtly 
practices, Elias argues, occurred alongside a shift away from private violence to a Weberian state 
monopoly of violence. Insofar as Elias can be read as an advocate of centralized state power as a 
solution to private violence, his theory at first appears to justify a broadly Hobbesian conclusion. 
This is precisely how Steven Pinker deploys his work in the full chapter he devotes to the 
civilizing process. Yet Elias himself was personally ambivalent about what the “civilizing 
process” meant. 
The changes instigated by the modern state, Elias insists, were often Janus-faced and the 
emergence of proto-capitalist economics sometimes produced no more than superficial changes 
in social practices. The reorganization of social activity, even when dramatic and revolutionary, 
does not necessarily alter the thrust of that activity. Put differently, many of the transformations 
Elias describes did not occur at the phenomenal level. Whether moving in or out of favor, 
changes in the form of social practices do not fundamentally alter the core behavior to which the 
practices in question are associated. Whether eating with a fork or shoveling food into one’s 
mouth by hand, basic nourishment or gustatory pleasure remain the unaltered principal 
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objectives. Yet the means by which these objectives were achieved (with the assistance of eating 
utensils) were rendered less messy, according to shifting social standards. Elias concedes as 
much when he points to concealment and distancing as the primary methods associated with the 
civilizing process.48 Urination and defecation, as well as audible belching and passing of gas 
were no longer to be tolerated in plain view and certainly not among people of quality. No one 
imagines for a second that basic corporeal processes ceased, just that the appropriate sphere in 
which these impulses should be indulged was transferred out of sight. “It will be seen again and 
again,” Elias writes, “how characteristic of the whole process that we call civilization is this 
movement of segregation, this ‘hiding behind the scenes’ of what has become distasteful.”49 In 
other words, the changes associated with the civilizing process are often of form and not of 
content. In using his work to argue the latter, Pinker mischaracterizes the thrust of Elias’ 
contribution. 
Elias points to three factors at work in the civilizing process. They include first, a gradual 
shift away from external social constraints imposed upon the individuals to a situation in which 
individuals rely increasingly on self-restraint; second, the development of a social context in 
which the constraints placed on spontaneous eruptions of emotional or behavioral expression 
become more stable; third, an increasing sense of solidarity and identification between people in 
a given society, across classes and other social divisions. In this way, the modern state achieves 
internal pacification and a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence. Elias’s recognition that 
this process typically involves bloodshed as political rivals consolidate power anticipates Charles 
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Tilly’s famous assertion that “war made states, and vice versa.”50 A significant factor in the shift 
away from private violence can be found, Tilly argues, “in the increasing ability of state to 
monitor, control, and monopolize the effective means of violence.”51  
The complementary relationship between state centralization, military force, and proto-
capitalist economics produces the playing field in which Elias’s civilizing process occurs. Yet in 
many cases, the violence displaced by the state merely changes hands. If the twentieth century is 
any guide, there appears to be an enormous body of evidence that the transfer of violence from 
private hands to state control does not necessarily reduce overall violence. Indeed, Tilly opens 
the relevant chapter of his book by describing the twentieth century as the “most bellicose” in 
history.52 Elias, himself a Jewish refugee who fled the rise of Nazism, struggled with the grim 
realities of the camps and sought to explain the variables contributing to “decivilizing 
processes.”53 His conclusion, absent in Pinker’s account, is that the civilizing process is not a 
linear march to a neo-Hobbesian teleology. Rather, it is a process by which some practices, 
though they may persist and even crescendo, are hidden away. If Elias is correct, the drive to 
obscure might just as easily discourage unseemly practices in some cases as it might facilitate 
them in others. 
A better reading of Elias than Pinker manages to offer, one that takes into account the 
centrality of visibility to the civilizing process, can be found in a study of industrial meat 
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production by the political theorist Timothy Pachirat. In the course of his work, Elias moves 
from manners to the slaughter and consumption of animals. He details the emergence of new 
culinary practices aimed at de-fabricating animals so that smaller, less readily identifiable parts 
would discourage consumers from drawing a clear mental connection between the animal’s flesh 
on their fork and a formerly intact, living body. Animal rights activists frequently point out the 
new words brought into use to further establish a mental distance between the living animal and 
its flesh as food. Pig becomes pork, cow becomes beef. As the metamorphosis from animal to 
commodity takes place, the act of eating is further alienated from the unpleasant sights and 
sounds of the slaughterhouse. Considering the rise of industrial capitalism and our present world 
of supermarket shelves stocked to the brim with a plenitude of shrink-wrapped animal parts, 
Elias’s work is veritably prescient. Abattoirs have moved ever further out of sight—to the point 
that the public is often legally prevented from filming or even viewing what goes on inside a 
factory farm54—while cheap meat is more readily accessible than at any other time in human 
history. 
In this vein, Timothy Pachirat picks up where Elias left off. Working undercover as a day 
laborer in an abattoir, he managed to observe what few today ever do: the killing and butchering 
of cattle on an industrial scale. His research documents how the system of industrial slaughter is 
enabled via mechanisms Norbert Elias identified in The Civilizing Process. Pachirat’s most 
important insights come from his discussion of dispersed responsibility, an application he 
acknowledges has implications for scholarly analysis in many other fields.55 Even as the remote 
physical location of the abattoir itself allows for a carnivorous public to avoid the ethical 
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questions attending the industrial production of meat as a commodity, the division of 
responsibilities within the abattoir itself also disperses these questions even among the very 
people engaged in the bloody labor. Pachirat’s normative project advocates a “politics of sight” 
he hopes will counter the current state of affairs: invisible people working in invisible locations 
abusing, slaughtering, and butchering invisible animals all to produce a visible shrink-wrapped 
piece of food—a true commodity in the Marxian sense, possessing an existence alienated from 
the social relations that produced it.  
In total, Pachirat identifies 121 separate responsibilities within the abattoir he observed, 
ranging from “spinal cord remover” (a self-explanatory task) to the “bung dropper,” responsible 
for cutting the large intestines away from the anus. Only one person is responsible for the act of 
killing itself, the “knocker,” who uses an air gun to drive a captive-steel bolt into the cows’ 
foreheads—one every twelve seconds. The isolation of these tasks, Pachirat argues by way of 
Elias, encourages a distancing from the act of killing itself for everyone but the knocker, a 
marginal job characterized by a high rate of turnover. Upon announcing his intention to work as 
a knocker, Pachirat’s co-workers urge him against it. 
“Man that will mess you up. Knockers have to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist or 
whatever they’re called every three months.” 
“Really? Why?” 
“Because, man, that’s killing … that shit will fuck you up for real.”56 
 
Clearly, for these workers, the division of labor in the abattoir itself obscures their own 
participation in the same system that transforms living creatures into commodities and 
establishes a moral hierarchy of tasks in which butchering dead meat is distinguished from 
killing a live animal. “These zones [of confinement],” Pachirat writes “segregate the work of 
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killing not only from the ordinary members of society but also at what might be expected to be 
the most explicitly violent site of all: the kill floor.”57 One further illustration demonstrates the 
profound visual component to such moral judgments. Pachirat opens his book by describing the 
outpouring of public anger when, after several cattle escaped from a slaughterhouse holding pen 
in Omaha, one was cornered by police and summarily shot to death.58 No similar outrage was 
expressed for the cow’s originally intended fate, provided it occurs out of sight, behind abattoir 
walls. One method of slaughter is acceptable; the other is not. 
 
Thresholds of Atrocity 
Timothy Pachirat is obviously writing about cattle, not humans, and the moral status of 
eating animals remains unsettled and controversial59 (if not the means of procuring it).60 Still, his 
sharp analysis of distancing, especially physical and linguistic, inevitably raises the specter of 
Nazi atrocities and the mass murder of human beings in general. Whether the slaughter of 
animals or of humans, moral distancing reduces our capacity for moral vision when the acts in 
question are too unpleasant for plain sight. 
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Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg were of course the first to reflect with any depth on the 
moral problems posed by the role of bureaucratization in the Nazi holocaust.61 One particular 
innovation stands out. In the early days of the Nazi genocide, German officers grew concerned 
with the high rates of psychological distress among soldiers of the Einsatzgruppen. Execution by 
firing squad was still the primary means of murdering prisoners at the time and the German army 
was concerned—for the executioners. In bureaucratic terms, executions of this kind are labor-
intensive and psychologically traumatic for the executioners. “The execution of women and 
children,” Saul Friedländer writes, “seemed to [Heinrich] Himmler to be too stressful for his 
commando members; toxic gas was more promising.”62 Hence, the notorious method of 
asphyxiating prisoners was developed as a solution to this dilemma, first in trucks with engine 
exhaust, later in dedicated gas chambers with Zyklon-B gas, a pesticide. 
The act of gassing, moreover, was divided into a series of individually minor tasks: 
flipping a switch, opening a hatch, shutting a door, etc. Each of these seemingly minor actions 
would be assigned to a different soldier and often to other prisoners themselves, thereby 
significantly dispersing a perception of responsibility for the mass murder among a larger whole 
in much the same way Pachirat describes in the abattoir. Just as the workers in Pachirat’s abattoir 
refused to acknowledge the moral questions stemming from their own participation in a system 
of killing, however small, so the average Nazi prison guard could not fathom why he or she 
should be held to account for the genocide.63 
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In his analysis of Elias, Burkitt sheds light on how the civilizing process might itself 
contribute to innovations in the use of violence. He cites gruesome examples of medieval 
European violence of a kind Michel Foucault would have described as “sovereign power”64 
before claiming that exhibitions of actual spectacular violence are no longer possible today, in 
part, because of changes associated with the civilizing process. Even Hitler, he writes, was 
constrained by trends governing forms of violence subject to social approval or approbation.  
Even a tyrant like Hitler could not display the power of the state that he commanded in 
such a way. The Holocaust took place ‘behind the scenes’, in concentration camps mainly 
outside of Germany, and their existence was never officially acknowledged. … As Elias 
emphasizes, when something moves behind the scenes it corresponds to something that 
people find distasteful or totally abhorrent; the knowledge of what has disappeared is not 
completely erased, but continues to exist in the unconscious as knowledge that is denied 
or repressed. It is darkly ambivalent to contemplate, but these aspects of the ‘civilizing’ 
process may have made it possible for the Holocaust to happen in the way that it did.65 
 
Moreover, the physical isolation of mass slaughter of both animals and humans is complemented 
by a kind of calculated semantic duplicity designed, as Orwell famously observed, “to make lies 
sound truthful and murder respectable.”66 Cows are not slaughtered; they are processed. Pachirat 
describes the abattoir as a place “where the linguistic leap from steer to steak, from heifer to 
hamburger is enacted.”67 We see a similar form of distancing in Arendt’s chilling description of 
the “language rules” adopted by the Nazis to obscure the grisly content of internal 
correspondence. “The prescribed code names for killing” she writes, “were ‘final solution,’ 
‘evacuation’ (Aussiedlung), and ‘special treatment’ (Sonderbehandlung); deportation … received 
the names of ‘resettlement’ (Umsiedlung) and ‘labor in the East’ (Arbeitseinsatz im Osten).”68  
                                                
64 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
65 Ian Burkitt, “Civilization and Ambivalence,” The British Journal of Sociology 47, no. 1 (March 1996): 145. 
Emphasis added. 
66 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George 
Orwell, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), 139. 
67 Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 30. 
68 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 2006), 85. 
 27 
The human capacity for ignoring the ethical consequences of participation in a larger 
system, especially when responsibility for systemic outcomes can be imputed to those with 
authority, reveals something very dark about ourselves. From the Milgram experiment on, the 
field of social psychology has attempted to understand how “good” people go “bad,” but these 
questions ultimately fall short. It is simply not the case that objectively “good” people go 
objectively “bad,” but rather the shifting sands of social expectation express more or less 
tolerance of some forms of violence than others.  
In this vein, George Kateb argues that mass atrocities arise both from the hyperactive 
imagination of those in power and the inactive imagination, or moral blindness, of those who 
unthinkingly carry out their leaders’ aesthetic vision. 
The initiators introduce the aesthetically compelling fictions and stories, redefinitions of 
the world through new or rearranged categories, that seduce the susceptible, including 
themselves. But the fanatical drive to realize what has been hyperactively imagined to 
make actually present what has hitherto been absent, could not proceed unless the 
initiators and leaders used their capacity, all the while, to make absent what is present. 
The people they lead and the people they destroy must cease being people in their eyes, 
must lose their humanity and become unreal or less real or caricatures of reality. On the 
other hand, it helps that the followers, to be suitable instruments, must have an added 
incentive to stay, in their own way, blind in what they do. This blindness, which is 
always at one’s disposal, is guaranteed to turn lethal when the fanatically aesthetic 
contagion has been spread by the initiators.69 
 
The “added incentive” of which Kateb writes, is of course the confidence that the authority of 
those in command renders independent moral judgment superfluous. A sufficient dispersion of 
responsibility coupled with this inability or unwillingness to reflect very deeply upon the 
consequences of one’s actions contributes to an ethical environment characterized by moral 
blindness. It is, at root, not so very different from the Nuremberg defense offered up by the Nazi 
génocidaires: “I was just following orders.” 
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Just as Nazi Germany sought to disperse the sense of responsibility that was driving their 
executioners to despair, all contemporary militaries—insofar as they must train their troops to 
kill and die for a cause—have an interest in encouraging non-reflection. Nor is the phenomenon 
limited to military endeavors. To the extent that contemporary private corporations engage in 
ethically dubious behavior, managers also have an interest in maintaining a dispersion of 
responsibility among their employees. When it supports and protects the actions in question, the 
law can be a powerful force for discouraging ethical contemplation. In the aftermath of the 
economic meltdown of 2008, for instance, Congress questioned executives from the major 
banking firms who had been deeply involved in the derivatives market and the trading of credit-
default swaps. Against the protestations of the politicians, many executives argued that nothing 
they had done was technically illegal. Ethics was another matter entirely. Patriotism and certain 
forms of nationalism can have a similar effect when it comes to excusing forms of behavior 
otherwise brought into question. “The nationalist,” Orwell quipped, “not only does not 
disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not 
even hearing about them.”70 Indeed, there are innumerable filters and other ideological 
apparatuses through which we are capable of remaining blind to the morality of our actions. 
Under such conditions, it takes immense effort and courage to seek moral clarity. 
 
Overview 
This opening chapter has followed a tortuous and fitful trajectory. It does not tell a linear 
story about the evolution of social norms pertaining to violence, but it lays the conceptual 
foundation for what follows. In the first half of the chapter, I claim that no political community 
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has ever sanctioned unhinged violence as an end unto itself. Though history is rife with 
massacres and bloody injustices, there have always been minimal norms and constraints placed 
against some practices of violence in some circumstances. Even in the bloodiest epics of 
antiquity, it is possible to observe that some forms of brutality went too far in the popular 
consciousness of their audiences. This normative limit, the conceptual division between 
acceptable and intolerable violence, is what I call a threshold of atrocity. That such thresholds 
exist, however, does not in itself reveal anything about their specific moral character from one 
cultural and historical context to another. 
 Given the fluid and changing nature of thresholds of atrocity, the second half of this 
chapter looked to the work of Norbert Elias for insight into how they take shape. In the course of 
this discussion, I point out some flaws in Steven Pinker’s highly influential but ultimately 
misguided reading of Elias’s work. Despite the views Pinker and others ascribe to him, Elias 
actually says much more about the changing manifestations of phenomena—especially their shift 
out of sight—than about their cessation. The literal removal from sight of activities no longer 
deemed acceptable for public display influences the metaphorical notion of moral vision. 
Scholars have long argued that the human capacity to shirk moral responsibility contributes to 
the persistence of atrocities. I argue that what Elias calls the civilizing process does not imply 
moral progress. In many cases, it may actually obscure moral responsibility literally and 
metaphorically by dispersing responsibility and thereby often facilitate the persistence of 
unacceptable behavior, albeit in a palatable form. 
Political theory has been proudly described as an “unapologetically mongrel sub-
discipline,”71 lacking either dominant methods or a clearly identifiable mainstream mode of 
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approach. Political theorists thrive at the intersection of traditional disciplinary boundaries and I 
have happily taken up the tradition here. The following chapters engage with and critically assess 
the work of a number of philosophers and social theorists from very different backgrounds and 
schools of thought—among them Norbert Elias, Emmanuel Levinas, Iris Murdoch, Simone Weil, 
Claudia Card, Hannah Arendt, Noam Chomsky, Niklas Luhmann, John Rawls, and Adam Smith. 
I trespass, moreover, upon several different fields of study besides what might be considered 
conventional political philosophy, including moral philosophy, media studies, and genocide 
studies. Yet this project is not merely an agglomeration of loose variations upon the broad theme 
of atrocity.  
Sheldon Wolin argues that good political theory has often contained an “imaginative 
element,”72 a normative project “influenced to a great extent by the problems agitating [the 
theorist’s] society”73 and aimed at “lessening the gap between the possibilities grasped through 
political imagination and the actualities of political existence.”74 Indeed, a strong normative 
argument undergirds this study. In different ways, each chapter advances an underlying 
normative claim: the concept of atrocity must be significantly expanded to include much more 
than it does at present. This may sound like a simple proposal but, if taken seriously, it implies 
dramatic social and political changes. Our thresholds of atrocity must change. Despite the strong 
moral prohibitions against “atrocities,” we are too often able to justify or tolerate forms of 
violence that should more accurately fall under that heading. This is wrong. Expanding 
thresholds of atrocity then means radically reappraising the many forms of violence we currently 
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excuse for various reasons, offering dedicated moral attention, and in many cases drawing 
different moral conclusions. 
 At this point, it is customary to provide the reader with an overview of the argument 
presented herein. Sadly, the subject of atrocity offers ample material for study, but it remains 
surprisingly under-theorized. I have attempted to develop the concept in a way that touches upon 
some of the most important components of the issue as I have come to understand them in the 
course of my research. The first chapter has laid the groundwork for what follows by advancing 
a notion of a threshold of atrocity, echoing Elias’s notion of thresholds of repugnance and shame, 
the hypothetical point at which acceptable violence becomes unacceptable atrocity. The second 
chapter contains an extended discussion of violence and moral vision, using the aesthetically-
oriented philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas, Iris Murdoch, and Simone Weil to argue for an 
ethics that locates morality in phenomenological experience. The face to face encounter of 
Levinas and the act of attending in Murdoch and Weil work against the inclination to moral 
blindness caused by internal self-love and external obfuscation.  
The third chapter looks closely at the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of atrocity and the 
extent to which the symbols associated with Nazi atrocities are used as a mental rule of thumb 
when assessing the relative depravity of other incidences of atrocity. In the course of the 
discussion, I explore the triangulation of three concepts: atrocity, evil, and genocide. Atrocity, I 
argue, must be understood as conceptually distinct from the latter. While the work of evil 
revivalists like Claudia Card is compelling, her discussion of atrocity is underdeveloped. The 
legal concept of genocide, moreover, is too confining to accommodate atrocities that have not 
yet made an appearance. 
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The fourth chapter considers the primary method by which most of us become aware of 
actual atrocities in the world: the mass media. A comparative analysis of Niklas Luhmann’s 
systems theory of the mass media and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model 
helps us to understand how the media define atrocity and thereby set up the conditions for moral 
judgment. Applying Murdochian moral attention is rendered extremely difficult, though not 
impossible, by virtue of the mediated nature of moral experience. While elements of both 
approaches to the mass media contain useful insights, Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda 
model is more useful both for a theory of atrocity grounded in vision and for the rather more 
optimistic prospects of raising political challenges to the priorities expressed in the media.  
Finally, the fifth chapter examines the moral distancing inherent to the politics of the 
liberal-democratic nation state. While these states set ostensibly lower thresholds of atrocity and 
thereby tolerate less violence than we might expect elsewhere, I argue that the ideological fusion 
of liberalism and nationalism itself produces a form of identity in which state actions are 
perceived as synchronous with the national—and moral—self. Liberal ideals are reduced to 
national conceits, a phenomenon which discourages substantial moral reflection. So long as state 
violence is manufactured in such a way so as not to explicitly disturb liberal principles, the 
fusion of liberalism and nationalism actually creates an ideological space in which state violence 
can occur behind the scenes without raising strong ethical concerns.  
The fifth chapter concludes with a discussion of Adam’s Smith’s sentimentalist ethics 
and the figure of the impartial spectator, which offers a possible method for pausing to consider 
the influence of ideology in promoting one moral judgment above another. Even if the function 
of national ideology proves insurmountable for many, Smith’s ethics emphasizes the 
impossibility of rendering moral judgment through sheer imaginary effort and self-reflection. In 
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this, his work complements a theory of atrocity grounded in vision by urging us to consider how 
hypothetical others might “see” the matter at hand. 
All the chapters herein retain a visual theme, e.g. the politics of sight, moral vision, 
phenomenology of violence, etc. There are good reasons for this. First, while humans possess a 
troubling capacity for excusing or ignoring great suffering, there is also reason to believe that 
when faced with this suffering, stripped bare of any ideological rationale, humans also possess a 
profound capacity for empathy. Literal vision or a lack thereof does not alone explain the 
persistence of atrocities however, but it is a major component. A second reason for adopting the 
visual theme is this: moral action requires moral vision. When we see, really see, the results of 
extreme violence, the mind rebels against our feeble justificatory prejudices. Literal vision 
expands our moral vision and, with a bit of moral effort, the visceral suffering of others 
occasionally transcends ideology. 
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II. ATTENDING: Vision and Violence in Levinas, Murdoch, and Weil  
 
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is 
unable to notice something — because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not 
strike a man at all. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.”  
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
“We talk of the Turks and abhor the cannibals; but may not some of them go to heaven before some of us? We may 
have civilized bodies and yet barbarous souls. We are blind to the real sights of this world; deaf to its voice; and 
dead to its death.” 
Herman Melville 
 
The Beastly Century 
The twentieth century brought with it the dismal realization that mass killing, exile, and 
torture on an incomprehensible scale have become commonplace occurrences. The most 
substantial material expansion of human welfare in world history occurred alongside the 
pioneering of genocide, total war, ethnic cleansing, and totalitarianism.75 Scholars of vastly 
disparate political and theoretical positions have described the twentieth century as “the most 
bellicose in human history,”76 “the most murderous era so far recorded in human history,”77 
“without question the bloodiest century in modern history, far more violent in relative as well as 
absolute terms than any previous era.”78 Indeed, if one views as representative the 187 million 
“killed or allowed to die by human decision” during the “short century,”79 the human capacity 
                                                
75 Jari Eloranta, “The Economic History of War and Defense,” in Routledge Handbook of Modern Economic 
History (New York: Routledge, 2013), 105–15. 
76 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, 67. Tilly writes “Since 1900, by one careful count, 
the world has seen 237 new wars—civil and international—whose battles have killed at least 1,000 persons per year; 
through the year 2000, the grim numbers extrapolate to about 275 wars and 115 million deaths in battle. Civilian 
deaths could easily equal that total.” 
77 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Barbarism: A User’s Guide,” New Left Review I, no. 206 (1994): 47. 
78 Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New York: 
Penguin, 2007).“By any measure, the Second World War was the greatest man-made catastrophe of all time. And 
yet, for all the attention they have attracted from historians, the world wars were only two of many twentieth-century 
conflicts. Death tolls quite probably passed the million mark in more than a dozen others.” 
79 Eric Hobsbawm’s term for the nearly 75-year period between WWI and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1914-
1990). 
 35 
for inflicting suffering appears not only boundless but routine.80 When violence becomes routine, 
it loses the power to shock. As Hobsbawm writes: 
[W]hat has made things worse, what will undoubtedly make them worse in future, is that 
steady dismantling of the defences which the civilization of the Enlightenment had 
erected against barbarism … For the worst of it is that we have got used to the inhuman. 
We have learned to tolerate the intolerable.81 
 
Yet there are always limits to toleration. Despite the bleak statistics, it is encouraging that the 
twentieth century is properly regarded today as a period of unremitting horror. Insofar as the 
“beastly century”82 has anything meaningful to say at all about the latent capacity for human 
cruelty, the ubiquitous cry of “never again” captures the attempt to normalize pious reflection on 
the grotesque extremes of state-driven carnage. For Adorno and others, this was the only lesson 
to be learned if it meant preventing future orgies of violence.83 However rudimentary, a 
normative framework remains that helps us to distinguish between violence that can be tolerated 
as acceptable under certain conditions and violence that cannot—must not—ever be tolerated. 
All political communities discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
violence. How these categories are established varies widely, but they are grounded in social 
norms and practical ethical systems. Most of us today for example are probably ethical 
deontologists when it comes to genocide, mass rape, terrorism, and extreme forms of torture. We 
regard such acts as unacceptable under any circumstances—brutal relics of an “uncivilized” or 
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“barbaric” past.84 Yet if the carnage of the previous century represented a devastating rejoinder 
to the liberal humanitarian belief in unceasing progress, it also led to the development of 
international legal norms aimed at preventing future horrors.  
In part because of its inceptive role in the development of international law, the Nazi 
holocaust constitutes an especially powerful paradigm of atrocity against which state violence in 
the West has since been judged. The details profoundly disturb us: the bureaucratic murder of 
millions in a vast network of death camps, the crematoria, the gas chambers, the macabre 
medical experimentation, the disposal of corpses reduced to a mere technical obstacle.85 Such 
radical evil seems to defy comprehension and thus serves as a metonym for human inhumanity, a 
rule of thumb for weighing the gravity of contemporary violence.86 The virtually universal 
recognition that Nazi crimes passed beyond any standard of permissible violence strongly 
suggests that there are limits to the state’s ability to act in ways that violate prevailing norms. 
There are thresholds of atrocity beyond which paradigms of acceptable (legitimate) violence 
become paradigms of unacceptable (illegitimate) atrocity. How does this happen? And is the 
distinction between violence and atrocity conceptually meaningful? 
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An atrocity, I argue, is an act or an accumulation of acts—directed by human agency, 
individual or collective—determined to exceed minimally tolerable levels of violence by 
nonparticipant observers for whom the violence in question is visible, i.e. phenomenologically 
comprehensible. For the purposes of this study, I wish to concentrate on atrocity as these external 
observers experience it first of all, and not how participants experience it. This definition of 
atrocity upsets a number of approaches. First, it suggests that a great deal of violence we 
presently tolerate or endorse is potentially atrocious. If the moral conditions I describe herein are 
met, we are likely to revise our moral assumptions regarding currently unquestioned violent 
practices. Second, a vision-based theory of atrocity avoids getting too much entangled in the 
problem of evil, a secular version of which has experienced something of a renaissance since the 
9/11 attacks and nearly always accompanies scholarly accounts of atrocity. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first explore the concept of visibility in connection to 
knowledge, which inevitably also raises the notion of blindness. The presence or absence of 
vision, literal or metaphoric, has since Plato been recognized as a key element in acquiring 
knowledge of truth; the notion is an apt one for helping us understand the willingness to endorse 
or oppose violence. The centrality of “vision” in the Western tradition however does not 
preclude the possibility of emphasizing a range of sensory experience. I explicitly endorse a 
more expansive notion of moral vision, one that potentially includes literal vision as well as 
sounds, smells, voice, texts, etc. Crucially, much of the world’s violence that would otherwise 
register as atrocious is not recognized as such because efforts are taken to obscure and actively 
control the representation of violence, thereby impeding phenomenological comprehensibility in 
its myriad forms. After surveying the symbolic importance of vision/blindness to knowledge of 
truth, I attempt to use the work of three aesthetically-oriented philosophers—Simone Weil, Iris 
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Murdoch, and Emmanuel Levinas—to assess the possibility of deriving ethical norms from 
phenomenological experience. 
The final section adapts the Rawlsian original position to the permissibility of violence. 
By applying such a heuristic, we are able to skirt the rationalizing impulse of nationalism, 
religious doctrine, formal law, and other complex influences that ultimately serve to justify 
violence in certain cases against certain people. A veil of ignorance attempts to discover, insofar 
as possible, a normative basis for interpreting violence: a meta-historical, meta-cultural threshold 
of atrocity. In doing so, it might be possible to better understand how rationalizing impulses 
allow for the justification of extreme violence against some people but not others, i.e. the two-
pronged ability to recognize injustice against “us” while too often remaining blind to atrocities 
committed against “them.” 
 
Blindness and Vision 
According to Norse legend, the god Odin gained his wisdom by plucking out one of his 
eyes and casting it into Mimir’s Well beneath the world-tree Yggdrasil. Yet though he gained 
wisdom, the loss of an eye left him dependent on two ravens to provide him with information 
about the objective world. Huginn and Munnin—translated as “thought” and “mind” 
respectively—loyally surveyed the world each day thereafter, returning to inform Odin of 
temporal affairs.87 With his sacrifice Odin acquired vast theoretical wisdom while 
simultaneously relinquishing his capacity for autonomous empirical observation. The surviving 
accounts of the myth offer only a sketch of the story; nevertheless, it draws clear connections 
between visibility, representation, and analytical knowledge. It is a charming parable about the 
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nature of wisdom and its foundation in phenomenological experience. Without his ravens, 
Odin’s wisdom is useless; on their own, the ravens have no capacity for critical thought.  
Though Odin was never depicted as fully blind, the allegory still obtains as his partial 
vision required supplementation. Partial or total blindness is a recurring theme in Western art, 
literature, and philosophy. Literal blindness (like madness) was viewed by the Greeks as a 
singularly supernatural phenomenon, caused either by the gods or through the intervention of 
demons.88 As with Odin, the loss of literal vision bestowed metaphysical prescience. As 
punishment for having viewed her nude form, Athena blinded Tiresias. For having transgressed a 
boundary forbidden to mortals, obtaining knowledge beyond that accorded to his station, he was 
forced to rely on nocturnal visions, bird songs, and other meta-visual cues to obtain knowledge 
about the future.89 Apollodorus writes of Tiresias that in blinding him, Athena “cleansed his 
ears” so he would be able to understand the birds and thereby acquire knowledge beyond that of 
ordinary humans.90  
Tiresias famously interacts with perhaps the single best-known blind figure of Greek 
mythology, Oedipus, whose lack of metaphoric vision leads to his loss of literal vision. In the 
Sophoclean version of the story, Oedipus accuses Tiresias of blindness of mind as well as vision. 
To this Tiresias responds simply: 
And mark me now—since thou hast scoffed at me 
Even for my blindness—thou both hast thine eyes 
And, seeing, seest not thy proper ill, 
Nor where thou art, nor side by side with whom.91 
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91 E.D.A. Morshead, trans., Oedipus the King (London: Macmillan and Co., 1885), 32. 
 40 
The purported author of the Illiad and the Odyssey himself is described in a Homeric hymn to 
Apollo as a “blind man, dwelling on the rocky island of Chios.”92 Artistic depictions of Homer 
typically emphasized his blindness and while Graziosi speculates that this may have stemmed in 
part from a desire to cast Homer as closely related to the gods (hence gifted with special powers) 
she generally concludes that the evidence strongly suggests the historical Homer was indeed 
blind.93 If blindness expressed a connection with metaphysical knowledge, temporarily impairing 
one’s senses might achieve a similar result. In this vein, the Pythian Oracle at Delphi inhaled 
intoxicating fumes emitted from a fissure below the Apollonian temple, thereby stultifying her 
physical senses to allow for the expression of cryptic divinations.94 
The Bible similarly embraces the symbolism of blindness, but always as a handicap, 
juxtaposed in opposition to knowledge of the truth—true vision. Both testaments are filled with 
references to blindness, often suggesting divine influence, namely the experience of holy 
revelation. The flash of light Saul encounters on the road to Damascus leaves him blind for three 
days after which time he becomes Paul, Apostle of Christ.95 Saul had been traveling to Syria on a 
mission to arrest Christians. Formerly blind to the truth of Christ’s divinity, his instant 
conversion and rebirth as Paul captures the Christian God’s ability to channel power through 
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even most unlikely forces, bestowing vision upon the metaphorical blind. Likewise, Christ’s 
healing of the blind remains among the best known of his parables; the story plays a critical role 
in establishing the legitimacy of his divinity. As Barasch explains, “So utterly utopian appeared 
the healing of the blind that it was understood as a distinctive mark of the messianic age.”96  
The notion of existence without literal sight, living in darkness as it were, was thought to 
offer the closest experience of death in life. In the book of Isaiah, the prophet likens blindness to 
a darkness from which true believers will be rescued by God: “And in that day shall the deaf 
hear the words of the book, and the eyes of the blind shall see out of obscurity, and out of 
darkness.”97 Knowledge of the truth, salvation itself, is set at odds with the notion of blindness 
found in scripture. Describing utopia, Isaiah continues:   
Then the eyes of the blind shall be  
opened, and the ears of the deaf shall  
be unstopped. 
Then shall the lame man leap as an  
hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: 
for in the wilderness shall waters break 
out, and streams in the desert.98 
 
God’s light is always framed in opposition to darkness, the void, Satan himself. The opening 
lines in Genesis establish the separation of light from dark, good from evil, as the foundational 
act upon which the rest of God’s creation is predicated:  
In the beginning God created the 
Heaven and the earth. 
And the earth was without form, 
and void; and darkness was upon 
the face of the deep. And the Spirit of 
God moved upon the face of the waters. 
And God said, Let there be light:  
and there was light.  
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And God saw the light, that it was  
Good: and God divided the light from the darkness.99 
 
In his epistles to the Corinthians, Paul emphasizes the connection of light to knowledge: “For 
God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the 
light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.”100 Moreover, Christ 
repeatedly either describes himself or his disciples as the “light of the world” or is described as 
such by others.101 In Milton’s account of Samson’s torment at the hands of the Philistines, the 
eponymous character loses his literal vision as a consequence of his failure to see the truth. 
Samson understands his predicament as the separation from God’s light as he descends into the 
darkness of blindness.102 
O loss of sight, of thee I most complain!  
Blind among enemies, O worse then chains, 
Dungeon, or beggery, or decrepit age! 
Light the prime work of God to me is extinct, 
And all her various objects of delight 
Annull’d, which might in part my grief have eas’d, 
Inferiour to the vilest now become 
Of man or worm; the vilest here excel me, 
They creep, yet see, I dark in light expos’d 
To daily fraud, contempt, abuse and wrong, 
Within doors, or without, still as a fool, 
In power of others, never in my own; 
Scarce half I seem to live, dead more than half. 
O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon, 
Irrecoverably dark, total Eclipse 
                                                
99 Gen. 1: 1-4 
100 2 Cor. 4: 6 
101 “Then spake Jesus unto them, saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in 
darkness, but shall have the light of life.” (John 8: 12) “As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world.” 
(John 9: 5) “And Jesus said, For judgment I come into this world, that they which see not might see; and that they 
which see might be made blind.” (John 9: 39) “Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be 
hid.” (Matt. 5:14) “This then is the message which we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is light, 
and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not 
the truth: But if we walk into the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of 
his son Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin.” (1 John 1:5-7) 
102 Milton himself was going blind and the notion of a descent into darkness features in much of his work. 
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Without hope of day!103 
 
Perhaps the most memorable and explicitly political link between vision and 
knowledge—a link seized upon by Christian theologians in late antiquity—is to be found in 
Plato’s Republic.104 The famous allegory of the cave offers an account of knowledge strongly 
rooted in the epistemological limitations of human vision and the difficulty inherent in 
attempting to grasp the eternal Forms. Practical politics was for Plato a misguided and 
potentially dangerous endeavor without a clear vision of what the good life entailed. Without 
clear vision, we are condemned to live in a world of illusion, “vainly following distorted images 
of reality and ceaselessly driven by irrational desires.”105  
Blindness to the idea of things themselves becomes so strongly rooted in the cave’s 
microcosm that when a single prisoner escapes, experiences the overwhelming brightness of the 
sun, and then returns to relate the truth to his subterranean comrades, they murder him. In his 
Phaedo, true knowledge of the world, i.e. knowledge of things to be found in the world and the 
relationships between things, can only be uncovered through knowledge of the Forms. The 
notion of equality is meaningless without first possessing an idea of Equality in the abstract, an 
ideal against which the empirical world will always fall short. Yet knowledge of truth brings 
with it the potential for danger; those incapable or unprepared to grasp truth might be consumed 
by it if unwisely exposed. To avert this outcome, a properly organized society must present most 
of its people with a “noble lie.” This lie, this myth, intentionally reproduces the prevailing 
                                                
103 John Milton, Samson Agonistes and Shorter Poems, ed. A.E. Barker, Crofts Classics (AHM Publishing 
Corporation, 1950), ll. 67–82. 
104 On the link between Platonism and late-antique Christianity, see Gerard O’Daly, Platonism Pagan and 
Christian: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001). 
105 Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 39. 
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conditions of the cave, essentially enforcing metaphorical blindness to the truth for those 
incapable of handling it.  
When Augustine adapts the Platonic theory of the Forms to a Christian context, the cave 
becomes the warning of an unsaved soul. For Augustine, God is the light that illuminates the 
world, the light of rationality.106 Only through God is true knowledge possible; indeed God’s 
light is itself knowledge. 
But distinct from objects is the light by which the soul is illumined, in order that it may 
see and truly understand everything, either in itself or in the light. For the light is God 
himself, whereas the soul is a creature; yet, since it is rational and intellectual, it is made 
in his image. And when it tries to behold the Light, it trembles in its weakness and finds 
itself unable to do so. Yet from this source comes all understanding it is able to attain.107 
 
If vision is a precondition to knowledge, knowledge is a precondition to moral action. Evil, by 
contrast, has no positive material existence and instead indicates an absence of God.  
Given the diversity of traditions reviewed above, the relationship between 
phenomenology and moral action may not be clear. This confusion is easily remedied if we 
consider how moral choices are actually made. Every day each of us confronts countless moral 
questions of greater or lesser importance; we assess the morally relevant variables and render 
judgment. Our judgment informs subsequent action or, as the case may be, inaction. Unless we 
are very unusual, witnessing extreme violence unfold before our eyes on the streets or on our 
television sets generates an impression of horror.108 Informed to a sufficient degree via literal and 
metaphoric vision, our moral intuition tells us that such violence is simply wrong. Whether this 
impression of horror inspires us to act is another matter. For various reasons, we often surrender 
                                                
106 See Louise Nelstrop, Kevin J. Magill, and Bradley B. Onishi, Christian Mysticism: An Introduction to 
Contemporary Theoretical Approaches (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 160. 
107 St. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. J.H. Taylor (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), bks. 12, 
xxxi.59, p. 222. 
108 The reference to Stoicism is deliberate. 
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the capacity for moral vision. We choose not to see, or else simply to deny what it is that we see. 
I would like to suggest that the initial encounter bears a closer resemblance to moral truth. It is 
only after the initial encounter of the moral chronology that we apply a range of filters designed 
to alter the content of what has been witnessed, to render our impressions comprehensible. The 
following section explores the possibility of phenomenological comprehensibility in moral 
encounters through a critical discussion of three thinkers who locate the key to moral action in an 
expansive notion of vision.  
 
Moral Attention 
A fascinating contemporary adaptation of the Platonic notions of vision and truth is found 
in the fiction and non-fiction of Iris Murdoch. For Murdoch, ego is the chief obstacle to “seeing” 
others clearly. Combining Plato’s theory of the Forms with a Buddhist ethical outlook, Murdoch 
establishes a remarkably consistent approach to knowledge using a handful of rich visual 
metaphors: attention, perception, seeing, looking, and vision. Linking all these notions is a 
metaphor for morality. She suggests that virtue lies between the dual process of aesthetic 
perception and ego “unselfing.” Murdoch sought to challenge the emphasis on the will common 
to Existentialist (especially Jean-Paul Sartre) and British moral philosophies (especially 
linguistic philosophy) of the mid-twentieth century. Seeing is for Murdoch a fundamentally 
moral practice because it establishes the empirical basis for moral choice. She offers a concise 
account of her idiosyncratic neo-Platonism in “The Idea of Perfection,” one of three influential 
pieces published together as The Sovereignty of Good in 1970: 
I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies 
that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course 
‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. … 
If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of 
choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is 
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nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how 
continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round 
about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business 
of choosing is already over.109 
 
The importance of Murdoch’s philosophy to a theory of atrocity grounded in vision should be 
self-evident from this passage. Only through seeing, i.e. not merely looking, but comprehending 
the myriad salient and morally relevant factors at stake, is it possible to make an informed moral 
choice. This also includes either tolerating violence as banal or opposing it as atrocious. The 
notion of “distorted vision” is especially useful because it helps to explain why we often make 
morally lamentable choices. Elsewhere, Murdoch writes of a “fog” or a “veil” that prevents us 
from seeing reality. Such distorted vision is invariably a product of the human ego, a symptom of 
insufficient “unselfing,” the process central to her vision of moral progress.  
A wider notion of visibility encompasses not only aesthetic perception and 
phenomenology but also the comprehensive conditions and context of the visible subject. This 
wider notion then should not be limited to vision but potentially includes a range of sensory 
experience, literal and metaphoric. This kind of “vision” sees not only the bloodied corpse, it 
understands at least minimally the physical (the physiognomy of the human body, geographical 
space), the cultural, and political contexts, etc. It is specifically not omniscience, but a kind of 
intellectual humility which embraces the responsibility to know what we are talking about before 
rendering moral judgment. But where do we gather the requisite moral knowledge? Aesthetic 
perception alone is analogous to a photograph and, popular wisdom notwithstanding, a picture is 
worth far fewer than a thousand words. While photographs do record a moment in time, we also 
tend to see in a given image what we are intended to see, as understood by the photographer. 
                                                
109 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2001), 35–36. 
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“This sleight of hand,” Sontag observes, “allows photographs to be both objective record and 
personal testimony, both a faithful copy or transcription of an actual moment of reality and an 
interpretation of that reality …”110 Murdoch’s notion of vision extends beyond merely looking, 
beyond a simple image, and encompasses a range of phenomenological experience. To this end, 
she employs at various points the terms “looking,” “seeing,” “regarding,” “watching,” 
“attending.” 
 Precisely how does one go about performing the moral work necessary to get at the truth? 
The visual metaphor still obtains, though it is not merely by looking, i.e. unguided 
phenomenological observation, but through concentrated and prolonged attention that advances 
can be made. Murdoch borrows the notion of attention from the French philosopher and mystic 
Simone Weil. Weil was concerned with the gravity of the temporal world, the mechanical 
grounding of humanity in a universe of illusion. Gravity isolates us from others and confounds 
our inherent desire to levitate towards grace—goodness and truth. In her original expression of 
attention, Weil downplays the role of the will in making moral choices. “The will,” she writes, 
“only controls a few movements of a few muscles, and these movements are associated with the 
idea of the change of position of nearby objects. … Attention is something quite different.”111 It 
would be absurd, Weil thinks, to imagine anyone capable of simply willing a good moral choice. 
Attention is a project that ends, when taken seriously, as a kind of ascetic meditation, stripping 
away the ego in search of something one can never entirely conceive. “Attention alone—that 
attention which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears—is required of me. I have to deprive all that I 
                                                
110 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2003), 26. 
111 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (London: Routledge, 2002), 116. 
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call ‘I’ of the light of my attention and turn it on to that which cannot be conceived.”112 
Crucially, attention allows for the “discrimination between the real and the illusory.” 
In our sense perceptions, if we are not sure of what we see we change our position while 
looking, and what is real becomes evident. In the inner-life, time takes the place of space. 
With time we are altered, and, if as we change we keep our gaze directed towards the 
same thing, in the end illusions are scattered and the real becomes visible.113 
 
Weil has a concept of the Christian God in mind, which reverts to an abstract Platonic Goodness 
once Murdoch gets ahold of it. Indeed, her basic moral rubric is deeply informed by the ongoing 
acquisition of knowledge obtained through the process of attention, i.e. “a refined and honest 
perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what 
confronts one.”114  
Murdoch admired Weil and her work enormously. “To read her,” Murdoch wrote, “is to 
be reminded of a standard.”115 In her own formulation of attention, Murdoch centralizes 
phenomenology, but emphasizes one important caveat: the type of knowledge obtained through 
phenomenological experience can only ever be an improvement. It cannot offer comprehensive 
moral understanding, the superhuman aspiration for perfection. Still, Murdoch insists that proper 
attention ultimately reduces the number of possible choices available to us, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of acting morally. As she writes, “if I attend properly I will have no choices and 
this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at.”116 Indeed Murdoch stresses that this process occurs 
most of the time anyway without us realizing, a million instantaneous decisions made over the 
                                                
112 Ibid., 118. 
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York: Penguin, 1997), 157.  
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span of a single day. Acting morally in her conception only becomes a conscious decision when 
confronted with difficult cases. 
 Attention remains an extremely difficult task for humans to undertake, one further 
complicated by our troubling tendency to allow convention first priority in moral judgments. 
Weil broaches this theme when she writes “the people who stood motionless, from one to eight 
o’clock in the morning for the sake of having an egg, would have found it very difficult to do so 
in order to save a human life.”117 Murdoch acknowledges as much and, following Plato, locates 
the attendant difficulties in the innate human tendency to selfishness: egoism. We are too much 
infatuated with our own subjectivity; indeed, introspection always carries with it the risk of 
blinding us to the salient moral concerns relevant to a choice at hand. Moral attention is 
impossible when our vision is rendered blurry by selfishness. “Obsession, prejudice, envy, 
anxiety, ignorance, greed, neurosis, and so on and so on veil reality. The defeat of illusion 
requires moral effort.”118 Elsewhere she writes: 
The enemies of art and of morals, the enemies that is of love, are the same: social 
convention and neurosis. One may fail to see the individual because … we are ourselves 
sunk in a social whole which we allow uncritically to determine our reactions, or because 
we see each other exclusively as so determined. Or we may fail to see the individual 
because we are completely enclosed in a fantasy world of our own into which we try to 
draw things from outside, not grasping their reality and independence, making them into 
dream objects of our own.119 
 
In addition to her conventional philosophical work, Murdoch’s fiction is riddled with complex 
characters of “distorted vision,” who build fantasy worlds of their own, blind to the truth of their 
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actions and often (mis)understanding human relationships as mere extensions of ego.120 This 
problem highlights the distinction Murdoch explores between “a morally-implicated visual term 
connoting success in grasping moral reality, and a non-morally-implicated one.”121 Looking does 
not yield the moral results that come with seeing or, better yet, attention.  
Distorted vision inevitably leads to violations of the Kantian dictum against treating 
people as means.122 We are too often caught up in ourselves, deluded by self-centeredness and 
fantasy: “the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one 
from seeing what is there outside one.”123 And yet Murdoch’s neo-Platonism also suggests that 
goodness exerts a “magnetic pull,” drawing us naturally to a notion of perfection that can never 
really be obtained. These two notions seem to be contradictory or in tension at the very least: on 
the one hand, we are drawn to the light of the Sun, seeking clarity; on the other, we are self-
centered egoists, a stubborn fact that precludes knowledge of the Good and leaves us in the cave 
of shadows and illusion. How is one ever to find the cave’s exit? In a world where nationalism is 
apparently resurgent, where cosmopolitanism has extended no further than capitalist trade, and 
the struggle against bloody intolerance appears historically constant, Murdoch is rather 
pessimistic about the prospects for achieving moral clarity of vision. Attention demands moral 
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effort which is, as it turns out, real effort. It takes an inconvenient amount of time and 
determination to see the world as it is, without distortion.124 The draw of social convention in 
various manifestations is a problem that absolutely must be challenged if distorted vision is to be 
successfully overcome. 
Too often the label of atrocity is used only to describe violence perpetrated against those 
within our immediate political and social communities. By contrast, we are willing to ignore, 
tolerate, or even sanction levels of violence against others we could never imagine visiting upon 
ourselves. If we take Weil and Murdoch’s concerns seriously, this lamentable state of affairs is 
the predictable result of our inability to “see” the consequences of violence. Self-love inhibits 
moral attention and hence moral vision, thwarting action. The blindness to inconvenient truths 
that results, whether deliberate or a byproduct of laziness, produces apathy and tends to 
obliterate forms of empathy physical or social proximity might foster. Blurred by veils of 
nationalism and other forms of parochial arrogance, our moral sense atrophies. If this process 
can be reversed through focused moral attention, as Weil and Murdoch advocate, a question 
follows: is it inevitable the effort will heighten or stir our moral sensitivity? Does 
phenomenological comprehensibility enable us to recognize atrocity where once we saw only 
acceptable violence? Perhaps it is doubtful that moral choice can ever be reduced to a single 
option, but some dogmas can be overcome and some of the veils removed. 
 
                                                
124 In a slightly different formulation, this sentiment resonates with Sheldon Wolin’s notion of political time. 
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Face To Face 
To help advance a theory of atrocity grounded in vision, we turn now to a philosopher 
strongly associated with the link between phenomenology and ethics, Emmanuel Levinas.125 
Perhaps more than any other twentieth-century thinker, Levinas places the trauma of atrocity, 
specifically the Nazi holocaust, at the center of his philosophy. A Lithuanian Jew who became a 
naturalized French citizen, Levinas was called up for military service upon the German invasion 
of France in 1940. His unit, however, was quickly routed and forced to surrender. Levinas waited 
out the war in a German POW camp. While his wife and children were spared thanks to 
assistance from friends, including that of Maurice Blanchot, much of his extended family was 
murdered in the camps. Levinas rarely mentions the Nazi holocaust or the camps in his work, but 
it remains the unacknowledged impetus behind his entire project. In one of the few explicit 
examples, Levinas describes twentieth-century violence as unconstrained by traditional theodicy: 
This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of 
right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of 
Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive 
fear of the return of everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil 
inflicted deliberately, but in a manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a 
reason become political and detached from all ethics. 
Among these events the Jewish people under the reign of Hitler seems to me the 
paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears in its diabolical horror. 
This is perhaps not a subjective feeling. The disproportion between suffering and every 
theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with glaring, obvious clarity. Its possibility puts into 
question the multimillennial traditional faith. Did not Nietzsche’s saying about the death 
of God take on, in the extermination camps, the means of a quasi-empirical fact?126 
 
                                                
125 In developing this sub-section, I found the following two accounts of Levinasian ethics especially illuminating 
and insightful: Judith Butler, “Precarious Life,” in Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (New 
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Elsewhere in his Talmudic writings, Levinas clarifies the conditions under which violence may 
be appropriate, but warns against being sucked into the destructive unreason of war: “[B]orn of 
human relations, violence remains at the edge of an abyss into which, at a certain moment, 
everything can founder, including reason. We leave war to return to its ultimate source, which is 
Auschwitz, and into which it risks reverting.”127 Most often, his use of the death camps is only 
indirect, as if to specifically name the Nazi holocaust would be to grant a kind of historical 
distinction to the atrocities Levinas did not believe was justified, and which served no moral 
purpose. Auschwitz is nevertheless the threat lingering just below the surface of his philosophy. 
How are we to orient ourselves morally in the world after Auschwitz? 
Levinas centers his ethics on the relation between two subjectivities when they encounter 
one another face to face. This apparently simple thought experiment obscures depths of profound 
complexity, which Levinas goes on to explore at length in his Totality and Infinity.128 The 
infinite obligation to the other that emerges from this encounter is grounded in a particular 
philosophical assumption: it establishes an ethics prior to phenomenological knowledge, linked 
not to empirical observation, but to the presence of what Levinas calls infinity, the precognitive 
development of a thought that cannot yet think itself.129 The ethical is transcendent; it is “first 
philosophy,” in his parlance—prior to ontology, prior to empirical observation, and issuing a 
moral demand that can never be successfully fulfilled. In the face of the other these two 
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subjectivities witness their infinite separateness, their alterity (alterité), which simultaneously 
underscores their infinite co-dependence. 
Whatever else Levinas may be proposing here and whatever the feasibility of responding 
practically to the infinite demand, his phenomenology utilizes vision as a metaphor for moral 
obligation.130 That is, we are not dealing with the conversion of light into electro-chemical 
impulses, in itself a rather clumsy cognitive representation of the world; rather, Levinas has in 
mind something much more in line with Weil and Murdoch’s conception of the Good. “[E]thics 
is an optics,” he writes. “But it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing 
objectifying virtues of vision, a relation of an intentionality of a wholly different type.”131 The 
intersubjective emphasis of Levinasian phenomenology is “ethical” in the sense that we discover 
our own particular subjectivity upon falling under the gaze of the other and this recognition 
establishes obligation. Each step of the encounter is absolute and thus infinite: the alterity 
established through the encounter is absolute; the passivity of the agent falling under the moral 
command of the other is absolute; the other’s demand itself is absolute; and the responsibility to 
respond is absolute. It is the absoluteness of this approach that compels Badiou to attribute to 
Levinas “a kind of ethical radicalism”132 and for others like Rorty to dismiss his project entirely 
as “a stumbling-block to effective political organization.”133 
                                                
130 I am simplifying Levinas here somewhat by using the word “phenomenology” in such a context. He rejected this 
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The connection between metaphoric vision and ethics is well illustrated by the story of 
Gyges of Lydia in Greek tradition, a story Levinas references. Gyges, a servant of king 
Candaules, is asked to hide himself in the queen’s chambers so that he might secretly watch as 
she undresses and confirm her unsurpassed beauty to the king. According to Herodotus’s account 
of the story,134 Gyges offers initial resistance but eventually agrees to the plan, not wanting to 
upset the king. He sneaks into the queen’s chamber, observes her in the nude, and is mesmerized 
by her beauty just as the king predicted. For her part, the queen realizes she is being spied upon 
but only chooses to confront Gyges about it after some time has passed, whereupon she demands 
that he either kill Candaules or be killed himself by her guards for setting eyes on that which is 
forbidden. “[Gyges] soon saw that he really was faced with the alternative, either of murdering 
his master, or of being murdered himself.”135 Seeing no other way around it, Gyges chooses to 
kill the king, marry the queen, and usurp the throne. Convinced that he has no choice in the 
matter, Gyges comes to view the act of killing another as excusable, even permissible, under 
such conditions.  
In his rather more fantastical version of the story, Plato retains the central plot, with 
Gyges killing the king and marrying the queen, but adds a famous twist.136 Gyges comes into 
possession of a magical ring that allows him to become invisible and to commit his crime with 
no risk of being caught. Plato introduces the ring to probe the nature of moral choice in a world 
without consequences. While Herodotus’s version of the story hinges on a forbidden sight (the 
queen’s nude form), Plato’s pivots on visibility in terms of liberation from social constraint. If 
there were no consequences for acting unjustly, why should we act justly? Socrates asks whether 
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it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it and famously argues the former: it is indeed better 
to suffer injustice than the alternative. This question plays a central role in Levinas’s work as 
well. Levinas himself argues that his entire philosophy can be summed up by saying that “there 
is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other.”137 Plato’s Gyges is a 
figure that can see without being seen, representative of a subjectivity living for itself, divorced 
from social restraint or obligation. This radical individualism flirts with the dream of total 
autonomy and the dangerous urges that come with this. “Gyges’ ring,” Levinas writes, 
“symbolizes separation … Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility of injustice and 
radical egoism, the possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating.”138 To refuse the 
responsibility commanded by the other is ultimately to refuse infinity and transcendence; it is to 
limit our moral potential and become worryingly self-centered. It is to become Gyges. 
Like Weil and Murdoch, Levinas places vision at the center of his moral philosophy. All 
three encourage us to strip away the egoistic tendencies, the moral distractions, that otherwise 
impede our ability to recognize a notion of goodness or our responsibility to the other. 
Levinasian ethics is not a movement closer to some kind of idealized truth, however. It is a 
trembling moment before the moral height and absolute naked vulnerability of the other. As in 
Weil, Levinas refuses to believe that morality is reducible to acts of consciousness or will 
because obligation is established in the face to face encounter prior to action and is co-emergent 
with subjective consciousness. We may of course refuse to act upon this obligation, but as Cohen 
writes, the “responsibility to respond to the other … is, paradoxically, the unspoken first word 
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prior to the first word spoken.”139 To reject the demand is to reject ourselves. “The will is free to 
assume this responsibility [to and for the other] in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse 
this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the 
Other has introduced it.”140 
 
Ego and the Original Position 
In Weil and Murdoch, one question in particular nags at us: is it reasonable to expect new 
morally relevant information to enter simply by force of will, through the act of attending? And 
yet this a misguided question; if one attends as Weil and Murdoch would have it, the process is 
not one of addition but subtraction—of the ego and its obstruction of moral vision, insofar as 
possible. Perfect attention winds up sounding a lot like Rawls’ original position: a moral actor 
stripped to its core, ignorant of its own socio-economic status, particular talents, physical 
attributes, indeed any knowledge that might prejudice one’s preferred political outcomes. Like 
Murdoch, Rawls takes human self-interestedness for granted and attempts to correct for 
problems this might cause by applying the veil of ignorance. To the extent that one is able to 
successfully eliminate the “I” via the unselfing process, moral attention bears a great deal in 
common with the original position, but the comparison ends there. For while the unselfing 
process is designed to get at the core of a moral dilemma by stripping away factors irrelevant to 
judgment, it simultaneously implies a heightened sensitivity to the condition of others once the 
clouds of egoism have been swept away. A Rawlsian veil of ignorance does not provide any such 
moral information. 
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Murdoch was strongly influenced by Buddhist thought, especially the notion of achieving 
wisdom via a hollowing out of the concept of self. Her elaboration upon Weil’s work, reflects 
the paradoxical nature of this ethical approach: only by unselfing and stripping away self-
information are we able to gain knowledge of that which is external to us. Murdoch hoped to 
provide readers with a practical way of thinking about ethics in their everyday lives. By contrast, 
Rawls always stressed the “purely hypothetical” nature of the original position: 
In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in 
the traditional theory of the social contract. This position is not, of course, thought of as 
an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is 
understood as a purely hypothetical condition characterized so as to lead to a conception 
of justice.141 
 
Rawls is convinced that actors in the original position are likely to agree upon a relatively 
egalitarian society, but he also believes they will likely tolerate minimal levels of inequality—
certainly much less than is actually the case in present society.  
It might be possible to adapt the original position to the question of atrocity if we pose an 
economy of violence as the central concern. How much and in what form will violence be 
tolerated before the veil of ignorance is removed? If we ask this question, the original position 
offers us a way to guess at which forms of violence are likely to be rejected as unacceptable 
under any circumstances. It seems highly probable that actors in the original position would 
tolerate minimal levels of violence, conceivably allowing for some kind of limited punitive 
violence directed at those who transgress social norms—murderers, for example. Whatever the 
forms of violence ultimately permitted in this reformulation of the original position, the 
determination proceeds on the assumption that some crimes should be singled out for special 
punishment. It is plausible to assume that, faced with the veil of ignorance, many of us would 
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sanction violence in highly specific cases. Yet without knowing who among us is likely to 
transgress social norms—and thereby find themselves subject to punitive violence once the veil 
of ignorance is removed—levels of permissible violence would remain much lower than our 
present society accepts as normal. 
 The veil of ignorance produces some interesting ideas when we put it to work with the 
wider conception of vision discussed in this chapter. Pain, whatever the source, is an isolating 
experience, limited to the physical confines of our own bodies. As Elaine Scarry argues, pain 
always arouses at least some suspicion among those of us not experiencing it.142 Could it really 
be so bad? We have no way of knowing for sure without subjecting ourselves to it. It is for this 
reason Christopher Hitchens subjected himself to waterboarding in an effort to influence public 
opinion against waterboarding as practiced against military detainees.143 It is for this reason also 
that groups like Amnesty International seek to emphasize suffering through shocking visual 
campaigns, attempting to render expressible in some detail the suffering of others. It is no 
coincidence that such campaigns often feature children, commonly perceived as innocents 
whatever the socio-political context, and thus less morally problematic.  
A veil of ignorance obliterates irrelevant information that would otherwise exert an 
unwarranted influence over individual moral judgment. Moral attention does the same—but only 
for the self. Even as the unselfing process strives to minimize and ultimately subvert the 
tendency to prioritize ourselves above others, it does this in order to heighten our sensitivity to 
that which lies beyond the self. Susan Sontag offers a nationalist example of the moral influence 
such information otherwise presents when she describes a photograph depicting a dead child, 
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blown apart in a suicide bombing of a Jerusalem pizzeria. “To an Israeli Jew,” she writes, it is 
“first of all a photograph of a Jewish child killed by a Palestinian suicide-bomber.”144 Likewise, 
for the Palestinians, “a photograph of a child torn apart by a tank round in Gaza is first of all a 
photograph of a Palestinian child killed by Israeli ordnance.”145 Such political context would 
presumably be absent in the original position, just as it would be stripped away from someone 
successfully attending to the problem of a child, any child, being torn apart. With moral 
attention, our own relationship to the child is removed as much as possible so that a clear view of 
the child’s death is not obscured by the clouds of egoism and rationalization. Clarity of moral 
vision is possible only by transcending the parochial, selfish concerns that inform the arbitrary 
ethical standards we set up on the basis of nationality, religion, race, and other morally irrelevant 
associations underscoring those associations beyond the self. 
Practically speaking, the horrors of violence are often recognized as atrocious too late, 
only after it strikes. Moral vision is often acquired first by those who experience violence 
firsthand, perhaps surviving atrocities like torture or perhaps speaking on behalf of a murdered 
family member. In many cases, the trauma of experiencing violence is itself sufficient to itself 
obliterate strongly held dogmas, converting the individual from a stalwart defender of torture 
into its greatest opponent, and often establishing formerly unimaginable political alliances.146 I 
have in mind the families of children killed in ways described by Sontag above. A common 
source of suffering sometimes generates moral clarity of the kind Murdoch wishes for us to reach 
without having to experience the trauma of losing a child. Ideally, we should be able to reach the 
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conclusion that murdering children is wrong without having to experience it, but nationalism is a 
remarkably adaptable form of egoism. 
To conclude with a few observations on Levinas, it may seem odd to juxtapose the face 
to face encounter with the neo-Platonic concept of attention found in Weil and Murdoch. Yet 
each of these thinkers sets about to establish vision as a metaphor for morality, stymied by the 
presence of ego. Though Levinas places the rise of subjective consciousness at a different 
chronological point in relation to the crucial moment, he nevertheless argues that “man’s ethical 
relation to the other is ultimately prior to his ontological relation to himself (egology) or to the 
totality of things we call the world (cosmology).”147  That is, our obligation to the other 
transcends whatever forms of egoism are later established through the inculcation of national and 
other groupist tendencies.  
For Weil’s version of Platonist Catholicism, egoism is the default mode of human nature, 
a cosmological inevitability that can only truly be overcome in the afterlife. Murdoch’s 
adaptation of this notion strikes a similar tone, with vision taking a central place in both 
accounts, willing something that resembles the original position in reverse: imagining how we 
might see the world once we have emancipated ourselves from particularist concerns. In Weil, 
this could be taken to an extreme in which the “I” disappears altogether. While Murdoch does 
not wish to abolish the ego with the same theological fervor one finds in Weil, she nevertheless 
argues that pure attention is to effectively transcend oneself, to truly feel what the other feels. 
Seeing is important, but seeing as a metaphor for vision must include as many of the senses as 
possible if we are to achieve vision in the morally expansive sense she intends. When the 
question at stake is violence, it is worth considering the experience for ourselves before choosing 
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to sanction its use against others or else we should hesitate in the humility of our own ignorance. 
In this way, the original position is helpful to imagine forms of violence that might pass beyond 
a threshold of atrocity but because Rawls never intended the heuristic to be adapted in such a 
way, its application for aiding practical moral judgment is undeniably limited. Moral attention is 
more useful in this regard because the ignorance it places upon a moral agent in turn facilitates a 
deep knowledge of the external world. 
The original position also resonates in some respects with Levinasian ethics, which, as 
we have seen, establishes a relationship prior to the development of subjective consciousness. It 
is a relationship defined by absolute codependence, an infinite demand: the other asks not to be 
killed and in this we realize our own desire not be killed. Indeed, we are less likely to tolerate 
violence when the possibility arises of suffering violence ourselves. Especially because Levinas 
places this experience prior to ontology, we can discuss violence without the morbid influence of 
national or religious martyrdom. The banal violence so easily justified against others suddenly 
becomes abhorrent once it is directed at our own bodies. Violence formerly treated as acceptable 
becomes, in essence, atrocious. At risk of expressing it crudely, we might call it the “golden 
rule” of atrocity. If atrocity is simply violence that is unacceptable under any circumstances, 
violence that we could never sanction against ourselves, then in the absence of parochial filters 
we will likely discover that much of the violence tolerated against official enemies, marginalized 
populations, and others must be reclassified as atrocious.  
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III. SEEING: The Nazi Holocaust as a Paradigm of Atrocity 
 
“There are no lessons to take from the Holocaust. And, perhaps, this is what’s terrible about the Holocaust.”  
Yeshayahu Leibowitz  
 
“[C]ontemplating the Holocaust is virtually cost-free: a few cheap tears.” 
Peter Novick  
 
“Men dressed in black, with leather boots and skull insignias, carrying out the large-scale and systematic murder of 
millions of innocent, unarmed, naked civilians: What could be more evil?”  
Roy F. Baumeister 
 
This chapter continues to develop a theory of atrocity grounded in moral vision by 
looking closely at the Nazi holocaust’s role in shaping our interpretation of what an atrocity 
“looks” like. Insofar as the Nazi holocaust and its associated symbols serve as a metonym for 
evil, I argue, the numerous horrors associated with the Nazi regime strongly color our 
understanding of contemporary atrocities. Forms of violence that resemble Nazi crimes are more 
easily identifiable as unacceptable than forms that do not. So while the universal repugnance 
with which Nazi atrocities are today regarded should be acknowledged as an achievement for 
moral education, we must also consider the ways it generates a blindness to forms of violence 
that do not quite rise to the level of Auschwitz.  
The chapter also addresses the triangulation of three powerful concepts that color 
interpretation of the Nazi holocaust and its role in assessing other incidences of unconscionable 
violence: atrocity, evil, and genocide. Atrocity, I argue, must be understood as conceptually 
distinct. A secular notion of evil, while compelling, is ill-suited to explain why some forms of 
violence qualify as atrocity while others do not. Finally, the crime of genocide is too confining in 
scope to accommodate fruitful theoretical work capable of explaining forms of atrocity that do 
not yet have a name. 
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A Nazi Kind of Thing 
US Army helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson, Jr. spotted bodies strewn across the 
landscape as he and his two door-gunners navigated their Hiller OH-23 Raven through South 
Vietnamese airspace on the morning of March 16, 1968. My Lai 4, US Army shorthand for one 
of several hamlets within the village complex of Son My, was located in the especially contested 
Quang Ngai province in South Vietnam. American soldiers of Charlie Company had been 
airlifted to the area earlier that morning expecting to engage Viet Cong fighters and Thompson’s 
crew was flying reconnaissance. Upon observing scores of fleeing and wounded villagers from 
the air, they marked several locations with smoke signals and left the area briefly to refuel. By 
the time they returned, many of the villagers they had seen fleeing lay dead. The crew signaled to 
a group of American GIs standing near a young Vietnamese woman and, hovering above her, 
attempted to alert the soldiers to her presence. “A few minutes later,” as Thompson later 
described, “up walks a captain, steps up to her, nudges her with his foot, steps back and blows 
her away.”148 Thompson and his crew found themselves in the middle of what would become the 
most notorious atrocity committed by American soldiers in Vietnam: the My Lai Massacre. 
During four hours of unremitting carnage, the soldiers of Charlie Company killed more 
than five hundred unarmed villagers at a level of calculated brutality that far exceeds what one 
might otherwise expect from soldiers acting on a combination of fear and confusion.149 Nick 
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Turse describes the sadistic nature of the massacre in his recent history of American atrocities in 
Vietnam: 
[T]he men of the unit shot chickens as they scurried about, pigs as they bolted, and cows 
and water buffalo lowing among the thatch-roof houses. They gunned down old men 
sitting in their homes and children as they ran for cover. They tossed grenades into homes 
without even bothering to look inside. An officer grabbed a woman by the hair and shot 
her point-blank with a pistol. A woman who came out of her home with a baby in her 
arms was shot down on the spot. As the tiny child hit the ground, another GI opened up 
on the infant with his M-16 automatic rifle.150 
 
The American soldiers faced no resistance from the villagers, many of whom had still been 
preparing breakfast when they arrived;151 not a single gunshot was fired against them.152 
Nevertheless, they carried out the assault in textbook military formation, kneeling and crouching 
as if in a firefight with armed adversaries.153 After the first wave of killing, members of Charlie 
Company raped women and young girls, burned houses to the ground, and soiled the village’s 
drinking water with grenades and the corpse of a monk. 
In the weeks leading up to the massacre, Charlie Company had suffered multiple 
casualties as a result of Viet Cong mines, booby traps, and sniper fire. The night before, soldiers 
had been told they would finally have a chance to directly engage a hitherto invisible enemy. 
Whatever latent desire for revenge smoldered in the hearts of these men prior to the next day’s 
bloody denouement, it was surely stoked by the briefing they received from Captain Ernest 
Medina. “We lost a lot of guys,” Medina is reported to have said. “Now we’re gonna get our 
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revenge. Everything goes.”154 They were to teach the villagers a lesson. When one GI asked if 
that included killing women and children as well, Medina offered a chilling reply: “Kill 
everything that moves.”155 It was Captain Medina who later executed the wounded village 
woman as Hugh Thompson’s crew looked on in horror. 
Recoiling at Medina’s murder of the young woman, Thompson landed his helicopter near 
a drainage ditch along the village perimeter in which he had observed dozens of terrified 
villagers huddled together. Several Gls were smoking nearby. Others were eating lunch. 
Thompson found a sergeant among them and asked if the people in the ditch needed assistance. 
The only way to help them, he was told, was to put them out of their misery. Thompson then 
spoke with Lieutenant William Calley, who brusquely told him that it was none of his business 
and that besides they were “just following orders.”156 Confused and frustrated, Thompson and 
his crew took off again in their helicopter and within minutes, began to hear bursts of automatic 
rifle fire. The realization that American soldiers were executing unarmed civilians casually and 
apparently without moral constraint shocked Thompson: 
During flying around we came across a ditch. It had bodies in it, a lot of them-women, 
kids, old men. I remember a thought going through my mind: “How did these people get 
in a ditch?” And I finally thought about the Nazis, I guess, and marching everybody 
down into a ditch and blowing ‘em away. Here we are supposed to be the good guys in 
the white hats. It upset me.157 
 
The massacre reminded him of Nazi atrocities in Europe, of Jews and political prisoners being 
rounded up by the Einsatzgruppen and made to dig their own graves before being shot. “What do 
                                                
154 Cited in Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War: Vietnam Veterans—Neither Victims nor Executioners (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 48. 
155 Turse, Kill Anything That Moves, 2. 
156 Kenneth Angers, The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story (Lafayette, LA: Acadian House, 
1999), 119–120. 
157 Kevin Sim, “Remember My Lai,” Frontline (PBS, May 23, 1989).  
 67 
you call it,” he asked, “when you march 100 or 200 people down in a ditch and line up on the 
side with machine guns and start firing into it? Reminds me of another story that happened in 
World War II, about the Nazis.”158 As he later told journalist Ron Ridenhour, “We’re the good 
guys. We don’t do those kind of things.”159 
 Thompson spotted a group of villagers fleeing for safety in a bunker. With American GIs 
in hot pursuit, he judged the civilians were unlikely to survive unless someone intervened. He 
landed the helicopter on the road, thereby separating the villagers from their American pursuers, 
radioed two nearby helicopter gunships for support and, through them, communicated to the 
soldiers of Charlie Company that his gunners would open fire on anyone shooting at civilians. 
The firing ceased. Thompson’s actions saved the lives of a handful of civilians. Of those in the 
drainage ditch, they were able to save only a three-year-old boy, who had managed to go 
unnoticed by his would-be executioners thanks to being completely covered in a grisly 
camouflage of mud and blood. Nearly the entire village had been wiped out. 
 My Lai was just one of numerous atrocities committed by American soldiers during the 
war and might have been forgotten were it not for a combination of factors that conspired against 
official secrecy. Despite the US Army’s best efforts, rumors of the massacre eventually leaked to 
the press and within a year, public outrage demanded an investigation. The existence of Ronald 
L. Haeberle’s color photographs, subsequently published by major newspapers and television 
networks, intensified the shock. Haeberle’s images depicted bundles of anonymous bodies piled 
alongside the road, lifeless old men, women, and children. One shot captured an instant of pure 
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terror in the faces of several women and girls literally seconds before machinegun fire mowed 
them down. 
The massacre at My Lai launched a national debate over responsibility for war atrocities. 
Though several of the soldiers who participated in atrocities that day were later charged with 
crimes, only Lieutenant Calley was convicted of killing twenty-two villagers and sentenced to 
life imprisonment with hard labor.160 Yet for all the national debate, My Lai was not the 
aberration American politicians and the military establishment claimed it was. 
Oliver points out that “horrors were often routine”161 in Vietnam. “Whilst the atrocities in 
Son My may have been exceptional in scale,” he writes, “the battlefield practices of the US 
military exaggerated the ordinary viciousness of a civil war to such an extent that the boundaries 
of ethical behaviour became obscure for many of those concerned.”162 Nick Turse has 
meticulously documented the perpetration of numerous massacres and other atrocities by 
American forces in Vietnam besides—and in some cases far exceeding—the events in My Lai. 
In his view, “the real aberration was the unprecedented and unparalleled investigation and 
exposure of My Lai. No other American atrocity committed during the war … was ever afforded 
anything approaching the same attention.”163 
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My Lai was made visible to the American public in a way other atrocities in Vietnam 
simply were not. As a result, it became the episode upon which the justice of the war itself 
ultimately hinged. An editorialist for the New York Times underscored the idea of visibility when 
he described the American presence in Vietnam as “that of a hideous blind giant, skilled at 
killing but unable to ‘see’ what he kills. My Lai now permits us to take a good look.”164 Indeed, 
the justice of American military power itself came into question. Even among supporters of the 
war, there was a strong sense that American violence had gone beyond the pale in this case. 
The national moral concern over My Lai was short-lived, however. At the urging of the 
media, the episode was eventually accommodated by an American public eager to reject the 
burden such an atrocity implied. While media coverage of the Vietnam war is often hailed as a 
glowing example of intrepid journalism in the service of democratic politics against corrupt and 
unaccountable power, the reality was somewhat different. Hallin describes how the mass media 
came to depict a version of the war and its objectives largely in line with official state policy: 
[J]ournalists gave up the right to speak with a political voice of their own, and in turn 
they were granted a regular right of access to the inner counsels of government … The 
press was recognized as a sort of “fourth branch of government,” a part of the informal 
constitution of the political system; and it in turn accepted certain standards of 
“responsible” behavior. These standards involved not merely renouncing the right to 
make partisan criticisms of political authority, but also granting to political authorities 
certain positive rights of access to the news and accepting for the most part the language, 
agenda, and perspectives of the political “establishment.”165 
 
Establishment journalists, Hallin argues, were generally unwilling to question the Cold War 
“national security” consensus, and instead acted as “‘responsible’ advocates for that 
consensus.”166 
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Before the massacre at My Lai became widely known in late 1969, details about other 
massacres had periodically leaked to the press, but even media outlets associated with the 
political Left were often unwilling to publish these accounts.167 Before My Lai, few seriously 
entertained the argument that, as the philosopher Bertrand Russell and others had already 
suggested as early as 1963, the Vietnam War was a “war of annihilation” and itself an 
“atrocity.”168 By the late 1960s, however, the antiwar movement had advanced to such a point 
that it became possible to find voices within the mainstream media willing to exploit the rare 
moment and offer more critical coverage. This is precisely what happened in late 1969 when the 
My Lai massacre was exposed. 
It might be said that national discourse between roughly 1969-1971 straddled a threshold 
of atrocity. To the extent that questions were raised about the morality of the American presence 
in Vietnam, My Lai injected an unusual dose of critical analysis. Thresholds of atrocity only 
loom when responsibility for a bad state of affairs appears to implicate the group as a whole and 
to thereby call the desirability of membership into question. If responsibility can be imputed 
elsewhere however, the threshold can be avoided. So while the outrage initially generated by the 
revelations of the My Lai massacre did open a window for more critical analysis than might 
otherwise have been the case, an emphasis on legality and the actions of individuals redirected 
the question of responsibility. “[A]s the discursive status of the massacre shifted from allegation 
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to certified crime, a number of media commentaries sought to preserve the protective cast around 
the national self-image, asserting the aberrant nature of the events at My Lai (4) and, by 
implication the excessive guilt of Medina, Calley and their men.”169  
In this vein, Hallin argues that media coverage of My Lai was generally “cautious and 
dispassionate,” preoccupied mainly with the legal complexities of Lieutenant Calley’s trial and 
not the details of the massacre itself—which of course became an “alleged massacre” once 
charges were filed.170 For the vast majority of mainstream commentators, the events at My Lai, 
while lamentable, were by no means representative of either American values or of the war in 
general. “[F]or much of the viewing public, My Lai was less an atrocity … than confirmation 
that American morale was on the decline.”171 At worst, My Lai represented a moment of 
irrational behavior on the part of several individuals; at best, craven scapegoating.172 Many 
Americans simply did not believe the story.173  
The issue of responsibility, collective or individual, is paramount in such cases. If the 
atrocities really were systemic, a degree of guilt potentially lay with the nation as a whole, as 
some had argued about ordinary Germans after the second world war.174 At a minimum, My Lai 
eroded a veneer of American benevolence and carried the unsettling whiff of Nazi crimes. Hugh 
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Thompson had intervened during the massacre precisely because the killing he witnessed that 
day reminded him of Nazi atrocities and he was not alone in drawing the comparison; Europeans 
compared the massacre to the German blitzkrieg and especially to the gratuitous Nazi killings of 
Czech civilians at the village of Lidice in 1942. “But at Lidice,” the New York Times pointed out, 
“the Nazis spared the women and children.”175 The Nation magazine similarly argued that if the 
details of the My Lai massacre were true, “the Americans involved behaved with an on-the-spot 
savagery that exceeded even that of the Germans at Liddice [sic] in World War II.”176 
The revelations of My Lai, regardless of whether the comparisons to Nazi crimes were 
taken seriously or not, nevertheless threatened to demolish the mythos of homespun benevolence 
surrounding the American GI in the national imagination. In an interview with one of the central 
participants in the massacre, veteran journalist Mike Wallace observed: 
The thought that goes through your mind is, we’ve raised such a dickens about what the 
Nazis did, or what the Japanese did, but particularly what the Nazis did in the second 
world war, the brutalization and so forth, you know. It’s hard for a good many Americans 
to understand that young, capable, American boys could line up old men, women and 
children and babies and shoot them down in cold blood.177 
 
Robert Rheault, the former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, expressed a similar 
sentiment: “Some people think that the Japanese committed atrocities, that the Germans 
committed atrocities, that the Russians committed atrocities, but that the Americans don’t 
commit atrocities. Well, this just isn’t so. American troops are capable as any other of 
committing atrocities.”178 
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 In the popular imagination, the Nazis represent pure evil. “In the twentieth century,” 
Baumeister argues, “the most compelling and enduring image of evil is the Nazis. The Nazis 
have replaced the red-skinned, pointy-tailed Satan as the prototype of evil.”179 In moral 
philosophy as well the Nazis loom large. Noting a shift away from religious discourses of evil in 
contemporary moral philosophy, Richard Bernstein notes “ever since we have become aware of 
the full horrors of the Nazi period and the perverse cruelty of the Shoah, Auschwitz has come to 
symbolize the most extreme evil of our time.”180 In correspondence with her mentor Karl Jaspers 
regarding her recently published The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote: 
Evil has proved to be more radical than expected. In objective terms, modern crimes are 
not provided for in the Ten Commandments. Or: the Western Tradition is suffering from 
the preconception that the most evil things human beings can arise from the vice of 
selfishness. Yet we know that the greatest evils or radical evil has nothing to do anymore 
with such humanly understandable, sinful motives?181 
 
Her appropriation of Kant’s notion of radical evil is directly inspired by the Nazi crimes—crimes 
that “explode the limits of the law,” as she put it.182 Arendt warns that once a specific act has 
made an appearance on the world stage, it remains with us “as a potentiality long after its 
actuality has become a thing of the past.”183 
The emphasis on the specific forms of violence associated with the actuality of Nazism, 
real or perceived, constitutes a paradigm of atrocity. That is to say the Nazi holocaust, 
understood as an event of transgressive violence par excellence, serves as a mental rule of 
thumb, a moral shortcut for weighing the severity of violence in other contexts. The comparison 
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with Nazi crimes may be more or less warranted, but even superficial resemblance carries strong 
moral prohibitions. On the one hand, the universal disgust evoked by Nazi atrocities should be 
recognized as a great success for moral education. At a minimum, Nazism surely represents the 
darkness and cruelty, the sheer moral depravity of which our species is capable. But might it also 
generate a blind spot? 
Our sensitivity to the historically specific nature of Nazi crimes and its imagery—the death 
camps, the gas chambers, the crematoria, the hellish piles of emaciated corpses—might leave us 
less able to imagine other manifestations of transgressive violence, less able to consider future 
atrocities “beside which Hitler’s gassing installations look like an evil child’s fumbling toys.”184 
It is essentially for this reason: that the unprecedented, once it has appeared, may become 
a precedent for the future, that all trials touching upon “crimes against humanity” must be 
judged according to a standard that is today still an “ideal.”185 
 
Insofar as violence resembles Nazi violence, it can be assigned an uncontroversial status as 
atrocity. Even even when the comparison to Nazi violence is shallow or unwarranted it can still 
carry a strong whiff of atrocity. While the U.S. presence in Vietnam took an enormous human 
toll, it is not obvious that it sank to a program of calculated and systematic extermination, but a 
direct comparison with Nazism is not required for the moral shortcut to obtain. A superficial 
resemblance is often enough. It is at least partly for this reason that the killings at My Lai elicited 
more concern and moral outrage than the millions of other civilian deaths caused by American 
military engagement in Vietnam. My Lai resembled Nazi crimes, at least superficially; the others 
did not—not obviously anyway. It is also for this reason that Hugh Thompson found the actions 
of Charlie Company so blatantly objectionable, motivating him to take the drastic measure of 




turning his guns on U.S. soldiers. As another member of Charlie Company later remarked, the 
mass killings at My Lai were a “Nazi kind of thing.”186 
 
Paradigms of Atrocity 
During the American Revolutionary period, the use of the word “slavery” as a metaphor 
for the colonial experience under British rule became popular among white anti-British 
agitators.187 Later, the metaphor was adapted to emphasize the oppressive conditions experienced 
by workers under early industrial capitalism—often derided as “white slavery” or “wage 
slavery” by labor activists. The idea of abstract slavery rode the crest of the Western 
philosophical tradition and was commonly invoked as a metaphor for absolute unfreedom, 
notwithstanding the actual practice of chattel slavery.188 Lay discourses generally operate 
according to a different set of objectives than do scholarly discourses, especially those aimed at 
achieving political goals. Insofar as it pushed against the mind’s limits for understanding labor 
conditions unsuitable for any (white) worker, adopting the slave analogy was politically 
expedient.189 Similarly, genocide scholars today employ a language of identification and 
intervention that rests strongly on the specificity of what Jonathan Glover calls the “distinctive 
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Nazi darkness.”190 Yet what is treated as specific has been simultaneously adopted as a paradigm 
for understanding genocide generally. 
For having invoked the memories of Nazi atrocities in particular, the My Lai massacre 
smacked of evil. The associations pointed out by critics of the massacre serve mainly to 
emphasize its transgressive nature by establishing a mental connection with the “exotic evil”191 
of Nazism. References to the Nazis in lay parlance are often deployed in this way, serving as a 
kind of shorthand for pure evil. Tal observes as much in North American political discourse; the 
use of the Nazi holocaust as a metonym for evil has predictable but interesting consequences. 
“‘Hitler,’ ‘Jew,’ ‘Nazi,’ and ‘Holocaust’ imply floating chains of signifiers in the Barthesian 
sense, each invoking a variety of signifieds.”192 In national politics, the specter of Nazism is used 
to discredit political candidates and their ideas. “Nazi references,” Johnson argues, “are nearly 
ubiquitous in American culture—appearing in film, literature, popular music, television, and 
video games, political speeches and debates. The proliferation suggests a national definition: 
Nazis are evil, and evil is Nazi.”193 This circular definition is sufficiently flexible for the many 
uses to which the popular imagination deploys Nazi analogies. 
So much for the popular discourse, but what does the Nazi holocaust offer scholars in 
terms of comparative analysis, if anything? The answer to this question remains the subject of 
some debate. Traditionally, the question has centered on the “uniqueness” or singularity of the 
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Nazi holocaust and the potential for extrapolating from it more general lessons. The sensitivity of 
the topic has unfortunately generated a great deal of confusion over what this actually entails. In 
his anthology of perspectives on the uniqueness debate, Alan Rosenbaum writes that “the 
Holocaust is in many crucial respects an unparalleled or singular event.” Nevertheless, “the 
historical singularity of the Holocaust does not imply by that fact alone that it is ‘unique’ in some 
significant sense.”194 It should go without saying that all historical events are to some extent 
unprecedented, but ascribing to the Nazi holocaust absolute phenomenal uniqueness poses 
obvious problems for social scientists. If a particular event is truly a case apart, how is the 
scholar to proceed?  
If [the Nazi holocaust] can’t be legitimately compared to any other historical process or 
event, and it is indeed utterly unique, then it cannot be repeated in any form, and thus the 
slogan ‘never again’—often uttered when attempts are made to draw lessons for the 
present and future from these terrible events—is meaningless, since the ‘Final Solution’ 
has no relevance to anything else and no lessons to teach us in the present day.195 
 
Incidentally, some have adopted this very position. The Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz, for example, emphatically argues “there are no lessons to take from the Shoah. And, 
perhaps, what is so terrible about the Shoah is that it has no lesson.”196 
The uniqueness debate resurfaced with great popular interest as recently as 1996 upon the 
publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners.197 Goldhagen argues that 
German anti-Semitism was indeed unique in both incidence and intensity, though his work was 
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roundly dismissed by many prominent holocaust scholars, including Raul Hilberg who called it 
“Totally wrong. Exceptionally wrong.”198 Though it periodically resurfaces in the popular 
literature and in North American Jewish philosophy,199 the special singularity of the Nazi 
holocaust is no longer a subject of much debate among mainstream genocide and holocaust 
scholars. It is instead regarded as intellectually untenable and morally dubious to reserve a 
special classification that would downplay, in effect if not intent, the catastrophes other groups 
have suffered in holocausts of their own. Nor does a skepticism of the Nazi holocaust’s absolute 
uniqueness in any way diminish or trivialize its horror. 
The historiographical and methodological disputes over the Nazi holocaust as a subject of 
scholarly analysis have produced some interesting contradictions. Senior editor of the Journal of 
Genocide Research, Dirk Moses, has criticized “leading genocide scholars” for treating the Nazi 
holocaust as what he calls a “paradigm of genocide” despite rejecting its uniqueness.200 Such 
treatment, he argues, implies that the Nazi holocaust has compelling analytic value—but only 
because it is the most genocidal of genocides, the genocide as it were. This is a common theme 
in the literature. For example, Jonathan Glover writes that while there are “some common 
patterns to be found” in comparative analysis with the Nazi holocaust, “this is not to deny that 
the Nazi genocide has a terrible darkness all its own.”201 The international legal definition 
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notwithstanding, Dirk Moses claims that the field of genocide studies has, “redefined [genocide] 
as an ideologically-motivated and state-executed program of mass killing.”202 The emphasis 
placed on these two variables (ideological motives and state direction) tends to eclipse the 
“capacious definition” proffered by Raphael Lemkin when he coined the term “genocide.” I will 
return to Lemkin and the expansive definition of genocide momentarily. 
If mass killing remains the central act associated with genocide, the Nazi holocaust 
remains the paradigmatic example. Nazi crimes are used as the measure against which the 
severity of all atrocities can be analyzed and assessed. Melson claims this analytical reliance on 
the Nazi holocaust on the part of genocide scholars is misleading and suggests that other 
historical incidents, especially the Armenian genocide, may generate more fruitful comparative 
analyses: 
In the Holocaust, the victims were not a territorial group; the ideology was a variant of a 
global racism and antisemitism, not nationalism; and the characteristic method of 
destruction was the death camp. Indeed, in the contemporary world, only the Cambodian 
genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge bears a closer resemblance to the Holocaust 
than to the Armenian Genocide.203 
 
Whether or not the contemporary field of genocide studies remains faithful to Lemkin’s intent is 
an ongoing debate, the contours of which cannot be adequately recounted here. Nor is it 
particularly important to offer more than a sense of this debate for the task at hand. I am much 
more interested in the normative implications that follow first from adopting the Nazi holocaust 
as a paradigm of genocide; and second from conceiving of genocide as the worst of all 
imaginable atrocities. What does it mean for a theory of atrocity grounded in vision that 
genocide is perceived as the paradigmatic atrocity, the Nazi holocaust as the paradigmatic 
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genocide, and the Nazis as the paradigmatic incarnation of evil?204 
 It is worth elaborating on my claim that the Nazi holocaust has become a paradigm of 
atrocity by reviewing the operative terms. As explained in the previous chapters, I take atrocity 
to mean violence perceived as having transgressed all social and political norms, i.e. lacking any 
excuse or justification under any circumstances. For instance, a given political community might 
tolerate a minimal degree of violence in the form of a basic internal security apparatus. The same 
political community would likely reject the regular use of torture by such an apparatus and the 
likelihood of a community tolerating such violence diminishes further once we apply the veil of 
ignorance heuristic discussed earlier. Other cases of institutionalized violence will surely follow 
a similar pattern: some coercion will likely be tolerated, but probably only within tightly 
constrained boundaries. It is probable that a greater amount of violence will be permitted against 
outsiders and less permitted against insiders. It seems very unlikely that any political community 
could develop norms predicated on mass suffering of either insiders or outsiders without an 
enormous amount of deception at work. Deception is certainly part of the story as the next 
chapter will address, but for now I am interested in what we might expect from communities in 
which violence is fully visible. 
 It is also necessary to explain just what I mean by paradigm of atrocity. Because I 
employ a definition of atrocity that necessarily relies to a great extent on the imprecision of 
interpretation, it is not possible to establish strict definitions; there are no convenient lines for 
which one might declare “there lies a threshold of atrocity!” Still, the inability to “see” many 
atrocities does not, in itself, disqualify those instances from correctly being ascribed such a 
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status. For the purposes of this study, a paradigm of atrocity is simply an example of past 
violence that has become ubiquitous and now serves as a powerful filter through which the 
identification and interpretation of violence that falls beyond a threshold of atrocity takes place. 
In the case of the Nazi holocaust, this is apparent not only in the scholarly literature but also in 
the wider culture in such a way as to obscure forms of atrocity that do not closely resemble Nazi 
crimes. One of the ways this manifests in political struggles is the understandable attempt by 
victim groups to appropriate the term “holocaust” for their own suffering.205 Critics of this 
practice argue that while it might be a politically expedient strategy for gaining political 
recognition, sympathy, or reparations, it also reinforces the idea that an atrocity must be 
sufficiently Nazi-like to warrant recognition. “Far from constituting a symbolic idiom that 
empowers non-Jewish victims to win public recognition, the Holocaust occludes their 
experiences by establishing an unattainable monumental threshold.”206 
Within a moral taxonomy of atrocity, the narrow understanding of genocide-as-
Auschwitz all but guarantees that genocide is today understood to be the worst imaginable 
atrocity, if not the central crime associated with the term, to the exclusion of other forms of 
violence that also demand vociferous moral protest. This contributes to a blind spot when it 
comes to recognizing atrocities that do not fit easily into the Nazi paradigm. Not all forms of 
atrocity are genocidal and not all genocides look like Auschwitz. It should be possible to expand 
our moral vision by heeding Arendt’s warning that future atrocities may appear very different 
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than the paradigm established by the Nazi holocaust without (and one cannot stress this point 
enough) diminishing the moral horror of Auschwitz a single iota. 
 
Atrocity and Genocide 
The twentieth century bore witness to astonishing levels of carnage, episodes of mass 
killing among which the Nazi holocaust holds a prominent, if not preeminent, place in both the 
cultural and scholarly imaginations. What is it about Nazi crimes in particular that stand out? A 
crude tally of the millions murdered cannot alone explain it; the century experienced multiple 
massacres, some of which resulted in greater numbers of gross death. Rummel offers an estimate 
of 21.9 million lives ended by the Nazi regime. Yet this mind-boggling figure is dwarfed by two 
more of what he calls the twentieth century’s “dekamegamurders”—the 35.23 and 61.9 million 
deaths caused by the Chinese and Soviet gulag states respectively.207 In addition to these three 
episodes of mass murder, Rummel also documents the killing of 10.2 million people in China by 
Chiang Kai-shek’s quasi-fascist nationalist regime. To these four dekamegamurders, I would 
suggest another example nowhere mentioned in his book: the colonial atrocities directed by 
Belgium’s King Leopold II in the Congo Free State, which resulted in 8-15 million deaths.208 
Looking at body counts is an unseemly business, especially when even one million dead, let 
alone tens of millions, is already an incomprehensible figure. Clearly the numbers alone cannot 
explain the Nazi holocaust’s status as a paradigm of genocide.  
Instead of numbers, many dwell instead on Nazi racial ideology and the underlying, 
symbolic meaning of Nazi violence. For instance, Emile Fackenheim, a major figure in the 
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uniqueness debate, suggests that it was precisely because there was no rational economic or 
political advantage to be gained by its implementation that sets the Final Solution apart. The 
sheer single-mindedness of the Nazi extermination program, proponents of this view claim, 
render it a very different phenomenon from the Chinese and Soviet episodes. Others claim that 
Nazi genocide is regarded with special horror by Europeans precisely because Hitler marked the 
return of colonial violence to the metropole. Aimé Cesaire mocked the irony of European 
indignation over Nazi crimes which had, until then, “been applied only to non-European 
peoples.”209 Indeed, many scholars now regard the German massacres between 1904-09 against 
the Herero people as the century’s first genocide and a forerunner to the Nazi holocaust.210 The 
symbolism of Nazi violence is surely part of the story. There is something undeniably chilling 
about the extension of industrial bureaucratic efficiency to the business of mass murder, the way 
in which the Nazis reduced the challenges of mass murder to mere technical problems to be 
solved. It strikes us as profoundly cold-blooded, somehow even worse than conventional mass 
murder—if there is such a thing. 
Whatever the other contributing factors, the Nazi holocaust’s paradigmatic status is 
informed at least in part by the evolution of the word “genocide” itself. None of the Nazi war 
criminals put on trial at Nuremberg were charged with genocide because the term did not exist at 
the time. It is a common misconception that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) was adopted by the United Nations in response 
to the Nazi holocaust specifically. While it is true that the Final Solution contributed to the 
animus behind passing the CPPCG, those drafting the Convention did not regard the Nazi 
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holocaust as a paradigmatic case of genocide. Still less was it thought to be so by Raphael 
Lemkin, the man who coined the term “genocide” itself. Though technological sophistication 
made it easier for Hitler, Lemkin felt there was nothing inherently modern about the idea and 
practice of genocide.211  
Genocide is a special crime insofar as its prosecution under international law requires a 
general intent for the underlying act itself (e.g. killing members of a group, forcibly transferring 
children, etc.) as well as an ulterior intent to destroy the victim group via such action. For 
instance, if one group is shown to have adulterated another group’s water supply with a chemical 
substance that reduces fertility rates, it may be a criminal act, but it is not necessarily genocidal. 
However, if it can be shown that the underlying act of tainting the water was implemented with 
the ultimate goal of destroying the group, the crime then rises to genocide under international 
law. No death camps are necessary for the legal definition to obtain.  
While the popular understanding of genocide and indeed much of the scholarly treatment 
of the subject relies on a definition that takes mass killing for granted, the crime of genocide 
technically requires no killing at all.212 Lemkin’s original formulation included a number of 
historical episodes of mass killing dating to the classical world which he regarded as genocidal in 
nature, but his use of the term also encompassed an array of non-lethal activities, e.g. measures 
taken to counter the biological reproduction of a victim group.213 Despite the direction Moses 
and others claim genocide scholars have taken the field, the international legal definition of 
genocide outlined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
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Genocide (CPPCG) clearly endorses Lemkin’s expanded notion. In addition to the prosecution of 
physical violence against a targeted group, article two of the CPPCG also proscribes as genocidal 
“measures intended to prevent births” and “[f]orcibly transferring children.” Forms of “para-
lethal” genocide remain controversial elements of the Convention’s definition and are often 
treated by scholars as ancillary or even non-genocidal.214 They are too often semantically 
trivialized as mere “cultural genocide”—and not genocide proper. The philosopher Claudia Card, 
to whose work I will return shortly, criticizes the tendency of genocide scholars to downplay 
non-lethal forms of genocide. As a corrective, she suggests placing Orlando Patterson’s concept 
of “social death”215 at the center of genocide. 
Putting social death at the center of genocide explains and clarifies the position, 
controversial among genocide scholars, that genocidal acts are not necessarily homicidal. 
Forcibly sterilizing the women or the men of a targeted group, or forcibly separating 
children from their parents for re-education to assimilate them into another group, can be 
genocidal in both aim and effect.216 
 
Emphasizing social death, Card argues, renders the notion of “cultural genocide” redundant and 
misleading. Her work implicitly suggests that non-lethal genocide is an entirely plausible 
potentiality and, given the definition of genocide outlined in the Convention, it is difficult to 
argue otherwise. Yet, non-lethal forms of genocide are either ignored or discussed only as 
adjuncts to the primary phenomenon: mass killing. 
                                                
214 As Watenpaugh argues, “These para-lethal elements have too often been consigned to the status of mere ‘cultural 
genocide.’ As a consequence, they can be more easily dismissed as ‘soft’ aspects of genocide, and not ‘hard’ in the 
way mass-killing is. That dismissal is wrong.” Keith Watenpaugh, “Genocide and the Social Death of Children,” 
Stanford University Press Blog, April 23, 2015, http://stanfordpress.typepad.com/blog/2015/04/genocide-and-the-
social-death-of-children.html. 
215 See Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982). 
216 Claudia Card, Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
238. 
 86 
 Because of the fairly loose legal definition of genocide outlined in the convention, it is 
conceivable that charges of genocide might be leveled at governments for pursuing policies 
aimed at destroying undesirable communities “in whole or in part” without resorting to mass 
killing—as in the sterilization example proffered above. Yet the term “genocide” is rarely 
invoked to describe such policies and is typically met with derision when it is. This disconnect 
between the legal and colloquial definitions of genocide has very real consequences. To offer 
one real-world example with which I am quite familiar, human rights groups have for years 
accused Israel of pursuing policies aimed at diminishing the Palestinian presence in East 
Jerusalem with the goal of maintaining a Jewish demographic advantage in the Old City, which 
Israel conquered in 1967 and later annexed in contravention of international law. The Israeli 
human rights group B’Tselem points to various methods the Israeli state has implemented to 
advance this agenda:  
• Physically isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, in part by building 
the Separation Barrier;  
• Discriminating in land expropriation, planning and building, and demolition of houses;  
• Revoking residency and social benefits of Palestinians who stay abroad for at least seven 
years, or who are unable to prove that their center of life is in Jerusalem;  
• Unfairly dividing the budget between the two parts of the city, with harmful effects to 
infrastructure and services in East Jerusalem.217 
 
While B’Tselem does not claim that such policies amount to genocide, they do claim the 
measures are designed “to create a demographic and geographic situation that will thwart any 
future attempt to challenge Israeli sovereignty over [Jerusalem].”218 Moreover, the restrictions 
placed on the growth of Palestinian towns in the occupied West Bank stands in stark 
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contradistinction to the vast resources devoted to expanding and codifying a strong Israeli-
Jewish presence over the occupied territories.  
Whether or not these policies fulfill the legal definition of genocide is debatable and it is 
important to stress that Israel is not unique in practicing this kind of demographic 
micromanagement. China pursues similar efforts against the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region, as 
does India against Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. Some scholars have leveled charges of 
genocide against the United States and Canada for infringement on the rights of Native 
Americans. However capacious the CPPCG definition of genocide, I am not personally 
convinced that it is morally or strategically wise to place racist demographic management 
alongside policies of mass killing. Whatever the merits of doing so whether the policies in 
question actually fulfill the legal definition of genocide, it is enough to point out that the CPPCG 
is sufficiently loose to include a range of non-murderous activities—so long as the ultimate 
intent is the destruction “in whole or in part” of the victim community. The popular and 
scholarly consensus notwithstanding, there is simply no good reason for us to think 
contemporary genocides must resemble Nazi crimes in order for them to fulfill the CPPCG 
definition. 
While the legal definition of genocide is fairly loose, it is rarely invoked. Yet even the 
current definition has its critics who feel the term narrows the scope of imaginable contexts in 
which vast numbers of lives are destroyed. In an interesting essay, Vinay Lal challenges the 
prevailing understanding of genocide specifically, arguing that the hidden practices of economic 
liberalization, often promoted under the name of “development,” have caused untold death and 
misery and might more accurately be described as a form of genocide. The disparate forms of 
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violence that accompany “structural adjustment” policies, he claims, are allowed to without 
producing much concern because market logic is assumed to be extra-political, even natural.  
Lal’s inclusion of destructive economic policy obviously falls well outside the present 
definition of genocide outlined in the CPPCG. Invoking the specter of Nazism, Lal questions 
whether or not we need to reevaluate the terms of the discussion away from “camps” for fear of 
missing genocides occurring under other guises. 
Will it suffice to speak of genocide as the wilful elimination, in part or in whole, of 
groups of people, whether conceived through the categories of nationality, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual preference or linguistic identity, and point to continuing 
violence in the Sudan, Chechnya, the Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere as instances 
of genocide in our time, or do our times call for some radical rethinking of genocide? 
Does our present understanding of genocide permit us to recognize the numerous forms, 
institutions and sociocultural practices, many cast as benevolent interventions, through 
which it might be practiced?219 
 
While Lal’s article raises some interesting questions, he does not follow up on the ideas, leaving 
that work to others. Certainly he is right to worry about markets obscuring intent and I agree that 
the analytic focus on Nazi crimes has tended to restrict our ability to identify objectionable 
violence in different quarters. I do not, however, understand the determination to label all forms 
of extreme violence, hidden or otherwise, “genocide.”  
Lal’s concerns simply cannot be addressed by expanding the legal definition. The crime 
of genocide under international law is already sufficiently open to accommodate a range of 
historical and present injustices that fall short of systematic extermination. Nevertheless, the 
term is also too confining in its emphasis on groups for application in the diversity of cases Lal 
suggests—nor is it clear what would be accomplished be expanding the legal definition beyond 
recognition. 
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The problem, rather, is one of politics; states are hesitant to use the word “genocide” 
because of the positive action the word implies in the age of “responsibility to protect.” Instead 
of expanding the definition of genocide then or abandoning the term altogether, I propose an 
emphasis on the notion of atrocity and a willingness to keep an open mind when it comes to 
manifestations of extreme violence. Prioritizing a discourse of atrocity leaves the door open for a 
range of crimes, many of which we are not yet able to comprehend or predict. As Arendt writes 
in her account of the Eichmann trial, part of the difficulty in prosecuting Nazi crimes was the 
sheer scale and legal illegibility they suggested. Nothing like the “fabrication of corpses” in 
factories of death had been seen before.220 The idea was simply unthinkable. What atrocities 
might the future have in store for us?—horrors for which we do not yet have a name and which 
may not easily conform to the legal definition of genocide? 
 The genocide-as-Auschwitz mindset has another complicating factor: its strategic use by 
states to advance narrow interests. Peter Novick argues that while Nazi Germany was, in the 
United States, regarded as the “apotheosis of human evil and depravity” during WWII, the Cold 
War brought about the necessity of relocating public perceptions away from Germany and 
towards the Soviet Union.221 This was achieved in part through the coining and proliferation of 
the term “totalitarianism,” which was intended to identify points of similarity between the Nazi 
and Communist regimes. Moreover, the widespread use of labor camps under both regimes 
helped codify the comparison in the popular imagination. The camp, after all, remains one of the 
most powerful symbols of Nazi atrocities. According to this argument, emphasizing the horrors 
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of the Nazi genocide served to advance state security prerogatives by providing a useful 
propaganda function.  
Building on Novick’s work, Norman Finkelstein argues that the moral status of the Nazi 
holocaust provided “the perfect weapon for deflecting criticism of Israel” over its brutalization of 
the Palestinians following that country’s 1967 conquest and continuing occupation of the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, and Golan Heights.222 According to Finkelstein, Israel’s policies vis-à-vis 
the occupied Palestinian population are more easily excused and justified by an Israeli populace 
convinced that it remains the victim of anti-Semitic oppression. Israeli politicians in the 
immediate post-war era frequently drew comparisons between the Palestinians and the Nazis, as 
if to suggest a direct ideological lineage.223 
There are other problems with the genocide-as-Auschwitz approach. According to 
Bloxham, the pervasive assumption that genocide must always resemble Auschwitz betrays a 
Euro-centric set of priorities. Channeling Cesaire, Bloxham is especially concerned with the 
refusal to consider what by modern standards must be regarded as genocidal colonial violence 
inflicted on African peoples for centuries: 
The truth is that most other genocides have been of insufficient interest to Western 
intellectuals for them to ponder their metaphysical dimensions the way the Holocaust has 
been pondered. Let me be clear: something of the dimensions of the final solution should 
prompt huge and sustained philosophical self-reflection, but it is the ‘surprise’ that 
registers in so much of the scholarship that is telling, since Europe had not only 
witnessed other genocides, it had inflicted them on its colonial peripheries well before the 
continent erupted at its own core in the twentieth century.224 
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While the uniqueness debate has subsided, Bloxham sees it reemerging in new forms that fit 
“into a long tradition of the West’s attempts to universalize its own values and uniqueness in the 
totalistic sense it is meant must be a demand for universal significance.”225 
 The cultural and professional focus on the Nazi holocaust has virtually guaranteed an 
awareness on the part of school children around the world of the latent potential for human 
cruelty on a staggering scale. This is laudable, but I worry that the moral benefits that accrue 
from acknowledging the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of genocide are tempered by the broader 
depiction of the Nazis as a paradigm of evil. Philosophers have attempted to revive the notion of 
evil in recent years and to inject the term with meaningful secular content, it nevertheless retains 
superhuman connotations. Evil is commonly perceived as absolutely-not-self. It implies a loss or 
absence of humanity. Atrocity, by contrast, is very much a product of human agency and 
innovation. But if evil is indeed something of which humans are capable, as some contemporary 
moral philosophers would like to insist, how can we reconcile a theory of atrocity grounded in 
moral vision with the powerful baggage evil inevitably brings to the discussion? 
 
Atrocity and Evil 
The scholarly literature on atrocity very often broaches the question of evil. What was 
once reserved for the exclusive purview of theological dispute has come into vogue among 
contemporary secular philosophers, partly in response to the immense suffering and violence that 
characterized the twentieth century. To be sure, categorizing Nazi crimes as merely “wrong” or 
“bad” strikes one as grossly inadequate. Nor does “very, very bad” quite capture it. Language 
falters at the attempt to describe the sheer scale of the wrongdoing. A theory of atrocity is then 
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immediately confronted by the question of scale and how to adequately differentiate between 
different wrongs. This problem is directly relatable to the threshold of atrocity in that it explores 
the basic distinction between that which is acceptable and that which transgresses all norms. 
Within the realm of petty social transgressions or very small moral wrongs, the question may not 
strike us as especially urgent, but when we extend the discussion to ongoing violence and 
suffering in our world today, they take on special importance. 
Despite the apparent urgency of the concept, atrocity is surprisingly under-theorized. In 
one of the only accounts to treat atrocity in some depth, Claudia Card advances a secular theory 
of evil centered on the suffering endured by victims of atrocity. She offers no definition of 
atrocity as such but lists several “well-known kinds,” including “genocide, slavery, torture, rape 
as a weapon of war, the saturation bombing of cities, biological and chemical warfare unleashing 
viruses and gases, and the domestic terrorism of prolonged battery, stalking, and child abuse.”226 
Card does not suggest that this is a comprehensive catalog of atrocities and it is plausible to 
imagine that at least some of what she lists might even be morally justifiable under certain 
conditions. Her use of atrocity as a concept serves mainly to advance a theory of evil and its 
boundaries are duly subordinated to that task. Consequently, it is occasionally difficult to 
understand precisely what she means by the idea. She uses the term only to offer examples of 
“evils” that remain unassailable as evil. Card describes as “evil” harm that is:  
(1) reasonably foreseeable (or appreciable) and (2) culpably inflicted (or tolerated, 
aggravated, or maintained), and that (3) deprives, or seriously risks depriving, others of the 
basics that are necessary to make a life possible and tolerable or decent (or to make a death 
decent).227 
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That which we commonly regard as atrocious fits each of these points, though part of her project 
aims to suggest that other forms of behavior and institutions are either evils or potential evils, 
though not necessarily atrocities (marriage, for instance).228  
While at one point Card writes that her “own” list of atrocities would including “evils 
done to animals”—thereby suggesting that others might not agree with this moral designation—
central to her argument is the assertion that atrocities are “uncontroversially evil.”229 This 
resonates with the definition of atrocity presented in this study, i.e. violence that transgresses all 
norms, assuming phenomenological comprehensibility. Moreover, Card specifically invokes 
vision as a tool with which one is able to become aware of some atrocities and remain oblivious 
to others: “Some [atrocities]” she writes, “are highly visible (bombings), others can be difficult 
to detect (environmental poisoning).”230 This observation also resonates strongly with a theory of 
atrocity grounded in vision, yet Card’s central argument proceeds in a different direction because 
her interests lie not in defining atrocity but in explaining evil. 
Card’s account of evil expressly includes atrocities as well as evil actions that do not 
qualify as atrocities. This places her theory somewhat at odds with popular conceptions of evil in 
which the term is reserved only for the worst imaginable acts.231 Card’s discussion of atrocity, 
though underdeveloped, is of more interest to us here for how it relates to my own formulation of 
the concept. She defends the utility of a secular notion of evil as a broad category of extreme 
wrongdoing and proceeds to make her case by pointing to atrocities as uncontroversial 
candidates for her definition of evil. In her view, atrocity describes a specific class of action 
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whereas evil is a wider category that encompasses a spectrum of potential wrongdoing from 
minor to severe. Card emphatically does not argue that atrocities are the only phenomena that 
qualify as evil, just that atrocities seem to underscore whatever discernable qualities we might 
identify in them as atrocious. 
Card’s account raises an obvious question: why distinguish evils from ordinary wrongs at 
all? “One reason,” Card argues “is to help set priorities when resources are limited for preventing 
wrongs and repairing harms.”232 We can call this the instrumental argument: adopting the 
language of evil lends urgency to the cause of alleviating more pressing forms of suffering. 
Card’s interest in directing our attention to atrocities before lesser injustices is a laudable project 
and I would make a similar claim about focusing on atrocity. Less clear is the need for a 
discourse of evil to accomplish the task. Though I have concerns about a discourse of evil, they 
are tangential to our present task and need not detain us. Nevertheless, some scholars do 
strenuously object to reviving evil as a conceptual category within the field of moral philosophy. 
Virginia Held wonders if a discourse of evil adds anything more substantial than 
“rhetorical variety.”233  
Certainly I think that people often act wrongly, even outrageously, that they commit 
gross injustices through acts that are inexcusable. I think they often fail to respect others’ 
rights, or lack a decent regard for their own humanity or that of others. … But evil? It 
seems to me that we can deal with all the relevant moral considerations without it.234 
 
In this vein, Phillip Cole also argues that evil is too much entangled with a host of metaphysical 
connotations for it to be of more use than it is the source of further confusion.235 By some 
accounts, evil transcends human agency; evildoers are inhuman, otherworldly, possessed, or 
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otherwise fixed in their dispositions. When the term is assigned to recognizably human actors, it 
often reveals a rhetorical strategy aimed at blocking alternative moral judgments. Evil is not to 
be questioned. This formulation of evil as absolutely-not-self is dangerous because it precludes 
the possibility of moral progress. In its crudest iterations, the discourse of evil “forms part of an 
ethical vocabulary that helps to brand political opponents as foes for eradication rather than 
enemies to be checked.”236 Indeed, it is this form of evil the Nazis themselves used to justify the 
mass murder of European Jews.237 Any attempt to derive useful analysis via the concept of evil 
must adequately address these concerns. For her part, Card insists that such criticism is self-
defeating. “If the likelihood of the ideological abuse of a concept were sufficient reason to 
abandon the concept, we should probably abandon all normative concepts, certainly ‘right’ and 
‘wrong.’”238 There is no need to go this far of course, but a less sophisticated account of evil than 
the one Card advances might generate conceptual confusion when conflated with other issues 
pertaining to extreme violence. 
Though Card is careful to avoid this pitfall, many scholarly attempts to explain mass 
murder place the Nazi holocaust at the center of a discursive triangle involving three charged and 
often poorly defined concepts: atrocity, genocide, and evil. Nazism is often the starting point for 
anyone who looks closely at these three issues. The social psychologist James Waller, for 
example, points out that the “substantial majority” of literature on genocide is “related to one 
particular instance of genocide—the Holocaust.”239 As addressed earlier in this chapter, the Nazi 
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holocaust is commonly understood as a paradigmatic case of genocide. In popular and scholarly 
accounts, the Nazi genocide and its macabre symbolism are taken to represent the crime of 
genocide tout court, notwithstanding the legal language of the CPPCG. In particular, the crimes 
committed at Auschwitz and its attendant symbols have come to be metonyms for genocide. 
When we think of genocide, we think of Auschwitz. Moreover, the connective tissue that helps 
to establish the metonymy is very often a vague and imprecise notion of evil. 
Genocide, moreover, is widely perceived as the worst imaginable atrocity and atrocities 
are thought to be genocide only insofar as they resemble Nazi crimes. Both are commonly 
described in superlative language and placed firmly at the peak of a hierarchy of crimes. 
Genocide is “the absolute crime, the gravest form of crime against humanity.”240 The insistence 
that genocide is not only the worst crime imaginable but the worst crime possible is very 
common. Genocide, Adalian writes, “is the embodiment of evil in a world in which human 
beings are mere particles and where the issues of life and death are subject to the arbitrary 
decision of the wielders of power. Genocide, therefore, is that final tyranny. There is no zone 
beyond it.”241 Observations of this kinds are ultimately normative claims about the hierarchy of 
various atrocities (ones that place genocide and the Nazi holocaust in particular at the top) and 
simultaneously claims about the impossibility of any atrocity surpassing genocide. When one 
genocide scholar calls the Nazi holocaust “the most horrendous of all genocidal acts,”242 he is 
simply reflecting a widely held view of the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of genocide and, by 
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implication, a paradigm of atrocity. Because atrocities are “uncontroversially evil,” Nazism and 
its attendant symbols are deployed as metonyms for evil even as Auschwitz in particular is 
deployed as a metonym for genocide. 
The conflation of atrocity, genocide, and evil has resulted in an impoverished discourse 
on atrocity in particular. Instead of recognizing atrocity as a distinctly broader category, it is too 
often subsumed into discussion of genocide in general and the Nazi genocide in particular. This 
logic flows in the opposite direction as well. As Bauer and many others point out, the Nazi 
holocaust has become a “cultural code” in the West, one that “signifies the evil in human 
society.”243 If Nazism is a metonym for evil, then atrocities are evil. “In the realm of mass 
atrocities,” one genocide scholar writes, “genocide is conceptualized as the evil beyond all 
others, the ultimate measure of all human rights violations.”244 While this might very well be the 
case, it remains unclear just what the use of evil means in this kind of analysis. 
Michael Humphrey offers an account of atrocity that departs from a reliance on evil.245 
Instead, he emphasizes a notion of “body horror,” a term he borrows from the journalist John 
Taylor, to describes a process by which power is built on spectacular suffering.246 With its 
concentration on the corporeal features of atrocity, it is an analysis that rests heavily on the work 
of Michel Foucault and Elaine Scarry, respectively.247 According to Humphrey’s argument, 
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atrocity is transgressive violence that extends beyond the expectations of the victims, i.e. beyond 
their comprehension and the comprehension of witnesses. It is inherently political violence 
because “pain, through violence, is made a spectacle and projected as power.”248 
Like Card, Humphrey locates the defining qualities of atrocity in its effects on the 
victims, its world-destroying qualities. Whereas Card discusses atrocity only in the context of a 
disquisition on evil, Humphrey prioritizes the concept of atrocity itself. “The central mechanism 
of atrocity,” Humphrey writes, “is to threaten life by cruelly disfiguring human bodies.”249 It is a 
fascinating and helpful study, yet despite the emphasis on atrocity, Humphrey has no clear sense 
of how formerly conventional violence actually becomes atrocious.  
While all violence threatens normative reality, atrocity—excessive violence—shakes the 
very foundations of both self and social existence. Atrocity is a traumatising violence 
because it leaves an unassimilable memory in the victim and exceeds cultural discourses 
of law or morality which manage the circulation of everyday violence.250 
 
But where does the gap between conventional violence and atrocity lie? At what point does 
violence transgress the expectations of its victims, as Humphrey claims? If I expect you to 
commit an atrocity, does that very expectation ontologically undermine the atrocity as atrocious? 
The “excessive” in his definition of atrocity as “excessive violence” is never fully explained, 
leaving us to speculate as to which forms of violence he would classify as atrocious. Just as Card 
side-steps the matter of defining atrocity in any detail, Humphrey takes it for granted that we 
know atrocities when we see them. I suspect we do, but to claim as much requires further 
analysis left unexplored as to just what we see when we see atrocity. By contrast, a vision-based 
theory of atrocity relies on clear moral vision. I have argued that an atrocity is an act or an 
accumulation of acts determined to exceed minimally tolerable levels of violence by 
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nonparticipant observers for whom the violence in question is phenomenologically 
comprehensible.  
 
A Touchstone of Victimization 
The Nazi holocaust, Flanzbaum observes, has reached “cult-like status.”251 It has become 
“a touchstone of victimization” and “a measuring stick against which all oppression is 
compared.”252 The weight of this status informs both scholarly and popular discourses so that all 
atrocities are to a greater or lesser extent measured against Nazi crimes, the paradigmatic atrocity 
and informal referent for comprehending cruel violence. Insofar as this moral deference to Nazi 
violence discourages its reemergence, it would be irresponsible to conclude that the phenomenon 
is necessarily problematic in itself. The concerns expressed in this chapter instead question 
whether a highly attuned sensitivity to Nazi-style violence in particular renders us less conscious 
to atrocity in general when it appears under a very different guise.  
Some readers may feel the observations and conclusions drawn herein trivialize the 
memory of the victims. My purpose in this sub-section has been neither to diminish the moral 
horror of the Nazi holocaust nor to suggest a kind of moral levelling that would place all 
atrocities on equal footing and thereby cheapen the memory of them all. The Nazi holocaust 
remains one of the most horrific episodes of atrocity in human history, a moral cataclysm of such 
magnitude that we now associate it with the darkest potential of our species. That much is clear. 
Instead, I have attempted to make the case that the status of the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of 
atrocity in both popular and scholarly discourses raises conceptual concerns that should not be 
ignored by scholars as well as challenges to clear moral vision that must be taken into account. 
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Atrocities usually take us by surprise. If we look too hard for signs of Auschwitz, we just might 
miss other, less obvious atrocities, a few of which are currently being committed in our name. 
  
 101 
IV. VIEWING: Atrocity in the Mass Media 
 
“No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms.” 
Hannah Arendt 
 
While the foregoing chapters have attempted to theorize a concept of atrocity and draw 
conclusions about how we recognize transgressive violence, we must now turn to the primary 
vehicle by which most us are made aware of atrocity: the mass media in its various forms. In the 
interest of clarifying terms, by mass media I refer to print, broadcast, and digital technologies by 
which the transmission of information about the world occurs. In particular, the two approaches 
discussed in this chapter address primarily the news media. 
Unless the issues involve us directly as participants, the mass media provide the 
informational content necessary for the interpretation and comprehension of the world. Indeed, 
our reliance on the mass media for an accurate representation of reality increases with the literal 
and metaphoric remoteness of our lives from that reality. For a theory of atrocity grounded in 
phenomenological experience, the importance of the mass media in constructing a particular 
vision of reality cannot be overstated. Because the representation of extreme violence is quite 
literally a mediated experience, the mass media play a critical role in determining which forms of 
violence may be tolerated and which may or must be condemned. In short, the mass media 
influence our perception of violence by defining what atrocity is to begin with. For a theory of 
atrocity grounded in vision, the mediation of phenomenological experience bears enormous 
moral consequences. While a substantial literature exists on the mass media’s role in shaping and 
informing public opinion, this chapter looks at how the depiction of violence and atrocity 
enhances or impoverishes our capacity for moral vision.253 
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In their propaganda model (PM) of the media, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman 
argue that media companies are guided by a set of structural constraints that shape the production 
of news content at multiple levels.254 Because media profits derive from advertising revenue, the 
PM predicts that the vision of the world produced by the mass media will, in general, reflect the 
interests of political and economic elites. By emphasizing institutional analysis, their work has 
the virtue of avoiding facile explanations that rely too much on the potential for manipulation on 
the part of individuals. Chomsky and Herman provide compelling empirical data to support their 
theory and, though it is often ignored by media scholars and absent from many mainstream 
textbooks, the PM has never been seriously challenged.255 It remains a powerful theory of how 
knowledge is produced in contemporary capitalist democracies.256  
The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann advances a rather different position.257 Though 
he would agree with Chomsky and Herman that the mass media depict a reality necessarily less 
complicated than the actual conditions of our world, he argues against a “distortion” model of 
the media and explicitly attempts to transcend what he regards as simplistic, cause-oriented 
explanations. Luhmann insists that the mass media, like all social systems, is closed and immune 
to external influence—including the economic and political systems. Though Luhmann’s work 
offers insight into the reproduction of institutional priorities within the mass media itself, his 
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“radical anti-humanism” inevitably leads him to a position that denies the possibility for political 
agency and, by extension, any meaningful resistance. Moreover, like Chomsky and Herman, 
Luhmann does believe the media play a role in reproducing social norms and ideology, but 
whereas the PM makes an argument about how these priorities develop and the interests they 
reflect, Luhmann never explains which norms rise to the surface, which ideas are deemed “fit to 
print,” and which are not. Nor does he seem to care much about the matter because truth in his 
formulation is always contingent and subjective.  
This chapter begins with a summary look at how several prominent thinkers in the 
Western tradition have characterized the relationship of knowledge and politics in general. It is a 
relationship that strikes at the heart of this study for the mass media’s influence in developing 
moral positions entails an epistemological question about the foundations of ethical knowledge 
in general. For a theory of atrocity grounded in vision, knowledge is paramount. It extends the 
breadth of moral perception and dramatically shapes our ability to render moral judgment. 
Having established this connection to knowledge as transmitted via the mass media, I then 
review the two aforementioned theories before closing with some thoughts on the construction of 
atrocity. 
  
Knowledge and Politics 
The intimate but uneasy relationship of knowledge and politics has its roots in the very 
origins of Western political philosophy. It troubled Plato, who dreamed of escaping the cave of 
illusions and attaining objective truth, distinct from the sophistry and base opinion he viewed as 
so destructive. In the Gorgias, Plato contrasts the form of dialogue—the proper form for 
 104 
philosophical endeavor—against mere rhetoric, the tool of the politician and demagogue.258 The 
former aspires to true knowledge while the latter is content with opinion. No worthy political 
order can last long on such an unstable foundation as opinion, which leave it vulnerable to the 
petty conflicts of political opportunists or else the unpredictable vagaries of popular whim. 
Though he eschewed his teacher’s theory of the forms, Aristotle felt that because the masses 
were too busy toiling for a living, they were unable to spend the time necessary to develop 
knowledge of politics and thus had no business participating in properly political activity as full 
citizens. Neither of the ancient masters had any love for democracy in its classical form, but the 
question of knowledge was as central to this disdain as it was to the wider implications of their 
respective political philosophies. 
Plato’s metaphysics placed knowledge beyond the realm of human experience. Only 
those with a talent for obtaining insight into the eternal forms stood even a slight chance. For the 
vast majority of humanity, true knowledge lies forever out of reach. The influence of this notion 
on early Christian theology was profound, with divine Providence easily supplanting the eternal 
forms as the wellspring of truth. Later political philosophers brought the question of knowledge 
back to earth from its extra-terrestrial abodes in Platonic and Neo-Platonic accounts. With more 
or less forcefulness and for rather different reasons, both Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò 
Machiavelli rejected the unquestioned authority of the church and its monopoly on virtue. In a 
move that would have appalled Plato, they instead reduced political knowledge to a kind of 
practical know-how. Political knowledge was true only insofar as it was demonstrably 
effective—whether in the power of a Leviathan-state to enforce a legal system or else in the 
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readiness of a Prince to get his hands dirty and maintain a grip on power. In De Cive, Hobbes 
insists upon a tension between scientific reason and rhetorical “eloquence”259 in a way that 
recalls Plato’s banishing of the poets from the Republic to prevent the misguided manipulation 
of emotion through the arts.260 For Hobbes, reason constitutes disinterested and logical inquiry, 
while eloquence seeks to persuade on the force of the speaker’s personal charms, though he does 
suggest in his conclusion to Leviathan that the apparent opposition may be reconciled: 
[I]n all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary … 
[Y]et if there be not powerfull eloquence, which procureth attention and consent, the 
effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded 
upon principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true, or false; and 
upon the passions and interests of men, which are different and mutable.261 
 
Thus, Hobbes insists that any truthful insight gained through the application of scientific rigor, 
whether in politics or in other spheres, is likely to fall upon deaf ears without eloquent 
mediation.262  
Machiavelli was less committed to scientific or metaphysical truth as a political end; in 
relation to the interests of power, truth was subordinate. Fortune commands much in the fate of 
men, but a Prince well-prepared with the knowledge of great men will be able to adapt to shifting 
tides. A Machiavellian theory of knowledge begins and ends with the preservation of power: 
But as to a prince’s mental activity, he ought to read history and give attention therein to 
the actions of great men, observe how they have conducted themselves in wartime, study 
the causes of their victories and defeats so that he can avoid the second and imitate the 
first. Above all he acts as some excellent men in the past have done: they have chosen to 
imitate some predecessor who has been praised and honored, and have constantly 
                                                
259 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The English Version, ed. Howard Warrender (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983), 137, 154. 
260 For a wonderful discussion on Plato’s antipathy to the poets, see Iris Murdoch, The Fire & the Sun: Why Plato 
Banished the Artists (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).   
261 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 389. 
262 For more on Hobbes’s rejection and reconsideration of “eloquence,” see chapters seven and nine in Quentin 
Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 106 
kept his deeds and actions before them. So it is said that Alexander the Great imitated 
Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus.263  
 
Machiavelli is totally unconcerned with the knowledge of the masses. If they possessed any great 
potential, it would surely manifest as practical political power. If not, they remain among the 
mindless hordes, relevant to the world of politics only insofar as they can be manipulated for or 
against a cause. Certainly, the Prince should not be constrained by a frivolous allegiance to the 
truth. Insofar as it aligns with higher objectives, truth may often be a prudent ally. When the 
opposite is true, however, lying becomes a useful recourse. “And if, to be sure,” Machiavelli 
writes, “sometimes you need to conceal a fact with words, do it in such a way that it does not 
become known or, if it does become known, that you have a quick and ready defense.”264 We 
will shortly return to the role of lying.  
From Plato through modernity, one repeatedly encounters the belief that the masses are 
little more than mindless drones, slaves to appetites over which they have little control, neither 
willing nor capable of obtaining knowledge in any meaningful sense. This view undergirds the 
distaste for democracy in the Western tradition from antiquity up to the bourgeois revolutions of 
the 19th century. With the compelling exception of Jefferson, the founders of the United States 
were not democrats in either philosophy or practice.265 Yet, the depth of philosophical debate 
surrounding the Articles of Confederation and especially the counter-revolutionary instincts of 
the Constitution propounded by its Federalist supporters, occurred at a level virtually 
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unparalleled in history. Madison and Hamilton’s picture of humanity was strongly Hobbesian, 
colored by a profound pessimism regarding humanity’s less appealing aspects. Even Jefferson 
and Paine, the most radical among them, frequently invoked this dark side of humanity and 
grudgingly felt it justified the establishment of government as a “necessary evil.”266 This much 
has often been noted, but less attention is typically given to the role of political knowledge in the 
founders’ vision. Madison’s view is representative of the founders’ general disdain for the 
political sensibilities of common people when he writes in Federalist #49: 
The reason of man, like man himself is timid and cautious, when left alone; and acquires 
firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number with which it is associated. … In a 
nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the 
laws, would be sufficiently inculcated by an enlightened reason. But a nation of 
philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by 
Plato.267  
 
Knowledge in this view is reduced, once again, to mere opinion competing in a marketplace of 
equally valid rivals. The founders certainly did not believe that knowledge had much relevance 
to liberty, for which questions of truth posed a real threat. Rather, Madison’s embryonic theory 
of pluralism located justice in a balance of competing political forces or “factions,” a view 
memorably distilled in Federalist #51: “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”268 
In beginning with the individual and defining liberty strictly as the freedom to own 
property and engage in trade, liberalism elided questions of truth. Whereas classic political 
philosophy had hitherto praised order and social concord above all, liberalism transformed 
discord into a pragmatic tool of governance. The common refrain that liberalism seeks a society 
governed by the rule of law and not by the rule of men is, at root, a deeply pessimistic 
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assessment of the possibility of political knowledge—or at least that attaining such knowledge 
has any practical political influence—but it is a predictable outcome of nearly unbroken denial 
spanning two millennia of a capacity for knowledge among the masses. Hamilton was likely the 
only one of the founders who grasped the full implications of the 1789 Constitution, particularly 
its displacement of truth onto the law.269 The Constitution’s creation of the judiciary and 
especially its codification of economic matters all but guaranteed that questions of wealth and 
inequality would be restricted to legal quarrels confined within carefully drawn boundaries. Law 
became a substitute for the open-ended search for truth and if liberty was synonymous with the 
freedom to own property, then political knowledge centrally became a matter of the law. Small 
wonder why so many American statespersons past and present have been lawyers by profession 
or why someone like Louis Hartz argued that the “law has flourished on the corpse of 
philosophy, for the settlement of the ultimate moral question is the end of speculation upon it.”270 
Whatever else may be the case, the Constitution was emphatically not born of democratic 
intentions. As the historian Richard Hofstadter points out, quite the opposite was true. “It is 
ironical,” he writes, “that the Constitution, which Americans venerate so deeply, is based on a 
political theory that at one crucial point stands in direct antithesis to the mainstream of American 
democratic faith.” 
Modern American folklore assumes that democracy and liberty are all but identical, and 
when democratic writers take the trouble to make the distinction, they usually assume 
that democracy is necessary to liberty. But the Founding Fathers thought that the liberty 
with which they were most concerned was menaced by democracy. In their minds liberty 
was linked not to democracy but to property.271 
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Moreover, the masses must be prevented from disturbing the order of affairs by remaining 
passive observers, while the real decisions are handled by others. This instinct is aptly distilled 
by John Jay’s well-known maxim: “Those who own the country ought to govern it.”272 
Knowledge among the masses was largely irrelevant so long as it did not adversely weigh upon 
state affairs—and many checks were implemented to guarantee as much.273 
Liberalism has a strange relationship with political knowledge. It at once places no 
demands upon the individual to acquire knowledge of any kind, and yet simultaneously 
predicates a notion of consent upon a minimal foundation of political knowledge. The Italian 
legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio points out that this expectation frequently crashes on the 
rocks of political ignorance in really existing liberal democracies—ignorance brought about 
through a failure of the education system. “[T]he most well-established democracies,” he writes, 
“are impotent before the phenomenon of increasing political apathy.”274 Less optimistic critics 
would argue that ignorance, at least on issues of political importance, is not an aberrant outcome 
but rather deliberately built into the system as a structural constraint against popular power. 
Nevertheless, public education has been a handmaiden to democratic reform throughout modern 
history; activists and revolutionaries have frequently demanded its universal implementation as a 
first step towards greater political freedom.275 Where such transitions have been later overturned 
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as the result of a military coup or other intervention, universal education has usually been 
abolished in short order.  
For liberals and their enemies on the political right, education is presumed to open a door 
to political agency. Yet the dearth of political knowledge in practice seems to all but guarantee a 
demos less qualified to make important decisions. This realization seems to thrust the entire 
democratic project into disarray by shaking its philosophical justification: that the people are not 
only capable of ruling, but that popular rule is preferable to political alternatives. Witness the 
periodic waves of pious concern on the part of intellectuals regarding the supposed “crisis of 
democracy.”276 The proliferation of books on the purported inadequacy of voters’ political 
knowledge has become something of a minor industry within the field of political science to the 
point that the desirability of the universal franchise itself has come under scrutiny in more 
pessimistic accounts.277 
Political scientists continue to study the consequences for democratic politics stemming 
from voter alienation in liberal democracies as well as widespread ignorance of the most 
elementary issues in contemporary public affairs. The dilemma is this: liberalism in its existing 
democratic form derives legitimacy from an abstract public, while the real flesh-and-blood 
individuals that compose public remain, for the most part, isolated from the halls of power and 
ignorant of much that occurs there. When the public is encouraged to participate (during 
elections, for example), elites seek to influence public opinion with simplified and emotionally 
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compelling cues rather than serious and considered discussion. “Race, ethnicity, and religion are 
the simplest, most easily deployed,” writes Charles Arthur Willard. “They are usually mingled 
with nationalism.”278 Nationalist ideology, particularly in its liberal variant, is a topic taken up in 




With the rise of mass democracy and the gradual expansion of the franchise to all sectors 
of the population, the relationship of knowledge to politics finally broke its privileged fetters and 
took on a special importance. Politics ostensibly became the province of all and so efforts to 
constrain, mold, and control knowledge necessarily expanded to include the new source of 
liberal democratic legitimacy: the public.279 This newfound importance of an abstract public 
gave birth to the field of public opinion and its concomitant, public relations.280 
If the vagaries of public opinion could be harnessed or at least pushed in a certain 
direction, guided toward predetermined conclusions, such a power would have far-reaching 
implications in areas well beyond the traditional purview of practical politics. Some were 
particularly quick in recognizing this potential. The so-called “father of public relations” Edward 
Bernays was a nephew of Sigmund Freud and consciously applied his uncle’s work to 
commercial endeavors. He famously employed cutting edge research in social psychology in his 
work on generating desires through advertising.281 The use of psychology to generate consumer 
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demand remains a hallmark of the advertising industry. But potential for the “manufacture of 
consent,” was not limited to petty commercialism; Walter Lippmann felt it would revolutionize 
politics: 
The significant revolution of modern times is not industrial or economic or political, but 
the revolution taking place in the art of creating consent among the governed. … Within 
the life of the new generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-
conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to 
understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of 
how to create consent will alter every political premise.282 
 
If Edward Bernays is recognized as the father of PR, Lippmann is recognized as his political 
counterpart in the development of public opinion as a field of study and analysis.  
Lippmann felt democracy should take a backseat to liberalism. He was concerned with 
what he saw as a misplaced faith in a “false conception of public opinion” and especially the 
unwarranted optimism as to its democratic political function espoused by “apologists of 
democracy.” In his view, the public was ignorant of political affairs and that correcting for the 
inadequacy was both futile and unnecessary. “No progress,” he writes, “can be made toward this 
unattainable ideal.”283 It was necessary instead to prod and push public opinion toward 
objectives deemed necessary by a class of qualified experts and political technocrats. He felt the 
only possible role that public opinion might play in American politics was the potential it 
suggested as a mobilized force to deploy against demagogues and opportunists who sought to 
overthrow American government. Lippmann’s view fits well with a procedural, shallow notion 
of democracy, but cannot be reconciled with a deeper understanding that would emphasize 
participation. Indeed, public participation is precisely what Lippmann hoped to avoid.  
A false ideal of democracy can lead only to disillusionment and to meddlesome tyranny. 
If democracy cannot direct affairs, then a philosophy that expects it to direct them will 
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encourage the impossible; they will fail, but that will interfere outrageously with the 
productive liberties of the individual. The public must be put in its place, so that it may 
exercise its own powers, but no less and perhaps even more, so that each of us may live 
free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd.284 
 
Liberals like Lippmann and Bernays liked to emphasize that public opinion was both fickle and 
slow to change. It could occasionally be harnessed (in times of war for example) but was not 
easily restrained once having served an instrumental purpose. In generating these impulses and 
emotions among the masses, the media had developed what Lippmann called “a technic of 
propaganda which was, until the totalitarian states put their minds to it, the most effective in all 
history.”285 
Any discussion of knowledge inevitably pivots on a question of authenticity and 
ultimately of truth. Without delving too deeply into questions of epistemological curiosity, a 
claim to knowledge is simultaneously a claim to truth. As Arendt argues, any such claim carries 
with it a kind of violence; it insists upon itself, precluding debate, and thereby adopts an anti-
political stance.286 Unless we wish to disconnect political activity from the affairs of the world, 
however, information is required. Before moving on to a discussion of two important theories of 
the mass media, it is worth briefly considering the normative function of the mass media for 
democratic practice. 
 
Democracy and the Media 
It is commonly observed that the mass media play a crucial role in a healthy democracy. 
For a political system that places an emphasis on consent, the importance of accurate and wide-
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ranging knowledge is paramount. The essence of democracy is popular sovereignty. For the sake 
of simplicity, we can say that the basis of democratic politics centers on popular power oriented 
around a commitment to political equality and individual liberty; Thomas Christiano argues that 
these ideals set a “minimal conception of democracy in modern societies.”287  
For popular sovereignty to fulfill its promise, access to political knowledge is required. 
Montesquieu complained that secrecy in power was anathema to liberty and Locke’s support for 
press freedom grew out of his insistence on freedom of expression generally.288 The American 
inheritors of this political philosophy, though skeptical of democracy, felt sufficiently passionate 
about the matter to include special protection for the press in the first amendment to the 
Constitution.289 Liberals generally ascribe to the mass media an informational as well as 
watchdog function, a prerequisite to effective political agency. Yet empirical studies of media 
and public opinion present a dilemma for democratic theory: again and again, research reveals 
the public’s deep ignorance of political matters, an ignorance that produces unexpected political 
outcomes. Gilens argues, for example, that political ignorance “leads many Americans to hold 
political views different from those they would hold otherwise.”290 
Several conclusions might stem from this realization, each of which is well-represented 
in the social scientific literature. If we are to understand the normative function of the media, it is 
worth briefly reviewing three broad conclusions. First, we may come to believe that democratic 
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theory, with its insistence on popular rule, is completely misguided. That is to say, the blunt fact 
of entrenched political ignorance may lead us to doubt the average person’s willingness or ability 
to acquire information let alone process it. By extension, we might lose faith in the public’s 
capacity for developing reasoned political positions and question democracy’s normative basis. 
According to this view, the outcomes of democratic politics are essentially random, subject to 
popular whim, and lacking a clear sense of public good. We can take virtually the whole of 
Western political thought up until the Enlightenment as representative of this first conclusion.  
A second, less pessimistic view might argue that while the vast majority of citizens do 
keep their distance from formal politics, the opinions of informed elites filter through and make 
all the difference when it comes to policy outcomes. In this view, democracies are actually 
thinly-veiled oligarchies guided by an informed and vocal minority.  
A third view argues that deep knowledge is unnecessary for the free development of 
sophisticated political sensibilities. People may not be aware of a political issue in great depth 
but they are nevertheless capable of forming reasoned political opinions through the use of a 
heuristic method. Those dubbed “low-information voters” by Samuel Popkin appeal to friends or 
family members whose opinions they respect or else look for a range of other informal clues, 
which might also include a trusted news source. This third view allows us to retain some 
confidence in the demos, ignorance notwithstanding.291 Yet all three of these conclusions take it 
for granted that the news media successfully carry out their job. The possibility remains that the 
news media do not provide accurate information or that the representation of reality they depict 
is one structurally inclined to emphasize particular interests while deemphasizing or ignoring 
others. 
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Often the news may be accurate and fair, but may not reflect society’s real issues. … 
What may be said to be “true” at any given time may be an arbitrary cultural construction 
and an ideology, a systematic distortion of reality to protect the interests of the 
powerful.292 
 
If this is the case, then one cannot foreclose the possibility that popular ignorance or incomplete 
knowledge on certain issues is itself a byproduct of the media system.  
Media scholars frequently discuss three broad methods by which the mass media 
influence the interpretation of information by their audiences: framing, agenda setting, and 
priming.293 Framing describes the media’s presentation of an event, i.e. how its form, content, 
and general character might exert an influence on the interpretation of the event in question. 
Which cues are established? Which experts are called in to comment? How are conflicts 
presented? What terminology is presumed to apply? Are there implicit value judgments 
pertaining to a “good” or “bad” actor in the story? Framing undermines the argument that 
journalists can ever really attain objectivity. Rather, it suggests that everything from the 
organization of a story’s presentation to the connotations and vocabulary invoked to discuss 
certain ideas invariably presents an implicit perspective.294  
The second power, agenda setting, simply acknowledges that even if the media do not tell 
the public what to think, they do tell us what to think about. Gatekeepers within the news media 
ultimately decide which stories are newsworthy and which are not. Moreover, they establish a 
hierarchy among stories from the headlines on down. These decisions are reinforced within the 
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hierarchy of media institutions themselves, so that smaller newspapers look to respected dailies 
like the New York Times and Washington Post for cues on what we should be reading about.  
Finally, priming refers to the method by which the media promote interest in a particular 
subject via ancillary stories that provide tools for interpretation of later coverage. For example, 
in media coverage leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the Fox news 
network was criticized for repeatedly showing images of the destruction from the 9/11 terror 
attacks just prior to coverage of the impending war. Some argued that such a pairing “primed” 
audiences to draw a spurious connections between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, thereby 
facilitating the manufacture of consent for the invasion.295 Another example of priming might 
include stories about advanced weapons technology. Such coverage would seem to glamorize, or 
at least normalize, military culture by “priming” audiences to admire American military 
endeavors. Taken together, these three functions offer insight into how the public responds to the 
news media and how the media exert control over not only of what is considered important, but 
also over the parameters of the discussion. 
There is a great deal more that could be said about news reception, but for now we must 
shift to an analysis of news content. How are news stories chosen for coverage? The question 
takes on a special moral urgency when the stories involve violence and atrocity. Indeed, the very 
notion of atrocity relies on media representations of violence along a spectrum of “good” and 
“bad.” The following sub-sections look at two theories of the mass media, and though they reach 
quite different conclusions about the political options available to us, each offers insight into the 
process by which the news comes to be news and hence how violence comes to be atrocity. 
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The Propaganda Model 
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman offer a compelling account of the mass media in 
their book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.296 They present a 
Propaganda Model (PM) of the media which postulates and explores five filters through which 
media content is judged “fit to print”—as the New York Times puts it in the well-known tagline. 
They argue that the media are instruments of power used to “mobilize support for the special 
interests that dominate the state and private activity.”297 As the authors insist, theirs is a “guided 
free market” analysis of the media, i.e. one that looks at the institutional and structural influence 
on media content within capitalist democracies. They argue that class interests have “multilevel 
effects on mass-media interests and choices,”298 which encourage a perspective of the world 
heavily informed by these constraints. According to their argument, media bias does not fall 
comfortably into the simple liberal/conservative dichotomy around which so much in American 
politics revolves. Instead, their depiction of world events tends to reflect the interests of capital 
and of the state. The five filters of which they write are: 
 (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass 
media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, 
and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) 
“flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) “anti-communism” as a national 
religion and control mechanism.299 
 
The first filter emphasizes the consequences stemming from the considerable influence of large 
private companies over media content and the degree to which they share common interests with 
other sources of elite power. “The dominant media,” they write, “are quite large businesses; they 
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are controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by 
owners and other profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have important 
common interests, with other major corporations, banks, and government.”300 With the 
deregulation of media ownership restrictions in the United States since the 1980s, this 
phenomenon has become even more sharp; 90% of all media is controlled by six companies.301  
 The second filter acknowledges the influence coming from the profit-seeking behavior in 
which most media ventures need to engage in order to maintain basic economic viability. For 
much of the mass media, this means selling audiences to advertisers and providing content that 
will not disrupt this interchange. Chomsky and Herman predict that advertisers will generally 
want “to avoid programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere 
with the ‘buying mood.’”302 In practice, this implies a good deal of indirect private power over 
the media. Advertisers are unlikely to sanction stories critical of corporate practices “such as the 
problem of environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex, or 
corporate support of and benefits from Third World tyrannies.”303 
 The third filter underscores the symbiotic relationship between formal political power 
and the media elite. Politicians and their various agencies ingratiate themselves to the media by 
facilitating the production of media content. They provide press releases, grant access, 
orchestrate photo opportunities, control leaks, etc. Likewise, a critical or oppositional perspective 
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on the media’s part risks being met with a denial of access.304 So the media rely, to a great 
extent, on the very sources of which we expect them to express a healthy dose of skepticism. 
Because of their services, continuous contact on the beat, and mutual dependency, the 
powerful can use personal relationships, threats, and rewards to further influence and 
coerce the media. The media may feel obligated to carry extremely dubious stories and 
mute criticism in order not to offend their sources and disturb a close relationship. It is 
very difficult to call authorities on whom one depends for daily news liars, even if they 
tell whoppers. Critical sources may be avoided not only because of their lesser 
availability and higher cost of establishing credibility, but also because the primary 
sources may be offended and may even threaten the media using them.305  
 
The fourth filter, “flak,” refers to the pressure brought to bear on the mass media by dominant 
elites when reporting deviates from accepted standards. As Chomsky and Herman describe it, 
this encourages self-censorship as media organizations learn which stories are likely to draw the 
ire of powerful interests. This filter usually manifests in decisions about which stories not to 
print in anticipation of the backlash that might result from news that unsettles widely held views. 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the final filter (anti-communism) seems a bit dated, but 
not if we simply think of it as “the dominant ideology,” as Klaehn suggests.306 In this way, the 
filter refers to the readiness of mass media organizations to produce content that emphasizes the 
moral correctness of state actions in contrast to the moral degradation of official enemies. This 
filter serves to normalize the status quo, to discourage ideologies that would challenge its 
hegemony, and mobilize the public in opposition to tangible threats to this objective. During the 
Cold War, this filter had a much clearer political division on which to focus its attention; in the 
United States, the filter is discernable in the media’s targeting enemy or quasi-enemy states like 
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Iran for negative coverage with more frequency than for official ally states like Saudi Arabia. 
The former explicitly rejects American global hegemony, the latter is a close regional ally. 
Each of these filters interacts with the others, though the complexities such interaction 
might produce is not probed very deeply in their book. Chomsky and Herman are not particularly 
interested in showing how media content influences public opinion and action, but they take this 
for granted. Indeed, it is a reasonable assumption given the ample evidence confirming it. 
 
Functional Differentiation 
Though he produced some 60 books and 400 articles, the German social theorist Niklas 
Luhmann does not enjoy quite the same reputation in the United States that he does in Europe. 
Much of the reputational imbalance is explained by the theoretical disputes within the field of 
sociology that divide the American and European professions. Luhmann is best known for his 
attack on Parsonian sociology through the development of social systems theory and his esoteric 
application of these ideas to religion, art, politics, economics—and the mass media. As new 
translations of his work have become available in recent years, Luhmann’s ideas have found a 
new audience, securing his legacy as a remarkably insightful thinker. Here, I wish to give a brief 
overview of Luhmann’s social systems theory as it applies to his work on the mass media 
specifically. I argue that while his work complements Chomksy and Herman’s in important 
ways, he downplays the importance of the media’s influence on popular views regarding the 
differentiated reality he describes so well. Luhmann’s work explains a great deal about the 
internal operational logic of the mass media, understood as a self-contained or autopoietic social 
system, but it does little to address the urgent normative concerns over accuracy when it comes 
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to the substance of the news content it generates. Luhmann, who denies the existence of public 
opinion and the desirability of meaningful democracy, would likely agree.  
In short, social systems theory is an inadequate framework because the premises upon 
which it is based are so deeply pessimistic about the possibility of substantial political change. 
Luhmann appears to adopt a troubling apathy with regard to reality that verges on extreme 
relativism. The consequences in untethering his theory so completely from events on the ground 
leads him to posit less agency than even his post-modern counterparts might ascribe to the 
individual subject. Ultimately, the consequences of his stance for a theory of atrocity, insofar as 
he denies the possibility of affirmative political action typically implied by labelling an act of 
violence atrocious, are incalculable and dangerous. 
 Though he developed social systems theory as a response to Talcott Parsons’s belief that 
social systems interact, the “radical anti-humanism” of Luhmann’s work poses challenges 
elsewhere. In particular, social systems theory pushes against the Marxist theory of society, 
which Luhmann felt overly emphasizes the role of economics and thereby reduces the whole 
(society) to one of its parts (the economic system).307 Against Parsons and Marx, Luhmann 
argues that social systems are “closed” to external influence from other systems, though 
occasional “irritation” may generate an illusion of the opposite. Social systems are defined by 
autopoiesis, a biological term we can simplify for the sake of brevity to mean something like an 
internal self-operating logic which produces a result external to itself. Like a single-celled 
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organism, autopoiesis implies that social systems reproduce themselves by “us[ing] their own 
output as input.”308  
According to this view, economics is one among many social systems that do not interact 
and, by extension, cannot exert dominance one over the other. Non-interaction and non-
domination are central to Luhmann’s theory. Economics is as readily capable of influencing 
politics as vice versa. Likewise, the mass media may influence politics but the reverse is also 
true—and the structural differentiation between the systems prevents undue influence or 
dominance that would result in qualitative change. In other words, the mass media (a distinct and 
self-contained social system) is neither above nor below politics (another social system). All 
social systems coexist on equal footing. There is, at most, occasional overlapping of phenomena 
between systems. 
If we reduce Luhmann’s social theory to its barest essentials, I think the following 
summary is fair: nearly all contemporary political and social theorists are living in the past, 
insofar as they draw on the humanist heritage of the Western political tradition. Whereas pre-
modern society (Luhmann has feudalism in mind) was once “stratified” along hierarchical lines, 
modern society has since evolved and is now defined by “functional differentiation” between 
highly complex social systems and a concomitant decentering of power. In Luhmann’s view, a 
dogmatic anthropocentrism pervades Western political thought from Plato through the 
Enlightenment and is fundamentally ill-suited to explain a “society without top and without 
centre; a society that evolves but cannot control itself.”309 Though Luhmann’s defenders insist 
that his theory was primarily diagnostic and not prescriptive, there are clear normative tenets 
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embedded within his political philosophy, namely the futility of human agency in seeking to 
change the political system. 
We have to come to terms, once and for all, with a society without human happiness and, 
of course, without taste, without solidarity, without similarity of living conditions. It 
makes no sense to insist on these aspirations, to revitalize or to supplement the list by 
renewing old names such as civil society or community. This can only mean dreaming up 
new utopias and generating new disappointments in the narrow span of political 
possibilities. These desirabilities serve as a central phantom that seems to guarantee the 
unity of the system. But one cannot introduce the unity of the system into the system. We 
may well recognize the hardships and the injustice of stratification, but this is no longer 
the main problem of society. For its scheme of difference and identity is no longer 
framed by stratificatory (or hierarchical) differentiation. Stratification would mean that 
we could know the addresses of influential people and the ropes, and that we would be 
able to change the structure of society by appealing to reason, by critique, by reforming 
institutions, or by revolution. But this has become more than doubtful.310 
 
Whether from the political right or left, traditionally conceived, efforts to influence politics are 
inevitably frustrated or accommodated, leaving the systemic core intact. This rather bleak 
assessment forms the background against which we must judge Luhmann’s explanation of 
knowledge generation and its political context via the mass media. 
For Luhmann, actually-existing democracy is necessarily symbolic because there is no 
such thing as “the people.” Even if there were, this social construct would have no bearing on the 
political system, which operates as a distinct social system according to the “functional 
differentiation” Luhmann posits. Echoing Brecht’s satirical remark, Luhmann writes, “As in the 
18th century, the people is only a construct by which political theory accomplishes closure. Or 
put differently: Who would notice it if there would be no people at all?”311  
Through the lens of social systems theory, politics occurs with or without the input of an 
electorate, which is really more of an audience. Though people obviously do vote, the ones who 
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exercise meaningful control over policies are politicians—and it is likewise politicians who 
ultimately decide whether to remain faithful to the majority or not. Moreover, even politicians 
are limited in the scope of their actions, which remain inevitably confined to the autopoietic 
system in which they embedded. Politics may exert limited influence on the mass media (e.g. 
issuing broadcast licenses, regulating content), but the mass media also influence politics (e.g. 
giving political candidates airtime, exposing political scandals) and the same can be said of all 
social systems, including the economy. 
 
Beyond Distortion 
In contrast to the other social systems explored in Luhmann’s work (religion, art, law, 
etc.), the mass media constitute a comparatively new system and the implications of its 
technological expansion continue to manifest themselves. Luhmann writes that the mass media 
“includes all those institutions of society which make use of copying technologies to disseminate 
communication.”312 By communication, Luhmann has in mind a one-way process only: 
information flowing from a source to a receiver. To count as mass media communications, he 
insists that “no interaction among those co-present can take place between sender and 
receivers.”313 Luhmann’s definition clearly does not make room for social media, which has 
become ubiquitous since his death, nor does it consider the related rise of so-called “fake news,” 
a contemporary variant of yellow journalism.314 With its emphasis on interaction between users, 
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the emergence of Web 2.0 and social media in general has dismantled the traditional wall 
between news producers and news consumers. Still, for Luhmann, the traditional media content 
we consume is generated beyond us and is characterized by no further interaction. All closed 
systems are governed by a specific code, a simple binary that governs the internal logic of the 
system. Without a code, Luhmann argues, a social system would be unable to distinguish its own 
reality from that of its immediate environment; it would be unable to attain closure and systemic 
differentiation. According to Luhmann, the news media’s code is information/non-
information.315 Information is that which is “known to be known about.”316 Non-information is 
anything that is not developed into a news story and neither printed nor broadcast. 
Luhmann points out an apparent paradox concerning the acceptance of the mass media by 
the public. On the one hand, the public is deeply skeptical over the veracity of content and there 
exist widespread suspicions that elements of a news story are being intentionally left out, spun, 
or otherwise distorted. Indeed, a recent poll suggests that at least 60% of Americans claim not to 
trust the media “very much” or “at all.”317 On the other hand, the public is also reliant upon the 
media for a picture of reality, however limited, without which they would have little notion. 
Though Luhmann seeks to explain the behavior and function of all forms of mass media, it is his 
discussion of the news media that detains us here. Though he readily concedes the media play a 
powerful role in reproducing social norms, Luhmann is completely unconcerned with the 
accuracy of the media’s content. As he writes, “The question is not: how do the mass media 
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distort reality through the manner of their representation?” Such a question, he claims, 
“presuppose[s] an ontological, available, objectively accessible reality that can be known without 
resort to construction.”318  
Instead of asking if the mass media is faithfully representing an objective reality, the very 
possibility of which he finds absurd, Luhmann seeks to understand what kind of reality the 
media creates. To this end, he argues that the following “selectors” play a role in determining 
news media content:319 (1) surprise, unexpected breaks from an accepted state of normalcy; (2) 
conflict on issues that lend themselves to easily identifiable positions of opposition; (3) an 
obsession with quantities, numbers, and statistics for their own sake; (4) issues of local 
relevance, which tend to more easily gain newsworthy status; (5) norm violations, legal as well 
as moral; (6) norm violations accompanied by moral judgments; (7) an emphasis on individual 
actors and cause-effect relationships; (8) topicality and the creation of identifiable news subjects 
with set discursive parameters; (9) the expression of opinions and commentary by figures 
deemed newsworthy; (10) and finally, a recursive interaction of each of the foregoing selectors. 
It is not my purpose here to assess each of the selectors Luhmann identifies. Instead, it is 
primarily those that deal with the media’s norm-setting and moral functions that demand 
attention because they speak directly to the classification of violence as atrocious—or not. 
 
Mediated Realities 
As Chomsky and Herman’s book was published before Luhmann’s own work on the 
media, one wonders what he might have made of the propaganda model. Chomsky and Herman 
cannot easily be ignored by Luhmannians who simply deny the possibility that the economy, as 
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one self-contained social system, can ever exert influence over another, the mass media. While 
there is no evidence that Luhmann himself was familiar with Manufacturing Consent or the 
propaganda model, his references to theories of the media that seek to root out “distortion” and 
“manipulation” suggest that he was at least minimally familiar with the broad currents of 
nominally Marxist media analysis when he made his own limited foray into the field. 
Unfortunately—and Luhmann is not quite as guilty of this as his followers—his characterization 
of a theoretical approach that imputes the manipulation of news content to individuals is a straw 
man argument insofar as the characterization is intended to include the propaganda model.  
Hans-Georg Moeller, a scholar who has done a great deal to make Luhmann accessible to 
political theorists, challenges the propaganda model on Luhmannian grounds. He argues that 
Chomsky and Herman reduce media analysis “to the ethical errors of some certain human 
beings.”320 Perhaps there is some facile research that focuses on the role of sinister individuals 
within the media organizations themselves, conniving puppet-masters pulling the wool over our 
collective eyes, but this approach has absolutely nothing to do with the propaganda model. 
Though Moeller describes Manufacturing Consent as an “exemplary” study, he incorrectly 
characterizes the argument presented there as one dwelling on the manipulation of media content 
“by more or less evil forces.”321 Social systems theory, Moeller argues, “tries to go further [than 
the propaganda model and theories like it] by attempting to explain the phenomena they describe 
with concepts that go beyond ‘simple’ one-way manipulation.”322 Luhmann may or may not 
succeed in this, but Moeller’s argument is predicated entirely on a mischaracterization of the 
propaganda model, which does not impute responsibility to individual actors, evil or otherwise. 
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As Chomsky himself explains, “[T]his is not a theory of … evil people. It is a study of the 
institutional structure of the media system which has almost nothing to do with the individuals 
who are in it.”323 
The fact that corporations, in their usual behavior—say General Motors—try to 
maximize profit, is not a criticism of the C.E.O. of General Motors. It’s a comment about 
the institutions and the way they function and in fact the legal system, even the legal 
system in which they function, also the market system. So there’s absolutely nothing to 
do with evil individuals. Change the names, it will come out the same. It’s an institutional 
critique.324 
 
The point is apparently lost on Moeller, who implies that Chomsky and Herman are engaged in 
the scholarly equivalent of conspiracy theory.  
Moeller’s attack does not end there. He further insists that Chomsky and Herman cling 
misguidedly to an objective reality that could be revealed if only there was a way to stop the 
manipulation.  
According to this theory pattern, we would be presented with the real view of reality if 
only we could get rid of these evil manipulators. If we had truly democratic and liberated 
mass media, manipulation would disappear, and only then would we be able to finally see 
the world as it is.325 
 
In fact, Chomsky and Herman concede that the media generate a version of reality—one that 
tends to reflect the interests of political and economic elites and not the interests of workers or 
marginalized populations, for example.  
Despite what Moeller thinks Luhmann would challenge in the propaganda model, the 
argument is quite agnostic on the issue of pure objective reality. Nowhere do Chomsky and 
Herman claim the representation of media reality is mere illusion. Rather than an indictment of 
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the media’s ability to represent an accurate reality, their critique centers on coverage i.e. the 
prioritization of some issues above others. To characterize the propaganda model as doggedly 
obsessed with “the real view of reality” is not only false, but the assumptions upon which it rests 
would seem to undermine the foundational premises of virtually all scholarship. Luhmann 
certainly argues that the entire history of Western political and social philosophy is misguided in 
its basic humanist assumptions, but Moeller’s Luhmann seems to detach the question of reality 
entirely from any concern with accuracy. 
The question of reality leads Luhmann to adopt some unsettling positions which should 
become apparent by way of contrast. One can only imagine how differently Chomsky and 
Herman might predict the reporting on a particular matter in contrast with Luhmann. Take the 
recent bombing of a hospital by American forces in Afghanistan that killed at least 30 people and 
injured at least as many. The PM might plausibly predict that American press coverage would 
characterize the incident as unfortunate but accidental and certainly not intentional. 
Investigations will likely be supported by the liberal intelligentsia as a means of demonstrating 
“American values” and ensuring that war is guided by the rule of law. It might further predict 
that while the United States has bombed hospitals in the past, this case is more newsworthy 
because it killed a large number of well-connected Europeans working for a respected non-
governmental organization, Médecins Sans Frontières.  
Finally, headlines covering the bombing will tend to obscure U.S. culpability and the 
matter will probably fall more quickly out of the headlines than similar forms of violence 
committed by official enemies.326 “A propaganda system,” Chomsky and Herman argue, “will 
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consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with 
equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be unworthy.”327 In short, the 
propaganda model predicts that the mass media will set the discursive parameters within which 
the violence in question may be discussed in the mainstream and whether it is to be tolerated, 
praised, or condemned. The normative goals or at least the potential challenges that might be 
raised to counter the deficiencies outlined in the PM are undetermined, though Chomsky and 
Herman write optimistically of community media initiatives. Most importantly, they leave open 
the possibility of challenging the mass media’s definition of acceptable and unacceptable 
violence—the possibility for developing a moral compass free from the influence of elite 
agendas.  
With Luhmann, by contrast, there is no such possibility of intervention nor is there any 
reason to think the media has any agenda besides self-reproduction. Certainly, it matters little to 
his theory how the media report such an incident because the mass media social system has no 
direct attachment to the events or indeed to other social systems. If the bombing does become 
newsworthy “information” based on the rather arbitrary criteria Luhmann suggests, the 
differentiated reality it portrays is a distinct phenomenon from the charred corpses on the ground 
and should not be judged in terms of its accuracy/inaccuracy.  
Even if one were able to claim that the news media grossly misrepresented the incident, 
Luhmann insists that human actors are virtually powerless to do anything to influence the media 
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or indeed any other social system. The very best effort human actors might be able to muster 
would be to establish a rival media institution dedicated to challenging the prevailing narrative—
but it would become just one more reality among realities. Alternatively, they may take up the 
issue within the political social system (to investigate the bombing for example), but it remains 
to be seen if a change in the political system will result in real change on the ground. Because 
social systems operate autopoietically, they cannot be steered by activists or by anyone else—
and it is moreover impossible to predict what the outcomes within one differentiated social 
system will have on others in the future. Luhmann expresses his bleak conclusion in detached 
diagnostic language, but as mentioned earlier, there are clear normative conclusions one can 
draw from his theory, most immediately the idea that political activism is almost always futile. 
Moeller’s final Luhmannian challenge suggests the propaganda model is flawed because 
it “forgets about itself.”328 Luhmann, he argues, remains willfully conscious of his own 
participation in the media system as well as the seemingly paradoxical reliance on the media 
system for the very facts he uses to guide his analysis, while Chomsky and Herman do not. 
“Unlike Chomsky [and Herman],” Moeller claims, “Luhmann does not want to ignore the fact 
that his own observations must necessarily have a systemic ‘location.’”329 Yet Moeller is again 
incorrect to suggest that Chomsky and Herman fail in this. They argue vociferously that the 
propaganda model predicts a poor reception of their work. It then came as no surprise when it 
was virtually ignored by mainstream scholars and left largely unreviewed in the professional 
literature.330 So much for Moeller’s critique, which remains the only Luhmannian attack 
launched against the propaganda model to my knowledge. 
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 Certainly the propaganda model has its limitations, but those pointed out by Moeller are 
not among them.331 In contrast to Moeller’s Luhmannian critique of the propaganda model, there 
are major weaknesses and inconsistencies in Luhmann’s analysis of the media. Luhmann at once 
argues that the media play a role in developing social norms and attitudes, yet denies that 
anything called “public opinion” exists. He also fails to explain the process by which some 
norms and attitudes are advanced in the media while others are not. This may be politically 
unproblematic so long as the issues in question concern nothing more serious than frivolous 
coverage of sports and celebrity news for instance. But when it concerns violence or other 
matters of material consequence, Luhmann’s assessment is paralyzing at best and pathological at 
worst. 
So Moeller is essentially correct to argue that the propaganda model is theoretically 
inimical to social systems theory. Though he vastly overstates the case in calling the propaganda 
model a theory of “liberation”—i.e. one that suffers from “the Old European illusion that the 
mass media (and politics) are not a communication system but actually ‘made’ by people and 
that they could be ‘democratic’”332—he is nevertheless correct to point out that Chomsky and 
Herman’s theory retains a sense of political agency that Luhmann does not. But the most 
difficult obstacle to overcome in this regard has to do with Luhmann’s rather arbitrary 
designation of the media system as a social system functionally differentiated from all others 
and, by extension, subordinate to no objectives beyond its own. 
                                                
331 For example, in a favorable review, Goodwin suggests several ambiguities in the propaganda model that should 
be addressed, among them an over-emphasis on the American case alone and inadequate attention to interaction 
among the five filters. Jeff Goodwin, “What’s Right (and Wrong) about Left Media Criticism? Herman and 
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model,” Sociological Forum 9, no. 1 (1994): 101–2. 
332 Moeller, Luhmann Explained, 147. 
 134 
Even if one were willing to acknowledge Luhmann’s insight into social systems theory 
generally, we might still disagree with his designation of the media as a system on par with all 
others. To put it bluntly, it is simply not plausible that the media are free to influence capitalism 
to the degree that capitalism is in a position influence the media—precisely because the media 
institutions are themselves capitalist enterprises. Whereas Chomsky and Herman claim media 
content is strongly informed by the structural constraints of capitalism, Luhmann argues that the 
economic system is a separate social system and exerts just as much influence on the media as 
the media exerts upon it. Luhmann’s insistence upon non-domination of one social system upon 
others apparently makes little of the fact that modern media institution are themselves capitalist 
enterprises. Using Luhmann’s own terminology against him, one might argue that the media’s 
“code” is not information/non-information but profit/loss. If so, there is perhaps a strong 
argument to be made elsewhere that Luhmann’s analysis could more accurately describe the 
media as a sub-system of the economic social system, a form of business among other 
businesses, and one that just happens to engage in matters of some political consequence. 
 
Defining Atrocity 
Moral judgment requires information. When information is mediated, we are 
automatically talking about an experience quite different from witnessing an event firsthand. If, 
as Sontag writes, “the very notion of atrocity … is associated with the expectation of 
photographic evidence,” the mass media occupy a position of power not simply because the 
images they broadcast are often assumed to speak for themselves, but because the media 
organizations themselves determine precisely which images will be broadcast and which will 
not. The power of the mass media is the power to define both the conditions of moral judgment 
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as well as its object. Of the two theories of news media discussed above, Chomsky and 
Herman’s is by far the more useful for scholars interested in predicting news content, including 
how violence will be depicted and whether it will be depicted at all. 
Given the connection between popular opinion and the mass media demonstrated by 
empirical research, it is reasonable to assume this influence extends also to the public’s 
acceptance or rejection of state violence.333 Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model predicts 
that the victims of violence carried out by official enemies will be emphasized and generally 
characterized by its unacceptable nature in the mass media. By contrast, the victims of violence 
carried out by the media’s home country will either be downplayed or ignored altogether. While 
the PM remains agnostic about the power of the people to initiate policy change, it predicts a 
connection between the acceptance or rejection of certain forms of violence depending on the 
actor perpetrating that violence. In short, the PM is strongly consonant with a theory of atrocity 
based on vision.  
By contrast, Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory of the mass media is explicitly 
unconcerned with the depiction of reality. Whatever the merits some have found in his theory 
applied elsewhere, it is simply implausible that the mass media, as a separate social system, 
shares equal status in terms of mutual influence with the economic system. Because Chomsky 
and Herman acknowledge that media institutions are themselves private companies constrained 
by the structural incentives this status implies, they offer an account that is able to explain a great 
deal more than Luhmann. By contrast, Luhmann denies the role of incentives originating in the 
economic system as having any meaningful influence on media content, which he argues is 
instead a closed and self-regulating system, guided by an internal logic.  
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V. OVERLOOKING: Liberal-Nationalism and Invisible Violence 
 
“[E]very one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in his own country.” 
Michel de Montaigne 
 
The foregoing chapters have addressed various facets of a theory of atrocity grounded in 
moral vision. This chapter extends that discussion by looking at the shape violence takes in 
liberal-democratic nation-states, given the presumption of a lower threshold of atrocity in such 
societies. I argue that 1) nationalism’s default self-regard grants liberal-democratic nation-states 
the benefit of the doubt when it comes to managing the interpretation of state violence because 
the constitutive elements of nationalism in these societies are tied to the institutions of state 
power; 2) nationalism tends to reduce liberal ideals to slogans which displace a meaningful sense 
of responsibility for bad states of affairs. The outcome of the curious ideological synthesis of 
liberal-nationalism is not necessarily less state violence, but rather violence of a kind that passes 
undetected by large numbers of people. Moreover, if it is detected, the violence in question is 
believed to be of a sort more humane than that of others, thereby averting the possibility of 
crossing beyond the threshold of atrocity. Finally, 3) Adam Smith’s moral philosophy 
emphasizes the impossibility of judging the moral content of one’s own actions and offers a 
possible way out of the conundrum by invoking a hypothetical spectator—an idea considered 
here in relation to the foregoing discussion of Murdoch and Levinas. 
 
Mere Description  
Upon entering office in 2009, US President Barack Obama pledged to release “a 
substantial number” of photographs documenting the abuse of detainees that had taken place at 
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Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison in the early years of the US-led occupation.334 Revelations of sexual 
abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and homicide at the prison only added fuel to the wider national 
debate over the so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” adopted by the Bush 
administration following the 9/11 attacks.335 As one of his first acts of office, Obama signed an 
executive order banning some of the more extreme practices and vowed before Congress that the 
“United States of America does not torture.”336 Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s 
embrace of torture, the abuse at Abu Ghraib clearly went far beyond the practices approved by 
the so-called torture memos and Obama was initially receptive to further investigation.337 At the 
time he entered office, 279 photographs depicting the abuse at Abu Ghraib and other American 
military prisons had already been made public, among them the iconic hooded figure. The exact 
number of photographs yet to be released remains unclear but estimates run in excess of 2,100. 
When the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) requested the release of 44 previously 
unreleased photographs, the White House initially welcomed the action in the interest of 
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transparency. Yet only a few months later the President abruptly reversed his position—no 
further photographic evidence connected to the Abu Ghraib scandal or similar episodes of abuse 
at other American prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan would be released. Moreover, the White 
House shelved an effort by the Justice Department to pursue a criminal investigation into torture 
under the Bush administration. According to the President, it was time to “move forward”;338 the 
release of these photographs, he reasoned, would only serve to “inflame anti-American opinion 
and … put our troops in greater danger.”339 In an attempt to allay concerns raised by this about-
face, Obama insisted that the photographs in question were “not particularly sensational.”340 This 
was a very different tone from that of Major General Anthony Taguba, head of the 2004 military 
investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal. Taguba claimed to have personally viewed images 
depicting “torture, abuse, rape and every indecency” against detainees in American custody.341 
This came on the heels of 2007 interview with Seymour Hersh for the New Yorker magazine in 
which Taguba claimed to have viewed “a video of a male American soldier in uniform 
sodomizing a female detainee.”342 When pressed specifically on the question of rape, both the 
Pentagon and White House offered a decidedly vague statement denying the very existence of 
the photographs “in question.”343 While Major General Taguba continues to insist that rape 
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occurred at Abu Ghraib, he agreed with the President that no further photographic evidence 
should be released. In his judgment, “the mere description of these pictures is horrendous 
enough. Take my word for it.”344 
In a campaign spearheaded by the ACLU, transparency advocates have continued to push 
for the release of all photographs. Congress voted for opacity in 2009, passing a statute granting 
the Secretary of Defense the power to conceal images for up to three years if their release might 
place American lives at risk. Erstwhile Secretary of Defense Robert Gates immediately invoked 
this power to suppress all 2,000+ images and his successor Leon Panetta did the same in 2012.345 
In March 2015, a federal judge from the U.S. District Court in Manhattan ordered the release of 
the images in their entirety, prompting an immediate appeal from the Obama administration on 
grounds of national security, which began oral argument in mid-January 2016. In February 2016, 
the Pentagon released 198 photographs.346 Though most of the recently released images appear 
fairly innocuous, they were not accompanied with captions or context, making it impossible to 
know exactly what they depict.347 
It is at first perplexing that Abu Ghraib specifically should have inspired the scandal it 
did, given the scope of American violence in the immediate post-9/11 period. To be sure, the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib is objectively upsetting. “Never before,” insisted the journalist Philip 
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Gourevitch, “had such primal dungeon scenes been so baldly captured on camera,”348 but by the 
time Obama entered office, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by American 
intelligence agencies was both well-documented and widely known. Waterboarding, a form of 
torture dating to the Spanish Inquisition, had been adopted by CIA and used to interrogate terror 
suspects at covert “black sites” around the globe. In addition to the overwhelming evidence 
gathered by NGOs and journalists documenting patterns of routine abuse at American military 
detention facilities, approximately 100 detainees have died in US custody, including 34 
suspected or confirmed homicides and at least eight others who were literally “tortured to 
death.”349  
Since 2004, when Seymour Hersh broke the Abu Ghraib scandal in the pages of The New 
Yorker, details have slowly continued to emerge. In late 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee 
torture report revealed that waterboarding was used to a far greater extent than previously 
thought and describes other disturbing techniques, including “rectal rehydration” or forced 
feeding through the anus, an “horrific and humiliating procedure”350 more accurately described 
as rape.351 Upon entering office, President Obama swept away some of the most egregious 
practices implemented under George W. Bush and barred the CIA’s use of “black sites.”352 And 
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while Americans have seemingly become much more tolerant of torture in the decade since the 
scandal broke, it is Abu Ghraib and not the CIA’s more damning record that remains the 
preeminent example of American abuse during this dark chapter of American history.353 Why? 
The primary distinction between Abu Ghraib and the CIA interrogation program quite 
clearly has to do with official sanction and not the severity abuse. While the mistreatment of 
detainees depicted in the Abu Ghraib photographs so far released is unquestionably despicable, it 
nevertheless remains arguably less severe than many of the techniques approved for CIA use, 
which resulted in numerous deaths. Several of the Abu Ghraib photographs depict American 
military personnel posing in crude attempts at humor with the dead body of Manadel el-Jamadi 
but his death, subsequently ruled a homicide by military investigators, occurred in CIA 
custody.354 Because of this and other detainee deaths as well as the conspicuous parallels to 
officially-sanctioned practices, the Bush administration appeared conflicted in its response to 
Abu Ghraib. When President Bush commented at all on the images’ content, he denied that 
anything depicted there amounted to torture and instead emphasized vocabulary like “abuse” or 
“humiliation.”355 Whatever he called it, the President was slow to condemn the abuse and when 
he did, it was expressed mainly as a security concern, i.e. it stoked the flames of anti-
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Americanism, put soldiers’ lives at greater risk, and tarnished the nation’s reputation. Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying before Congress, said “There are a lot more photographs 
and videos that exist. … If these are released to the public, obviously, it’s going to make matters 
worse.”356 This approach suggests that the images themselves were more of a problem for the 
government than the practices they recorded. To date, the only Americans held liable for charges 
relating to torture are eleven low-level soldiers involved in the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.357  
Though Human Rights Watch and other groups argue that criminal charges should be 
brought against those directly implicated in the Bush administration’s wider enhanced 
interrogation techniques, including “assault, sexual abuse, war crimes and murder, as well as 
conspiracy to commit some of these crimes,”358 no prosecution has ever been brought, nor do 
such prosecutions appear likely. Ken Davis, a former military police officer whose early 
complaints about the abuse at Abu Ghraib to his commanding officers were ignored, expresses 
resentment over this fact in Rory Kennedy’s award-winning documentary, Ghosts of Abu 
Ghraib: 
Has anybody been brought to trial for [Manadel el-Jamadi’s death]? No, but [Charles] 
Graner and Sabrina [Harman] were charged with those pictures. That to me is ridiculous. 
‘We won’t charge the murderer, even though it’s ruled a homicide, but we’ll charge you 
for taking pictures and exposing that a murder happened here.’ … [Charles] Graner and 
the 372nd MP company embarrassed the army. With pictures. And the army got them 
back.359 
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Abu Ghraib was a problem mainly because the photographs existed at all. While the details of 
officially-sanctioned CIA interrogation practices were rendered benign through the use of sterile 
bureaucratic prose, pictures shock even when the violence they depict is objectively less severe.  
Modern torturers have dispensed with crude methods, and have instead devised 
techniques that remain either palatable or invisible to the general public. The political scientist 
Darius Rejali calls these forms of torture “clean” (as opposed to “scarring”). While “clean” 
techniques do cause immense physical suffering and often irreversible psychological damage, 
they are perceived as less physically violent because they leave no visible scars.360 In print, 
“forced standing” reads like a minor inconvenience; “sensory deprivation” like a game of hide-
and-seek; “rough handling” like a fraternal wrestling match; “stress positions” like a particularly 
intense session of yoga. This language intentionally masks the trauma such techniques actually 
inflict. The CIA was extremely careful to avoid any perception of excess, even as it engaged in 
severe forms of physical and psychological abuse. By contrast, the Abu Ghraib pictures made 
visible forms of abuse of an especially sexual nature (enforced nudity, simulated fellatio, 
touching of genitals, bestiality, etc.) that push strongly against social norms and thereby violate 
what I have called in earlier chapters a threshold of atrocity. 
The truly transgressive nature of the Abu Ghraib scandal then has less to do with the 
abuse it revealed than with the complications it posed and still poses for American national 
identity and its constitutive myths. Jasbir Puar points out that the homosexual and 
sadomasochistic content of the images evoked a special outrage because they challenged the 
“multicultural hetero-normativity intrinsic to U.S. patriotism.”361 
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It may well be that these responses [of outrage] by westerners reveal what we might 
deem the worst form of torture—that is, sexual torture and humiliation rather than 
extreme pain—more than any comprehension of the experiences of those tortured.362 
 
Insecurities about sex, especially gay sex, say a great deal about where a threshold of atrocity is 
likely to be located in the United States today and, by extension, which methods of violence 
must absolutely be avoided if invisibility is the goal. Moreover, because sexual acts are imbued 
with deep cultural fascination and “burdened with an excess of significance,”363 as Gayle Rubin 
argues, they are subject to what she calls the “fallacy of misplaced scale.”364  
Sexual violence generates a special revulsion in the hierarchy of imagined misdeeds, out of 
proportion even with forms of abuse that result in severe physical pain. In the case of Abu 
Ghraib, the revulsion was deepened by deviations from hetero-normative sexuality, including 
homosexual, sadomasochistic, and bestial content.365 That these acts were performed by 
members of the armed forces, a traditional bastion of patriotic sentiment and national reverence, 
deepened the revulsion still further. Indeed, polls confirm that while Americans have grown 
more supportive of torture in general, they are nevertheless roundly appalled by abuse of a 
sexual nature.366  
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As foregoing chapters have discussed at length, visibility is a central component to a 
theory of atrocity and photography, a consummately visual medium, exerts tremendous 
emotional power.367 In principle, the sexual abuse at Abu Ghraib was “clean” torture; the scars it 
left were psychological, not physical. Were it not for the photographic record, the suffering and 
humiliation conducted at Abu Ghraib would command much less power that it does. This is 
perhaps why the allegations of rape at Abu Ghraib have been so underreported. No visual 
evidence has yet come forward and without documented proof of torture, the inaccessibility of 
pain proves a massive obstacle to moral vision. 
“To have great pain,” Elaine Scarry writes, “is to have certainty; to hear that another 
person has pain is to have doubt.”368 Because suffering is inherently subjective, the Murdochian 
call to attention faces tremendous resistance when it comes to judging the suffering of another. 
This point is also well-acknowledged by the practitioners of “clean” torture themselves, insofar 
as their intention is to render torture invisible. 
[T]hough there is ordinarily no language for pain, under the pressure of the desire to 
eliminate pain, an at least fragmentary means of verbalization is available both to those 
who are themselves in pain and to those who wish to speak on behalf of others. … [But] 
this verbal sign is so inherently unstable that when not carefully controlled … it can have 
different effects and can even be intentionally enlisted for the opposite purposes, invoked 
not to coax pain into visibility but to push it into further invisibility, invoked not to assist 
in the elimination of pain but to assist in its infliction …369 
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Through its spectacular display of abuse—especially sexual abuse—Abu Ghraib made visible 
that which was intended to remain invisible. By contrast, no photographic evidence has come 
forward documenting the C.I.A.’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques and the video 
evidence that once existed was deliberately destroyed by the agency.370 All we have are the 
textual descriptions which, however detailed, inevitably fall short for the purposes of 
Murdochian moral vision.  
Images and video command a moral authority that “mere description,” as General Taguba 
put it,” simply does not. Still, even if we had bundles of photographic evidence, it is doubtful 
crude visibility alone would be enough to command Murdochian moral attention when the 
perpetrator of violence is oneself. We must wade through other compelling factors that influence 
and frame our moral vision, especially when considering that dramatically expanded sense of 
self: the nation. Visibility takes us only part of the moral distance and, though cliché insists 
otherwise, photographs never do speak for themselves. Nationalists typically cast aspersions on 
evidence that would undermine their central dogmas. “To photographic corroboration of the 
atrocities committed by one’s own side,” Susan Sontag writes, “the standard response is that the 
pictures are a fabrication, that no such atrocity ever took place … or that yes, it happened and it 
was the other side who did it, to themselves.”371  
To these fraught explanations offered up by the nationalist, I would suggest another: 
“yes, it happened—but ‘they’ do worse to ‘us.’” Reciprocation is often a moral crutch against 
which all kinds of atrocity can be justified, when perceived as less barbaric than methods 
employed by the enemy. Both sides in any war maim and murder. This much is acknowledged, 
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but because “our” cause is perceived as just and our methods humane, no great introspection 
follows from this insight. Yet when American soldiers are seen to have behaved in ways that 
violate deeply felt social norms without evidence of reciprocation on the enemy’s behalf, a 
threshold of atrocity approaches. With Abu Ghraib the state was eventually able to avoid passing 
beyond such a threshold by arguing that the abuse that occurred there was a result of a few “bad 
apples,” and did “not reflect,” as President Bush put it, “the nature of the American people. 
That’s not the way we do things in America.”372 It might even be argued that adopting a 
principled stance against the Abu Ghraib abuse and swiftly punishing those involved actually 
served to reinforce American nationalism by emphasizing moral superiority a “nation of laws” 
held in relation to its barbaric enemies. In this way, liberal-nationalism provides powerful 
insulation against even the most damning evidence. 
 
Biopower and Nationalism 
Michael Foucault’s analysis of racism and biopower might shed some light on our 
present task. His interest in racism stems from a more general concern with how war has 
ostensibly come to be the preeminent paradigm of social organization. In his view, racism is a 
product of biopower’s obsession with the health of populations vis-à-vis their sensitivity to 
degenerate elements. That is, racism emerges in part as an instrumental tool of state power; as a 
means to justify sovereign violence against anyone deemed not to belong. Foucault makes it 
clear that his use of the term racism bears little in common with either “the ordinary racism that 
takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races” or “the racism that can be 
seen as a sort of ideological operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that 
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is directed toward [them] … onto a mythical adversary.”373 It is a use of the term “racism” that 
transcends superficial biological distinctions because, to a large extent, society defines its 
degenerates according to arbitrary criteria, which may or may not be dictated biologically. 
Because of the expanded notion of racism he employs, Foucault’s conclusions lend themselves 
easily to nationalism. 
The crux of Foucault’s argument is that modern biopower optimizes life by regulating it 
at the level of populations. Racism is the “precondition that makes killing acceptable”374 for the 
benefit of racial health; it is “primarily a way of introducing a break in the domain of life that is 
under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.”375 This “break” has 
two functions: first, it creates clear hierarchies within a population between those who belong 
and those who do not. Second, it establishes a positive relation between the eradication of bad, 
undesirable, or degenerate elements and the welfare of the dominant population. For Foucault, 
these functions operate as normalizing mechanisms to the extent that any deviation from 
established norms of behavior is conceptualized in racist terms. Whereas the subjects of power 
had formerly found themselves in constant, albeit suppressed, conflict with the sovereign, this 
conflict now turns inward.376 At this point, biopower reveals its limits and state racism emerges, 
i.e. “racism that society will direct against itself” in a process of “permanent purification.”377  
Giorgio Agamben famously concludes from the foregoing analysis that the purifying 
logic of modern society is inseparable from that which produced Auschwitz.378 While this may 
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be true in a very general sense, I am not convinced we need to frame it quite so starkly. Instead, I 
would simply observe that Foucault’s idiosyncratic analysis of racism resembles what is more 
commonly recognized as a strand of conventional nationalism. The health and life in question is 
of course that of national society. While sovereign authority had formerly expressed itself 
through the right to take life or to let live, Foucault’s analysis of biopower introduced the 
inverse: the right to make live and let die. In a nationalist context, deaths inflicted as a result of 
national purity are mere side-effects, or as Puar observes, “a form of collateral damage in the 
pursuit of life.”379 Nor must the project of enhancing national health necessarily take on an 
explicitly aggressive form. It is usually enough to simply establish a binary of 
inclusion/exclusion via the law, which, as Massad observes “enacts not identity but difference 
tout court.”380  
The national state then determines who is and who is not a member. It creates juridical 
subjects and imposes legal categories of “us” and “them” to reinforce this distinction, which in 
turn sets the basic conditions for the prosecution and justification of violence. “Wars,” Foucault 
claims, “are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged 
on behalf of the existence of everyone … It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and 
race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be 
killed.”381 For killing to remain palatable, i.e. within the bounds of acceptable violence, it must 
be framed as a safeguard of the nation. Hence “the most murderous [states] are also, of necessity, 
the most racist.”382 Degenerate lives become not only expendable but also necessary in their 
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expendability. This relationship between one’s identity and the power of the state to uphold or to 
deny that identity is the quintessential symptom of the modern nation-state—one that has a 
profound influence on the perception of atrocity. As Butler writes, “certain lives are not 
considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized; they fit no frame for the human, and their 
dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to a physical violence which 
is already at work in the culture.”383 Yet while a proliferation of conventional violence may well 
attend the emergence of biopower, how can we account for more extreme and shocking 
manifestations? 
The emphasis Foucault places on biopower, while fascinating, nevertheless leaves him 
unable to account for incidences of state violence characterized by a desire to maximize 
suffering, i.e. not simply to kill on the way to enhancing national health, but to kill for the sake of 
killing and torture for the sake of torturing. Achille Mbembe offers a useful corrective here, 
pushing Foucault’s insights in more fruitful directions by questioning if the notion of biopower is 
“sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political under the guise of war, or 
resistance or of the fight against terror makes the murder of its enemy the primary objective?”384 
Instead of understanding death as a hidden byproduct of biopower’s drive for life, Mbembe 
places death in the foreground of his analysis. Invoking what he calls necropolitics, a slight twist 
on Agamben’s “bare life,” he attempts to account for the creation of “death worlds” in which 
“vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living 
dead.”385 
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Both biopolitics and necropolitics present totalizing visions of state violence. Each 
explains the phenomenon in terms that conform to an overarching logic of either maximizing the 
health of the nation or maximizing the suffering of enemies. Though Mbembe’s work is rather 
more useful for considering the concept of atrocity insofar as it centralizes death, it nevertheless 
remains a mystery why the creation of “death worlds” he posits would not in itself generate great 
unease among large numbers of people. While the victim group is terrorized and oppressed, the 
profound nature of the violence exacted upon them is likely to stir unease even among the 
perpetrators unless it occurs in secret. Admittedly, neither Foucault nor Mbembe is particularly 
concerned with how the members of a given society might themselves rationalize state violence. 
While there is a tacit assumption in their work that, whatever its form, state violence is typically 
undertaken quietly beyond the purview of public scrutiny, they do not explain why this should be 
the case. Missing from their analyses is a clear understanding of the form responsibility for 
violence and atrocity takes in nationalist societies. 
 
Dispersing Responsibility 
The ability to make sense of rampant inconsistencies and patent historical falsehoods is 
arguably one of nationalism’s most powerful assets. This poses some challenges when it comes 
to a philosophical approach to responsibility in a national context. Nationalism is in the first 
place capable of generating the conditions of its acceptance among large numbers of people by 
appealing to the kinds of self-glorifying conceits that frequently arise among groups of any size. 
When hegemonic, nationalism is also able to frame the interpretation of past, present, and future 
deeds insofar as they are perceived as collective efforts. This is true regardless of whether one 
adheres to an instrumentalist view of nationalism, which claims the phenomenon arises as a 
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cypher for manufacturing consent in the service of elite interests, or whether one believes 
nationalism arises organically, according to aleatory and unpredictable reasons.386  
Once it gains currency, nationalism reproduces itself according to a self-justifying 
framework; it is a tautology at root, one that derives legitimation on the basis of its very 
existence. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall adopt a broadly constructivist account of 
nationalism. The nation is a social construct, an “imagined community” in Anderson’s 
terminology.387 Gellner summarizes the scholarly consensus on the matter in his account: 
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-
delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing 
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-
existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. 
Those who are its historical agents know not what they do, but that is another matter.388 
 
Nationalism is the belief that a given nation must control political power in a territory uniquely 
associated with it. Nationalism’s central political objective is to secure the congruity of state and 
nation. The reasons for nationalism’s historical emergence do not concern me here, nor does any 
one approach fundamentally alter the thrust of my argument. Finally, a constructivist account of 
nationalism should not be taken to deny the phenomenon’s persistent emotional and political 
relevance. 
 Nationalism, moreover, masks its origins and obscures the logical absurdities it 
propounds as essential and eternal. A common example of this is found in the many strands of 
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nationalism that fuse contemporary monotheistic practice with a romanticized history of 
paganism. This assembling and reassembling of disparate pre-existing as well as fabricated 
cultural elements means that nationalism “must be regarded as both construct and process.”389 
As Gellner points out, nationalism’s “historical agents” have a rather different view on 
the matter. Especially in countries populated by communities able to trace their biological 
lineage several generations into the past, nationalism is easily perceived as eternal. An evidence 
for this timelessness is easily bridged by fabricated histories of collective glories and suffering 
stretching back to the dawn of time. In this way, the nation connects its contemporary adherents 
to events long past. As Renan reminds us, national solidarity is facilitated by the capacity to 
forget past divisions and rivalries between pre-national groups.390 Similarly, David Miller 
describes the nation as “a community that, because it stretches back and forward across the 
generations, is not one that the present generation can renounce.”391 Moreover, nations are 
frequently described in decidedly corporeal terms, as biological organisms that possess a clear 
past, present and future; a physical disposition that can be injured or become sick; a personality 
with the capacity to take offense and hold grudges; a will; and other such characteristics.  
Nationalism connects people to a project with ramifications well beyond their parochial 
existences and offers every member of the nation the possibility of meaningful participation. In 
most cases, this participation requires very little actual effort. Instead, individuals are able to 
share in the vicarious deeds of their co-nationals through no greater connection than shared 
national affiliation. “As a result, those who take their national belonging seriously can 
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meaningfully say things like ‘we have been injured,’ ‘we won the war,’ ‘we lost our country,’ 
‘we gained our independence,’ ‘we made the desert bloom,’ or ‘we shall prevail sooner or 
later.’”392 This collectivizing sentiment is what Anderson has in mind when he describes the 
notion of “horizontal comradeship.”393 At the heart of this comradeship lies a vague notion of 
responsibility. 
Part of nationalism’s steady and wildly successful proliferation around the globe since 
the French Revolution is the void it fills for a world no longer bound by the divine. In place of 
religious immanence, nationalists take pride in sports victories, military heroics, scientific 
discovery—all without having participated directly in the achievement of these glories. Yet the 
eager acceptance of vicarious responsibility invariably flows in one direction. As Abdel-Nour 
has pointed out, though nationalists are often willing to accept derivative responsibility for the 
successes of their co-nationals, their enthusiasm for shared responsibility rapidly diminishes 
when it comes to recognized misdeeds.394 National malfeasance must be ignored whenever 
possible or else subjected to such interpretive contortions as to wedge it back firmly within the 
boundaries of acceptable national behavior. Killing is wrong, but killing in defense of the eternal 
patrie is not merely acceptable, but necessary and honorable. 
 It is with the unpalatable that this study is particularly concerned—the maimed, mangled, 
and mortified bodies produced by states and so easily justified by nationalists. It requires no 
marked creativity to discern the motives underlying the nationalist will to appropriate greatness. 
Less comprehensible, however, is the ease with which nationalists are able to ignore or excuse 
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morally abhorrent actions. Mass atrocities, when rendered visible, are nevertheless typically 
obscured by characterizing the enemy as subhuman—as “animals walking about in human 
form.”395 This mental process transforms what should be objectively understood as violations of 
a basic moral prohibition against killing into instances of indifference or even collective pride. 
Not merely killing, but inflicting suffering becomes a source of vicarious pride when undertaken 
by our national brethren against the enemy. This kind of rationale is, however, not usually 
necessary as the perpetrators of extreme violence are careful to keep it away from public 
scrutiny. Ignorance of atrocities more often precludes the nationalist impulse to justify the 
unjustifiable. 
The burden of collective moral responsibility for state actions arguably increases to the 
degree a state can be said to legitimately represent the views and desires of the nation itself. 
Indeed, one of the core outcomes of nationalism even in its earliest manifestations has been to 
simultaneously simplify and to render apparent an organic connection between the state and the 
people. The argument, moreover, applies to all nation-states. Though their governments may 
differ in structure and form, the governing authority in every nation-state at least attempts to 
derive legitimacy through an appeal to the nation. Abdel-Nour is correct when he argues that 
insofar as individuals partake of vicarious pride for perceived national glories, a degree of moral 
responsibility for the nation’s misdeeds should also obtain. However, the degree to which a 
population feels compelled to accept authoritarian state actions as consonant with national ideals 
is often tenuous, which complicates the picture. Any inquiry into collective responsibility for 
state actions must confront the basic question of the synchronicity nation and state. A recent 
example demonstrates precisely what I mean by this. 
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 Before his ignominious fall from power in 2011, Hosni Mubarak, like his predecessor, 
ruled Egypt with a curious form of nationalist imagery that de-emphasized pan-Arab sentiment 
and stressed a distinct Egyptian identity. To the extent that Mubarak’s regime engaged in 
behavior that resonated within and across nationalist circles, the regime won applause from these 
quarters. But when he tortured, disappeared, and murdered political enemies, nationalists were 
under no illusions that such behavior constituted anything more virtuous than the unpleasant 
byproducts of a Machiavellian power struggle. The lofty ideals upon which the nationalist vision 
of Egypt rested necessarily transcended the temporal politics of Mubarak’s regime, which few 
Egyptians would have honestly described as a government worthy of their admiration.396 The 
ability to reject a regime’s actions as dissonant with national ideals is a curious advantage quite 
unique to authoritarian nation-states, where nationalists are under no pressure either to view state 
actions as an embodiment of their vision or to accept vicarious responsibility for those actions. 
Moreover, to carry the Egyptian example just a bit further, when the Arab Spring came to Egypt 
so dramatically at Tahrir Square, the movement to bring about Mubarak’s ouster took an 
explicitly nationalist tone. For instance, not only was Tahrir Square the traditional site of protests 
throughout Egypt’s modern history, it also prominently features a statue of Omar Makram, the 
leader of the nationalist opposition to Napoleon’s colonial inroads. Mubarak’s decision to crack 
down on the protests removed any lingering doubts as to his nationalist legitimacy.  
Though baffling to outside observers, the military’s initial willingness to stand by the 
demonstrators and to oppose police violence lent the army great credibility as the true 
embodiment of the national will. By contrast, Mubarak was denounced as sharply at odds with 
this will. As Eva Bellin explains, “Using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the 
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image of the military as defender of the nation, especially if the crowds are representative of the 
‘nation’ and cannot be dismissed as distinctly ‘other’ along class, sectarian, or ethnic lines.”397 
The nationalist lines drawn between army and state helped temporarily patch over the social 
cleavages within Egyptian society that later contributed to the revolution’s stagnation and 
cooptation.398  
Nationalism thrives on the selective use (cynics might call it an abuse) of history.399 It 
draws upon a real or imagined cultural legacy and from it creates a set of myths that both justify 
and extend its influence. Strict adherence to objective reality is subordinate to the social 
functions such myths serve. As Eric Hobsbawm wrote apropos of nationalism and the 
responsibilities of the historian, “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not 
so.”400 While nationalist authoritarian regimes do make use of national myths, their ability to do 
so is hobbled by the shallow and often incidental nature of the connection. So when the state 
behaves in a way that is widely perceived a deviation from or directly antagonistic to national 
myths, a little old-fashioned repression is all that is needed to swiftly contain any discontent.  
By contrast, brute force is not usually a viable option for liberal-democratic nation-states, 
where national identity is molded by ideals widely perceived as synchronous with state power. 
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Once inflected with liberalism and the trappings of democratic governance, nationalism implies a 
much more linear relationship between the individual and the state than what one tends to find 
under authoritarian regimes. In such cases, where nationalism has been effectively harnessed by 
state institutions and where democratic governance inculcates a belief that state policy is driven 
by the will of the people, the liberal ideals that undergird the state’s legitimacy simultaneously 
serve to define its national myths as well. Democracy, liberalism, and their attendant ideals—
justice, equality, toleration—form the core principles upon which national identity flourishes in 
such states. In short, whereas nationalism in authoritarian nation-states remains detached from 
the echelons of formal power, liberal-democratic nation-states realize the fullest alignment of 
nation and state. 
With sufficient time to stabilize and gain legitimacy, the formal institutions of democratic 
governance exert tremendous power over national identity. Likewise, the particular 
manifestation of these institutions is in turn shaped by the pre-existing elements of national 
identity. There is what Beissinger calls a “recursive element” to the relationship between myths 
of nation, national mobilization, and state power, each informing and justifying the other.401 To 
echo Tilly’s maxim on war-making and state formation, nationalism makes the law and the law 
makes nationalism. Some observers have noted the importance of the Declaration of 
Independence and especially the Constitution for a uniquely American sense of national identity. 
What has been called a “civil religion” simply describes the material codification of American 
national identity.402  
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When democracy is perceived as a central component of the national mythos, 
democracy’s physical embodiment, its worldly existence, becomes quasi-sacred. In the United 
States, this includes the various monuments to American democracy that span the Washington 
Mall and so many battlefields, heroes, martyrs, and devils recorded in the history books. The 
government itself, the very pinnacle of state power, represents the apotheosis of national ideals, 
albeit within highly constrained parameters that render the range of political action predictable 
and largely powerless to enact major change. Republican or Democrat, the notion of responsible 
citizenship articulated by everyone from the caretakers of primary education to the gatekeepers 
of the intelligentsia implies and expects adherence to either one main party or the other. 
Alternative political options are simply not taken seriously. 
Even today, at a time when large number of Americans have come to believe that 
meaningful change is impossible or at least extremely difficult to enact via conventional means, 
an alternative to the two-party cartel appears equally unthinkable. At the limits of the political 
spectrum lie two sides of one coin insofar as the strategies they pursue retain a common 
nationalist premise. On one side, we find a liberal-left whose oppositional force, when it 
emerges, is distilled in the nationalist slogan “protest is patriotic;”403 at the other, a reactionary 
right that has elevated the Constitutional framers to demi-god status, and which deploys their 
decontextualized words in the hope of resurrecting a lapsed golden age of American history.  
These oppositional forces may each at different times and for quite different reasons 
oppose particular policies or politicians. They may excoriate Washington “politics as usual” and 
denounce the current occupant of the Oval Office as a traitor, but the basic legitimacy of the 
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political system almost always survives intact. The synchronization of national identity and 
formal politics in liberal-democratic nation-states guarantees as much. Any political ideology 
that fundamentally questions or rejects the basic premises of American-style democracy appears 
nonsensical, even “un-American.” It is a powerful symbiosis underscored by Louis Hartz, who 
used a less explicit but no less ideological notion—the “American way of life”—to describe the 
embedded Lockean liberalism at work.  
There has never been a “liberal movement” or a real “liberal party” in America: we have 
only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually 
does not know that Locke himself is involved. … Ironically, “liberalism” is a stranger in 
the land of its greatest fulfillment.404  
 
If Hartz is correct, then American identity is inextricably tied to a deep respect for the 
institutions of state power. For while other nations are able to draw on real and perceived 
histories that span millennia, the United States simply cannot mine the same field of legitimacy 
without extensive historical fabrication. Instead of a timeless history then, national identity in the 
Untied States is grounded in a civil ethos, a strand of Lockean liberalism Hartz pegs as the 
American Way of Life. For our purposes here we can simply observe that insofar as uncritical 
acceptance of core state institutions is an implied condition of membership, American identity is 
shaped and reshaped mainly through its relation to state power. No analysis of American state 
violence is complete without confronting this basic insight. 
 While the foregoing discussion centers on the American case, and while synchronization 
of state and nation may be more advanced there than it is elsewhere, national identity is 
nonetheless similarly tied to state power in other liberal democracies. The more perfect the 
connection, the more legitimacy the state enjoys in the eyes of its national subjects. The opposite 
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is true as well; the less perfect the connection, the less legitimacy the state enjoys and the greater 
the potential for a nationalist movement to emerge that challenges the state’s claims to national 
representation. As Breuilly argues in his classic account of nationalism, “Only when the existing 
state is held to have different boundaries from those of the nation are political oppositions liable 
to go beyond political justifications to arguments that explicitly appeal to cultural identity.”405 
This is as true for a nation conceived on ethno-linguistic grounds as it is for the strand of civic 
nationalism described here. It is important to emphasize that the verifiable existence of 
democratic state institutions is less important for this kind of civic nationalism than the belief 
that these institutions do exist and operate legitimately. 
An ethics grounded in moral vision depends greatly on the acceptance or refusal of 
responsibility. In regimes where the relationship between individual and state is not facilitated by 
the connective tissue of nationalism, responsibility is generally refused. By contrast, in states that 
cultivate a strong connection between individual and state, we should expect to see a readiness to 
accept moral responsibility for state actions. Yet this is not usually the case when it comes to 
misdeeds. Thus, it would at first appear that even the liberal-democratic connection is too weak 
to establish moral responsibility—but this is too hasty a conclusion. The reality is rather more 
complicated. What at first appears to be a conscious refusal to accept a bad state of affairs is 
nothing of the kind. Instead, the liberal-democratic nationalist impulse to refuse moral 
responsibility for the nation’s misdeeds stems from an unwillingness to concede any misdeeds at 
all. That is to say the question is not whether or not to accept responsibility; the question is 
whether or not anything wrong was done to begin with and nationalism scrupulously avoids self-
incrimination. It attempts to reverse the meaning of “bad” whenever possible, even to the point 
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of absurdity, through willful ignorance or political denialism. If the nation is synonymous with 
all things beneficent and the state is perceived not only as legitimate executor of the nation’s will 
but its highest embodiment, then state behavior deviating from this myth faces serious 
intellectual dissonance.  
Some dissonance can be accommodated and may take the form of a partisan political 
battle over the nation’s proper identity. As an example, we might look to protest movements that 
have sought to argue for reform along nationalist grounds, from Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dream 
that “one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed”406 to the common 
liberal refrain “not in our name,” both of which seek to legitimize political movements by 
suggesting the nation is not living up to professed ideals.407  
In the same way, conservative activists have expressed their opposition to policies 
advocated by the Obama administration by invoking explicitly nationalist arguments, ranging 
from bizarre denials of his birth certificate’s validity to more common objections to a “big” 
government out of step with the founders’ vision.408  
From one Presidential administration to the next, government policies always ruffle the 
feathers of those who oppose them, but rarely do these skirmishes rise to a level that forces 
citizens to reassess their national identity altogether. In this way, minor political dissonance can 
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be accommodated within the accepted boundaries of mainstream politics. If the government 
enforces policies that seriously contradict what someone happens to think is the proper role and 
destiny of the American nation, it is surely because feckless elites have run amok and not 
because there is anything fundamentally wrong with the system itself. To reach the latter 
conclusion, one must have already come to believe that the state is no longer the true executor of 
the nation’s will. And for this to occur, the misdeeds in question must be so bad, so inexcusable, 
that no amount of convincing will tame the crisis. Herein lies the particular form a threshold of 
atrocity must take if it is to penetrate the ideological fetters of liberal-nationalism. The following 
subsection looks at the morally blinding consequences that result from liberal-nationalism’s 
conversion of liberal ideals into national conceits. 
 
Liberal Ideals, National Conceits 
Nationalism is often a benign force, one that unifies and encourages solidarity across 
social divides. It need not manifest the racist and xenophobic tendencies we associate with its 
more extreme forms. Whatever its shape however, nationalism remains one of most ideologically 
potent forces of our time, capable of subordinating and subsuming competitors. When 
nationalism comes into contact with liberalism for example, the former tends to absorb the latter. 
Whereas nationalism and democracy are inherently limited visions of human society, marked by 
an inside and an outside, liberalism aspires to the universal. The nation is for those who belong 
to the nation; democracy is for the demos; liberalism is for all humanity.  
Nationalism transforms liberal universal ideals into national particularist conceits. A 
belief that one adheres to liberal universal norms can paradoxically become the source of 
particular pride in itself. “We” believe in higher ethical standards than “they” do; “our” behavior 
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is rooted in universal norms, unlike “theirs.” This tendency of nationalism to use liberalism 
instrumentally should be troubling to anyone who takes the prospects for diminishing human 
suffering seriously. Liberal ideals and the very foundations of international law itself can become 
tools in the service of domination and oppression—a worrisome phenomenon Nicola Perugini 
and Neve Gordon have called “the human right to dominate.”409  
Invisible or obscure violence committed by an unrepresentative authoritarian regime is 
one thing; openly embracing violence committed by a state perceived to be acting in the interests 
of a nation devoted to an idealistic potpourri of causes (human rights, democracy, justice, 
freedom) is another entirely. The latter case is likely to accommodate forms of violence that 
might otherwise be condemned by a public more inclined to critically assess the moral content of 
state actions. Hence liberal-nationalism may actually allow the state greater freedom of action 
when it comes to waging violence. Weizmann argues this is especially so when a case can be 
made that violence is in fact exercised with humanitarian intent using methods perceived as 
humane and adhering to what he calls the “humanitarian minimum.”410 One obvious moral 
dilemma raised by the perception of war as humanitarian and humane is a higher threshold of 
tolerance for state violence. Relating the matter more directly to democratic states, Weizmann 
claims that it is only a perception of violence as humanitarian that explains how “societies that 
see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization.”411 
Putting the matter differently, Laleh Khalili warns that “if policy makers think war can be waged 
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more humanely, they may choose to wage war more often.”412 To the enthusiasm of policy 
makers, I would add that a public inured to forms of violence that appear benevolent in intent is a 
public unwilling or perhaps afraid of looking too deeply into the grisly details. 
Martha Nussbaum points out that the values on which Americans pride themselves, 
“respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness,” are empty 
signifiers so long as they are not conceptualized in universal terms and instead apply to 
Americans only.413 This is certainly true, but American national values are not limited to the 
apparently benign liberal belief that “all human beings are created equal and endowed with 
certain inalienable rights.”414 A deep-rooted, popular belief in American exceptionalism, in 
democracy, and, more recently, human rights, complements the state’s enormous military and 
economic influence.415  
American nationalism accepts a position of global dominance in much the way earlier 
world powers did: as a logical extension of historical necessity. American values are imagined to 
be universal, the American government able to act in ways that benefit a universal humanity. 
Democracy figures large in this scheme. The United States “is a state committed not only to 
preserving the idea [of democracy] within America but extending it to the rest of the world.”416  
Paradoxes inevitably arise from the purported desire to spread American values around 
the world and the very real military and political hegemony the state enjoys. For example, 
Americans believe they live in the greatest country on earth, an assumption that implies the 
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inferiority of other societies. Nationalism is adept at balancing antagonistic and contradictory 
beliefs, so this need not detain us. It is enough simply to observe that while nationalists may take 
the state at its word, policy makers know very well that justification matters. No regime, not 
even the most murderous, ever portrays its violence as morally unjustified; rather, violence is 
typically portrayed as defensive in nature or else in the service of some grand ideological project.  
For a nation characterized and defined by a liberal-democratic ethos to prosecute 
violence with minimal controversy, it must be justified along liberal-democratic lines. As 
Wallerstein notes, the American line since 1945 has been threefold:  
America is the world’s greatest country (narrow nationalism); American is the leader of 
the ‘free world’ (the nationalism of the wealthy, White countries); American is the 
defender of the universal values of individual liberty and freedom of opportunity 
(justified in terms of Kantian categorical imperatives).417 
 
 The idea that America has a special mission in the world has historically resulted in two 
contradictory approaches on the international stage: 1) an isolationist reluctance to engage the 
country in foreign entanglements and 2) a strong belief in the United States as “a city upon a 
hill,” in which involvement overseas is occasionally necessary not only to preserve the American 
Way of Life, but to protect global human dignity. This impulse, with its cosmopolitan, 
universalist undertones was invoked in support of the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
launched by Bush administration.418 When violent means are believed to serve noble ends, it is 
difficult to perceive violence as passing beyond a threshold of atrocity. 
Clear moral vision is further hindered by the oversimplification of geopolitics. The Cold 
War had suggested a very clear ideological demarcation, physically drawn along the frontiers of 
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the iron curtain. Since the 9/11 terror attacks, the threat of Islamist terrorism has provided U.S. 
policy makers with a similarly useful Manichean division between “us” and “them”—a struggle 
between the forces of American values (good, liberal, universal) and the forces of terror (bad, 
illiberal, particular).  
Immediately following the attacks in 2001, erstwhile New York Senator Hillary Clinton 
said that the United States should “make it clear that every nation has to either be with us or 
against us.”419 President Bush made a similar statement only weeks later in a special address to 
Congress: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or 
you are with the terrorists.”420 Bush later elaborated on the universalist impulse of this vision: 
“Once again, this nation and our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world 
of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people and the 
hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility.”421 Such a perspective deliberately casts 
the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as humanitarian in nature and only 
incidentally motivated by domestic security concerns. The United States “intervened”—never 
the pejorative “invaded”—to overthrow the Taliban and to restore the rights of women; it 
invaded Iraq to overthrow the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein and to establish democracy in 
the Middle East. The GWOT itself was framed as a humanitarian effort to rid the world of an 
evil scourge.  
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush made this almost comically 
explicit with his designation of an “axis of evil,”422 a strange notion that evokes a threat of 
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generic evil linked to a suspiciously Nazi-sounding “axis.” As we have seen in earlier chapters, 
opposition to evil is not a position that can be easily rejected. When preparing to garner 
multilateral support for military intervention in Iraq, Bush consistently cited Saddam Hussein’s 
violations of human rights. “Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding,” he 
asked, “or will it be irrelevant?”423 The overall thrust of this discourse reveals some very basic 
assumptions at the highest levels about America’s global role and its self-styled responsibility for 
setting international moral standards by projecting its own actions as universal norms. In 2000, 
Condoleezza Rice stated the case decisively: “American values are universal.”424  
The symbols, speeches, tropes, and totems of American nationalism frequently remind 
Americans that the United States stands for freedom, democracy, human rights—enlightened 
cosmopolitanism itself. This belief, however discordant with the facts, is a powerful source of 
pride for those who take their national identity seriously. The Unites States is the “land of the 
free,” a “city on a hill.” Moreover, a belief that the United States is widely admired by other 
societies around the globe, its actions perceived as just, reinforces these myths. Some scholars 
believe that American global hegemony is rendered palatable to the rest of the world mainly 
because American values are widely accepted as synchronous with liberal values, that the 
country’s actions are tolerated because the United States represents a vanguard of modernity 
understood broadly as some combination of democratic politics and neoliberal markets. “The 
United States ‘project,’” Ikenberry writes “is congruent with the deeper forces of 
modernization”—or is at least thought to be.425 Whatever the merits of this argument in the 
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immediate post-9/11 period, it is no longer objectively credible today when a plurality of the 
planet’s population views the United States as the main threat to world peace and is torn on the 
merits of American government.426 
Americans widely believe their country to be the envy of other nations and despite the 
misgivings just noted, the belief is not altogether inaccurate.427 Admittedly, when US 
policymakers speak about “human rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom,” they might very well 
do so out of personal conviction and earnest idealism. Yet because of the power of “human 
rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom,” as signifiers of American nationalism, there is an element 
of deception and self-deception involved. The deception involves the international projection, 
however unwitting, of particularist conceits masquerading as universal norms; the self-deception 
arises in objections originating from within. When liberal ideals are thought to be synchronous 
with American values, American actions are assumed to be synchronous with liberal ideals. Yet 
this is not the case. When objections to state actions do occasionally crop up internally, they 
frequently adopt some variant of “we don’t do that sort of thing” or “that’s not what America 
stands for,” thereby mentally distancing the actions from some assumed core of recognizably 
American behavior. This is precisely how nationalism reduces liberal ideals to instruments of 
power. 
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Though it would seem to provide nationalist conceits with a veneer credibility, how the 
United States is perceived abroad is much less important to the question of political 
responsibility than how Americans themselves understand the relationship been state and 
society. At a time when mainstream scholarship reports levels of economic inequality without 
historical parallel and laments the consequences of this for democratic politics,428 polls indicate 
that American have a remarkably clear-eyed sense of what is at stake.429 Polls are notoriously 
ambiguous however, and while Americans universally decry the shortcomings of their political 
system and express dismay at the obstacles limiting upward social mobility, they remain 
stubbornly committed to the empirical validity of the American Dream.430 “Ideology isn’t false 
consciousness,” Walter Davis writes. “It’s fantasmatic consciousness, the creation of illusions 
and self-delusions.”431 The basic dogmas of American civil religion—a strand of what I have 
been calling liberal-nationalism—assert their self-evidence even when they come crashing 
against the sharp rocks of empirical disqualification. The American Dream is only the most 
famous expression of this kind of ideological tenacity and if it dies, where will the nationalist 
turn for succor? What future myths will stir the nationalist imagination? 
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In much the same way, those who subscribe to liberal-nationalist assumptions that 
American state violence is fundamentally benevolent will find it exceedingly difficult to reassess 
their beliefs in the face of counterevidence. However strenuously mainstream American liberals 
objected to the Presidency and policies of George W. Bush, very few would have thought to 
question the altruism of his intentions. “When we go somewhere, we don’t go as conquerors. We 
go as liberators.”432 Others invade, occupy, destroy; America liberates. Civilian deaths are 
lamentable to be sure, but ultimately unintentional. 
The goal of ideology is the production of a collective consciousness that leads ordinary 
citizens to serve the system convinced in their heart of hearts that it is morally good … 
Does not such a belief describe the consciousness of most Americans both in their 
readiness to celebrate all the American platitudes and in their readiness to support the 
domestic and international policies of their government?433 
 
Even today, with revelations of President Obama’s “kill list” and the vague standards by which 
his drone program selects targets for assassination, the mainstream debate revolves predictably 
around questions of legality and consequences for American security.434 Rarely, if ever, does the 
debate cast aspersions on American intentions, which lie beyond reproach. 
 
Invisible Violence 
There is a tradition in moral philosophy which insists that nationalism always and in all 
its forms exerts a deleterious influence on morality. The very nature of nationalism, it is claimed, 
“offends against the requirement of universality and impartiality of moral judgment.”435 Bernard 
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Gert puts it rather more starkly: “[N]ationalism overwhelms morality, not only as the basis for 
action, but also as the basis for judgment about moral matters.”436 
Confusion about morality often allows nationalistic judgments to pass for moral ones, a 
confusion often not only supported by the leaders of the country but often shared by 
them. Sometimes, however, nationalism is explicitly put forward as superior to morality. 
“My country, right or wrong” is a slogan that war makes respectable even in most 
civilized societies. … Many persons are not only willing but anxious to sacrifice their 
lives for their country, even when their country is engaged in an immoral war. During the 
twentieth century the evil caused by immoral actions due to nationalism was greater than 
the evil caused by the immoral actions due to religious reasons.437 
 
While there is much in Gert’s assessment that resonates with my own—especially in his isolation 
of war as an especially troubling subject for rationalization by the nationalist—it has not been 
my intention to claim that nationalism precludes ethics. Nationalism hinders moral judgment 
certainly, but it does not render the task impossible. 
Nationalism exerts a tremendous normative pull, especially in the modern liberal-
democratic nation-state, where the constitutive elements of national identity are themselves 
strongly associated with the state. Returning to the language of moral vision found in the work of 
Murdoch, Weil, and Levinas, this kind of liberal-nationalism inserts itself at the moment a moral 
agent is confronted with the state’s actions. Perhaps more than other filters to moral vision, 
nationalism requires a determined effort at the “unselfing” process Murdoch regards as essential 
to clearheaded moral agency. This is because nationalism makes it that much harder to assess the 
moral content of one’s actions, or one’s vicarious actions carried out by the nation-state. Indeed, 
of all the filters to moral judgment Murdoch describes, nationalism must certainly count among 
the most powerful. 
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In this final sub-section, I turn to the moral philosophy of Adam Smith, whose work 
might help us begin to remove our nationalist goggles. The key, Smith argues, is looking to a 
hypothetically impartial spectator, his contribution to the ideal observer tradition. While the 
ethical system Smith outlines in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is grounded in sympathy (not 
impartiality), his deference to an uninvolved outside observer resonates strongly with the notion 
of moral attention discussed by Murdoch and Weil. Admittedly, the impartiality Smith describes 
is unconvincing, but the figure nevertheless provides a useful aspirational ideal for evaluating 
moral dilemmas. As an ideal and not a literal moral agent, the impartial spectator is 
hypothetically stripped of the filters, ideologies, and other obstacles to moral vision in much the 
same way one practicing perfect moral attention might be. It is worth noting that in Murdoch and 
Weil’s conception, the importance of moral attention lies not in its ultimate attainability, but in 
its insertion of a moral pause, a moment of questioning one’s assumptions.  
When Adam Smith invokes the figure of the impartial spectator, he describes to a great 
extent what in earlier chapters I have termed minimally comprehensive moral knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge that places an act in a context beyond the simple phenomenological experience of the 
act itself. Just as this hypothetical spectator is unlikely to arrive at a reasonable moral judgment 
with the clouds of ideology and personal proximity lingering over the relevant interpretive 
faculties, likewise one must have access to some knowledge about the state of affairs in question. 
Simply witnessing an episode of violence is not enough. A basic notion of vision must be 
expanded to incorporate minimally comprehensive knowledge of the actors’ motivations and the 
range of morally compelling factors at stake. In short, Adam Smith’s impartial spectator brings 
us back to the face to face encounter of Levinas and the moral attention of Murdoch and Weil by 
arguing for an expanded notion of vision as a component central to moral choice. 
 174 
 In his own time, Smith’s moral philosophy was overshadowed by his economic writing 
and by his friend David Hume’s similar, albeit more coherent, sentimentalist ethics. In our own 
time, a different twist on the ideal observer concept has proved enormously fruitful for moral and 
political philosophers of the late twentieth century, namely the veil of ignorance heuristic 
proposed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. While Rawls attempts to develop the contours of 
a decent society through his innovative use of the original position, I believe Smith’s approach is 
actually far more open to universal extrapolation. Whatever his aspirations, Rawls remains tied 
to a hypothetical community with relatively recognizable boundaries—a point that becomes 
quite clear upon considering the shortcomings of his attempt to apply the model on an 
international scale. 
Though cloaked behind a veil of ignorance as to their place in the schema, Rawls 
nevertheless relies on the deliberation of the same members of the community he wishes to 
assess. By contrast, Smith argues that we can never independently know the moral content of our 
actions. 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment 
concerning them, unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station 
and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no 
other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other 
people are likely to view them. … We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we 
imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.438 
 
Smith then offers some explanation for the moral blindness of nationalism in general as well as 
the readiness to accept “custom” as morally neutral or desirable. His solution to both dilemmas is 
to propose the idea of an “impartial spectator,” predicating moral judgment on separation from 
immediate circumstances with a strong visual metaphor.  
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Amartya Sen argues that the use of the spectator device moves Smith toward an idea of 
“open impartiality” contra the “closed impartiality” of the Rawlsian contract tradition439 but the 
impartiality of Smith’s spectator is less interesting or convincing than the openness it implies. 
Opening moral conduct to scrutiny by “other people,” as Smith argues, potentially allows us to 
consider our actions from another perspective through sheer force of imagination. While ethical 
self-transformation is initiated for social reasons, Smith thinks it is ultimately achieved 
independently. The spectator obviously begins as a product of society and socialization but when 
taken seriously as tool for moral judgment, it can provide a position from which an individual is 
able to evaluate and criticize her society. 
Rawls’s version of the ideal observer enables us to imagine a base level of tolerable 
structural violence that might fall within a threshold of atrocity, i.e. it establishes minimally 
acceptable levels of violence.440 Under such a rubric, as I suggested in the second chapter, 
individuals are likely to tolerate much less violence than is currently the case. However, there are 
also important shortcomings of a Rawlsian approach, which stem from its moral chronology. 
The original position and the norms it produces usually precede the proliferation of any 
real-world phenomena that demand moral attention. Rawls sets the moral framework within 
which real-world actions may later be interpreted and reinterpreted. If moral views require 
revision, he proposes the concept of reflective equilibrium, which allows for moral beliefs to be 
“tested” and altered as necessary. “It is an equilibrium,” Rawls writes, “because at last our 
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principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our 
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation.”441  
Rawls insists upon continuing reflection, always bringing our principles and moral 
judgments into equilibrium as new morally compelling information becomes available. 
At the moment everything is in order. But this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is 
liable to be upset by further examination of the conditions which should be imposed on 
the contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to revise our 
judgments.442 
 
Though Rawls himself eschewed the term, this has been called an intuitionist account of moral 
judgment—as opposed to a deontological or consequentialist approach. Intuitions, via reflective 
equilibrium, may be refined and improved.  
While reflective equilibrium is a compelling notion for emphasizing an ongoing process 
of moral refinement, it remains vulnerable to the unique challenges posed by violence. It simply 
cannot address the colossally difficult task of achieving measured and impassioned judgment 
from actors involved in violence on one side or the other. Violence enters into Rawls’s 
framework only peripherally. He accepts a traditional state monopoly of violence as a “nonideal” 
means for “curbing the liberties of the intolerant and of restraining the violence of contending 
sects,”443 provided it violates neither his Liberty Principle nor his Difference Principle. It is 
rather difficult, however, to imagine any act of violence that would not trespass on the victim’s 
liberties. 
More to the point, Rawls discusses state violence mainly under the broad category of 
war, assuming formal initiation and just conduct. He points out that “Even in a just war certain 
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forms of violence are strictly inadmissible; and where a country’s right to war is questionable 
and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe.”444 In one of the 
only passages where Rawls directly addresses the question of atrocity, albeit without using the 
term, he declares “The aim of war is a just peace.” 
[T]herefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a 
contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. The 
conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end.445 
 
Reflective equilibrium provides a useful method for considering particular value judgments in 
light of one’s abstract value judgments. It requires a moral agent to strike a balance between 
competing value judgments without privileging one over the other. Given the formal institutional 
setting Rawls envisions in his discussion, reflective equilibrium seems a reasonable expectation. 
It is unreasonable, however, to expect individual moral agents, actively engaged in acts of 
violence as perpetrators or victims, to derive much use from a method aimed more properly at 
the “representatives of states.”446 In part, this has to do with the kinds of moral distancing and 
dispersion of responsibility state bureaucracy implies, but it also stems from Rawls’s own 
normative intentions. His project is aimed at encouraging the development of a just community 
of states, each adhering to basic standards of human rights he calls the Law of Peoples. To this 
end, he seems to impute all instances of atrocity and violations of human rights generally to 
“oppressive and expansionist regimes.”447 An application to individual ethics is unclear. 
Rawls famously applies reflective equilibrium to a hypothetical original position. 
Adapting the original position to a theory of atrocity, participants are asked to determine 
minimally acceptable levels of violence by imagining what it would be like to suffer as potential 
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victims of this violence in the future. Behind the veil of ignorance, they have no way of knowing 
if they will be born into an oppressed sub-national culture or a to a wealthy family in 
Westchester County. As in Rawls’s formulation, it is reasonable that rational self-interested 
moral agents will tolerate much less violence than we currently experience. Certainly, structural 
violence will have been considerably diminished in a Rawlsian society through the development 
of just institutions predicated on the Difference Principle. Though violence is never explicitly 
factored into his account, justice as fairness does envision a much less structurally violent 
society.448 So how can Rawls help us at the crucial moment brute physical violence actually 
occurs? Does reflective equilibrium provide the tools for moral reflection in such cases? 
Rawls is primarily interested in theorizing the foundations of decent institutions. In this 
way, the practice of reflective equilibrium implies dedicated consideration and time; it is not 
intended to offer real-time tools of judgment to individual agents in the midst of moral conflict. 
While it might offer a useful practical method for considering and reconsidering a particular 
policy or course of action, it is virtually powerless when taken by surprise. Violence explodes 
both the tidy normative framework established by the veil of ignorance and the method of moral 
assessment offered by reflective equilibrium. In such cases, it cannot offer a reliable path to 
moral judgment if only for the basic fact that a death-struggle does not resemble the kind of 
reasoned moral consideration Rawls envisions. 
So while reflective equilibrium seems to offer a way of assessing a moral dilemma in the 
past tense (i.e. of using past experience to inform future moral judgment), it is less clear that it 
offers very much in the present, as a moral dilemma unfolds before our eyes. It is all too easy to 
imagine scenarios about which reflective equilibrium has little to say because there is no history 
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to draw from. To some extent, every moral dilemma presents a unique moral crisis. 
Extrapolating from past experience is not always possible or even desirable. It is all very well to 
say that killing is wrong and should not be tolerated, but raising the maxim to a deontological 
dogmatism risks perpetuating injustices for which violence may pose a viable, if regrettable, 
countermeasure. If this is true, then strict pacifism is morally untenable.  
Whatever minimal violence might be tolerated by members of a decent society, there 
remains the question of counter-hegemonic violence that must be judged along quite different 
moral criteria. A theory of atrocity then treat anti-colonial violence as morally distinct from other 
forms of violence. While reflective equilibrium may very well conclude that colonialism is 
morally unacceptable, it can only do so after the baleful experiment has been “tested.” This can 
hardly offer much confidence to the potential victims of such violent moral experimentation. To 
be fair, a Rawlsian might object that the very threat colonialism poses to the Difference and 
Liberty Principles precludes any rational agent advocating for such a system behind the veil of 
ignorance. However, it remains plausible to imagine the basic structure of a Rawlsian society at 
some point coming under threat in the course of conventional political struggle, a threat which 
inevitably raises the possibility of injustice. 
As with Plato’s warning of the eventual stagnation and decay of his ideal state, so it 
would be with a Rawlsian society. There must be a means for addressing challenges to the 
Difference and Liberty Principles when they arise, even if the political circumstances allowing 
such challenges to arise would not have been a predictable outcome of the original position. In 
short, reflective equilibrium’s inability to reassess norms when they are taken by surprise is 
exacerbated by Rawls’s treatment of the phenomenon discussed in this chapter: nationalism. 
Rawls’s liberal cosmopolitan project is often assumed to foreclose on the possibility of any 
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widespread nationalist influence in his vision of a just society. While Rawls writes of “nations,” 
“national communities,” “national power,” even “national glory,” nationalism is curiously absent 
from his analysis. In the Law of Peoples, Rawls suggests that he understands nationalism as a 
“pattern of cultural values”449 along lines described by John Stuart Mill: 
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among 
themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—
which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire 
to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, 
or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been 
generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. 
Community of language, community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical 
limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the 
possession of national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective 
pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. 
None of these circumstances, however, are necessarily sufficient by themselves.450 
 
Whatever his views on nationalism, Rawls is unclear about what reflective equilibrium might 
look like when applied on a global scale. He writes that a global system of justice is impossible 
because the prerequisites of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus simply do not exist 
on such a scale. Whereas individuals comprise the moral agents in the original position, no such 
arrangement is possible internationally.451 Instead, the best we can expect are some basic rules of 
coexistence between liberal and hierarchical societies.  
Rawls famously posits cooperation between liberal societies and societies that fall short of his 
ideal but can still be described as “decent.” Whether these non-ideal societies encompass broadly 
nationalist ones is unclear and it is not my intention here to weigh in on the nationalism-
cosmopolitanism compatibility debate. However, I do think is fair to say that to the limited 
                                                
449 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 25 n.20. 
450 John Stuart Mill, cited in Ibid., 23 n.17. 
451 Though some argue Rawls is incorrect to conclude his egalitarian principles cannot be grafted onto the global 
context. See Thomas W. Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no. 3 (1994): 
195–224. 
 181 
extent Rawls treats nationalism at all he encourages toleration—provided it does not pose a 
threat to the Liberty or Difference Principles. On a state-institutional level, reflective equilibrium 
offers a method for subjecting our views to critical analysis and reform. But on the international 
scale, it seems something else is required to figuratively remove moral agents from the 
encounter. An external spectator of the kind Smith postulates has the potential to expand the 
possibilities for moral judgment Rawls offers via reflective equilibrium. Rawls oddly places 
Adam Smith’s moral philosophy in the utilitarian tradition, which his theory of justice and 
fairness rejects on grounds that it is liable to produce outcomes incompatible with the Liberty 
and Difference Principles. No one behind the veil of ignorance is likely to risk emerging as a 
member of an oppressed minority, however much utility it brings society. However, it is not at 
all clear that Smith’s ethics are consequentialist in the way Rawls claims they are. Rather, Smith 
explicitly complains that philosophers have focused far too much on the consequences of actions 
instead of their innate propriety and views his own contribution to moral philosophy as a 
corrective to the trend. 
Smith’s spectator addresses some of reflective equilibrium’s shortcomings by attempting 
to step outside the self through an act of imagination—before, during, and after a moral 
dilemma. Sen argues that the open quality of Smith’s approach avoids the parochialism of Rawls 
by incorporating the relevance of other people’s interests as well as the moral weight of their 
perspectives.452 It is helpful in this regard that Smith’s project is refreshingly devoid of the 
standard racism so common among his contemporaries. Smith seems to have genuinely believed 
that differences of class and race were products of society and not innate. Hence a theory of 
atrocity benefits from both Rawls and Smith. Rawls helps us to imagine a basic threshold of 
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atrocity and the limits to violence we might establish when ignorant of our place in the schema. 
Furthermore, he lays the groundwork for later moral refinement, demanding the rigorous moral 
self-critique reflective equilibrium implies. Smith, however, grants us the freedom to make more 
nuanced moral judgments by expanding the subject and moral chronology of reflective 
equilibrium. Because the strict Rawlsian account can only assess moral actions after the fact, its 
solutions are always future-oriented. By contrast, Smith’s spectator raises the possibility of 
reflective equilibrium in the present. 
Anticipating the ideas of Murdoch and Levinas, Smith’s moral agent is fundamentally a 
product of society and socialization. Moral judgment demands extraction from the deleterious 
influence of “custom.” That is, Smith believes our moral sentiments, benevolent or malevolent, 
obtain from the process of socialization. When assessing the moral content of a particular action, 
Smith argues that we imagine how another person must feel and, by extension, how we would 
feel if confronted with a similar predicament. In this way, imagination is absolutely central to 
effective moral vision. The spectator is a product of our imagination insofar as we are the ones 
who pose the very questions such a figure might ask. As such, the act of imagining can be 
hijacked and rerouted through an unreflective reliance on social convention. Our moral concerns, 
Smith argues, derive from an experience of sympathy with fellow human beings, but because 
there is a strong cultural component to standards of acceptable conduct, they often vary wildly 
from group to group according to differences of “custom.”  
To illustrate the tremendous power of custom, Smith points to the practice of infanticide 
by the Greeks: 
[T]he murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of 
Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstances 
of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to 
wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure. … Uninterrupted custom had by this 
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time so thoroughly authorized the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world 
tolerated this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought 
to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established custom, and upon 
this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by 
far-fetched considerations of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrates 
ought upon many occasions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion, and, 
with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks 
this practice with disapprobation.453 
 
Smith was deeply troubled at the apparent power of custom to so easily warp our latent capacity 
for sympathy. Whatever the terms, it is quite clear that Smith may as well have been writing 
about the widespread and unreflective use of nationalism as a guide for morals. His solution was 
to solicit “the eyes of the world” to help step outside the limiting confines of our behavior and 
consider what an impartial spectator would think.  
This last point is absolutely essential to Smith’s argument and the argument presented in 
this study: distance, literal and figurative, matters. The victims of violence feel it more strongly 
than the perpetrators of violence, who generally deny their actions are morally abhorrent. Yet 
both are as close a proximity to the act as possible. The immediate local cultural context in 
which violence occurs all too often provides a customary justification for suppressing sympathy, 
for rendering the violence excusable or invisible. There is a strong case here against ideologies 
like liberal-nationalism that demonstrate great resistance to external critique.  
For the committed nationalist, foreign views that contradict their own have little value. 
To the Israeli nationalist who supports the seemingly interminable occupation and colonization 
of Palestinian land, it surely makes little difference that much of the rest of the world 
unanimously opposes their government’s policies. To the Chinese nationalist who opposes 
Tibetan independence, we might expect similar resistance to external criticism. To the American 
nationalist who regards military interventions as a just and benign use of martial power, it comes 
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as a surprise and no small amount of irritation that others frequently see it differently. In each 
case, it is difficult to imagine nationalist dogmas crumbling away simply by inserting a healthy 
dose of the external spectator’s purported wisdom. Likewise, those who remain detached and 
distant from the violence in question are often unaware of its severity and lack the minimally 
comprehensible knowledge required for moral judgment. 
The role of moral philosophy, Murdoch argues, is not to provide comprehensive logical 
justification for a given course of action. “Philosophers,” she writes, “have always been trying to 
picture the human soul, and since morality needs such pictures and as science is … in no position 
to coerce morality, there seems no reason why philosophers should not go on attempting to fill in 
a systematic explanatory background to our ordinary moral life.”454 Moral philosophy should 
actually help us to become better. Murdoch’s solution to moral progress (i.e. attention) takes 
great effort and practice, but potentially rewards us with a method of making moral progress. 
Similarly, forcing ourselves to imagine Smith’s spectator enhances our ability to detect what 
might otherwise pass unnoticed, as if invisible. Like Murdoch, Smith prioritizes practical 
application above philosophical rigor. Pointing out the connections between Murdoch and Smith, 
Fleischacker argues that it “need not be the sole function of moral philosophers to provide a 
groundwork for the metaphysics of morality.”455 
Displaying, clarifying, and showing the internal connections in a way of thinking is also a 
philosophical task, even if one sets aside the question of whether the way of thinking is 
justified. … [Smith’s] astute and nuanced analysis of what goes into moral approval — of 
what sorts of factors the impartial spectator considers, of how it can deceive itself or 
otherwise go wrong, of how it develops and how it judges different virtues in different 
ways — is accomplishment enough for one philosopher, regardless of whether he 
adequately justifies the fact that we engage in such approval at all.456 
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“Smith,” Fleischacker writes, “was a moral phenomenologist.”457 While the spectator’s 
impartiality is a false dream, the effort to imagine what might constitute the moral horizon of an 
uninvolved outsider—an “unselfed” moral agent in Murdoch’s terms—might push us in the 
direction of Murdoch’s own ethical phenomenology: moral attention. 
Smith does not claim that an external spectator is infallible for that would imply a status 
independent of our own imagination from which it ultimately springs. Rather, Smith’s challenge 
insists that, difficulties notwithstanding, moral judgment simply cannot take place with any 
degree of certitude before at least attempting to step outside our narrow experience and consider 
a spectator. Individuals cannot judge the moral content of their actions; nor can groups. By at 
least stopping to imagine what an external spectator might think, we are forced to reflect on our 
own moral assumptions—our own limitations. As with Murdoch’s attention, the act of imagining 
a hypothetical spectator is intended to force reflection on one’s own obscure motives and 




Liberal-nationalism is likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future and by the time 
it finally passes into memory, another filter to moral vision will have already taken its place. The 
question is not how to escape ideology, as some strands are more resistant to self-criticism than 
others, but rather how to escape the kind of derivative moral insularity that would excuse the 
inexcusable. I have attempted to describe in a small way how liberal ideals have been reduced to 
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signifiers of national identity and how American identity is tethered to the institutions of state 
power and its secular shrines to lofty yet elusive values.  
Crucially, I argue that this phenomenon is not unique to the United States (though it may 
be more advanced) and that as the trend continues in other parts of the world, we should expect 
state violence to increasingly adopt the language of liberal universalism and human rights.458 As 
always, moral clarity requires vigilance, especially when it is so thoroughly clouded by the pomp 
and self-congratulations of liberal-nationalist discourse. Smith offers one way to pause for a 
moment and to reconsider our assumptions before arriving at a definitive moral judgment. If the 
unstated line that separates acceptable violence from unacceptable atrocity is to be reimagined 
and redrawn, then such a pause is surely necessary, if only to hear the cries of the suffering more 
clearly. 
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